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THESIS

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV'S "NEW THINKING":
IMPLICATIONS FOR WESTERN SECURITY

by

Kenneth L. Knotts, Jr.

June, 1991

Thesis Advisor:

Mikhail Tsypkin

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Mikhail Gorbachev's "New Thinking":
Implications For Western Security

by

Kenneth L. Knotts, Jr
Captain, U.S. Air Force
B.S., United States Air Force Academy, Colorado, 1983

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
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
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


Kenneth L. Knotts, Jr.

Approved by:



Mikhail Tsypkin, Thesis Advisor



Stephen A. Garrett, Second Reader



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Department of National Security Affairs

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines some of the most important policies encompassed within Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking." The author explores the economic incentives and shifting Soviet view of international relations which led Gorbachev to introduce his groundbreaking reforms. Primary emphasis is given to an in-depth analysis of the "defensive doctrine" and how the issues surrounding that doctrine will impact upon the future U.S.-Soviet security relationship. Special topics include: increasing evidence of changes under way in the structure of Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe; possible future Soviet force deployments inside the USSR, including the construction of "fortified regions," and the evolving U.S.-Soviet relationship in the most important theater of relations between the two countries--Europe. It is the author's contention that the central driving force behind all of Gorbachev's reforms was, and remains, a resuscitation of the Soviet economy. The author concludes that ultimate Soviet objectives under "new thinking" will remain uncertain, and that the only prudent U.S. policy is to bargain in a vigorous but businesslike manner with Gorbachev to further reduce the Soviet threat, while retaining defenses sufficient to react to possible future Kremlin backtracking.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. STEPS LEADING TO THE SELECTION OF THIS TOPIC

Within months of Mikhail Gorbachev's ascendancy to the post of General Secretary, the Soviet press was deluged with a flood of information dealing with topics which varied from loosening the bonds of secrecy surrounding Stalin's purges to open discussions of drug abuse and prostitution. A dominant theme which emerged during this period was a revolutionary new Soviet outlook on domestic and international affairs. This broad range of political, economic and military reforms has become known both within the Soviet Union and abroad as Gorbachev's "new political thinking," or simply "new thinking." From the outset, this new program triggered intense debate as to its origins, its validity, and its implications, both for the USSR and for the West.

An in-depth analysis of the overall phenomenon of "new thinking" is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, in these pages I will concentrate on what I consider the most prominent implications of Gorbachev's military objectives within "new thinking," and address the most significant economic and political factors which in turn affect and result from those military issues. Particular emphasis will be given to examining the hotly debated "defensive doctrine," which was declared by the Warsaw Pact in May 1987.

B. THE PROBLEM

The purposes of this thesis are to:

- examine the origins of economic and military objectives within Gorbachev's "new thinking" and the controversy surrounding those issues;

- investigate changes in force structure now under way in Soviet forces in Europe as well as possible future deployments of Soviet forces inside the USSR;
- and to analyze the evolving superpower relationship in Europe in an attempt to determine its impact on future western, especially American, security policies.

C. METHODOLOGY

In preparing this study, I have drawn materials from a wide variety of books, journal articles and newspaper accounts. I also relied heavily on Soviet articles which were translated and published by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), as well as those which I read and translated myself from original Soviet sources. I interpreted the information from those sources and blended them with my own experiences from almost ten years of studying the Soviet Union, to construct this thesis.

Two final notes of explanation are necessary at this point. The reader will note that I address only changes in the Soviet Army force structure, and not those directly affecting either the Soviet Air Forces or Soviet Navy. I chose to do so in order to restrict the research for this work to a manageable amount of material, and also because the Soviet Union is primarily a land power. Simply put, with the notable exception of strategic nuclear delivery systems, the majority of Soviet air force and naval assets primarily support the nation's ground forces, and the nation's military doctrine is therefore centrally focused on land warfare. Finally, in Chapter Seven, I examine the evolving U.S.-Soviet relationship not on a worldwide basis, but in the context of Europe. Again, my purpose in doing so was to make the amount of research material manageable and to highlight the European Continent as the most crucial arena of U.S.-Soviet relations.

II. THE SOVIET SETTING IN 1985

A. THE LEGACY INHERITED BY GORBACHEV

Since he took over the helm of the Soviet Union in March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev ¹ has gone to great lengths to overcome the barriers which he initially faced. Noted Sovietologist Seweryn Bialer observes,

The universe in which Gorbachev took the reins of the Soviet Union was one in which his country had no major friends and was strapped with an unruly and economically and politically sick 'alliance' of satellites and semisatellites. The evaluation of the existing situation by the new leadership led to the beginning of major revisions and Soviet thought and actions with regard to their security and foreign policy. ²

This major policy revision culminated in a revolutionary new Soviet outlook on domestic and international affairs. The resulting broad range of reforms has become known inside the USSR and abroad as Gorbachev's "new political thinking" or simply "new thinking." This program cannot be easily defined, but is perhaps best characterized as a fundamentally more flexible approach to dealing with a wide range of domestic and international concerns. Most western scholars emphasize Gorbachev's work to resuscitate the lagging Soviet economy as the central driving force to all of his efforts. Dr. Seweryn Bialer believes this economic explanation to be oversimplified. In his article entitled "New

¹Author's Note: At the time he assumed power in March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In March 1990, a new post of "Executive President" was established in the USSR and Gorbachev was elected to that post. As such, he now holds the title of "President of the USSR."

²Seweryn Bialer, "The Soviet Union and the West: Security and Foreign Policy," in Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1988), 457.

Thinking' and Soviet Foreign Policy," Bialer argues that the entire Soviet system—politically, socially, economically, and even culturally—was in crisis. While the West was making astounding gains in minicomputers and microcircuitry, the USSR could not even meet basic consumer needs. A feeling emerged that, if the Soviet economic base were not revived, the USSR would not enter the twenty-first century as a superpower worthy of the name. Seweryn Bialer notes that this perceived external crisis "...gave a sense of urgency to Soviet reform plans and reinforced the conviction of the necessity to concentrate on domestic tasks." ³

In March 1985, it fell to Mikhail Gorbachev to deal with the deepening domestic crisis. In the beginning of his tenure, it was far from certain just how Gorbachev would go about trying to resolve the problems which he faced. Since the reforms which have emerged in the past five years have now been so closely linked personally with Gorbachev, I believe it necessary to briefly explore just how Gorbachev was selected, among a number of possible successors, to carry forward the CPSU's program.

Although the full story may forever remain a mystery, Gorbachev's rise to prominence is most often linked to his sponsorship by longtime KGB chief and former CPSU general secretary Yuri Andropov. Gorbachev biographer Thomas Butson writes that, during the waning years of Leonid Brezhnev's tenure in office, Yuri Andropov became increasingly upset with the widespread corruption and inefficiency in the Soviet system. In his positions of KGB chief and Politburo member and in his brief tenure as general secretary, Andropov repeatedly sought to combat corruption and inefficiency, especially in agriculture. His concerns in this area were shared by the charismatic young

³Seweryn Bialer, "New Thinking' and Soviet Foreign Policy," Survival (July/August 1988): 293.

party boss from Andropov's home region of Stavropol--Mikhail Gorbachev--and Andropov was so impressed by Gorbachev that he became his political sponsor. ⁴ Author Dusko Doder writes of how Andropov arranged to have Gorbachev introduced to Leonid Brezhnev in August 1978 while Brezhnev was en route to a vacation in the southern USSR. Brezhnev must have been favorably impressed because in the following November Mikhail Gorbachev was summoned to Moscow and elected as a secretary of the Central Committee.⁵

During Yuri Andropov's short reign as general secretary, Gorbachev emerged as Andropov's trusted adviser and chosen successor. Upon Andropov's death in February, 1984, however, Brezhnev protege Konstantin Chernenko was elected general secretary instead of Gorbachev, and the latter's meteoric rise to power seemed for a moment to fizzle. Although passed over for the party's top post, Gorbachev is reported to have remained in good stead with the CPSU leadership and was widely acknowledged to be the so-called "second secretary," an unofficial title indicating that Gorbachev was second in stature only to Chernenko. ⁶ Even so, in the last days of Chernenko's reign it seemed increasingly doubtful that Gorbachev would receive the party's nod to succeed Chernenko. As Chernenko lay on his deathbed, rumors began to circulate in Moscow that either former Leningrad party leader Grigori Romanov or former Moscow party boss Viktor Grishin was

⁴Thomas Butson, Gorbachev: A Biography (New York: Stein and Day, Publishers, 1985), 15-16.

⁵Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, Gorbachev: Heretic in the Kremlin (New York: Viking Press, 1990), 39.

⁶Thomas Butson, Gorbachev: A Biography (New York: Stein and Day, 1985), 115.

Chernenko's designated successor.⁷ According to author Dusko Doder, in the leadership struggle which ensued after Chernenko's death, the crucial swing vote in choosing between Grishin and Gorbachev fell to the party's elder statesman, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Other key supporters for Gorbachev's candidacy reportedly included one of the membership's more conservative members, Yegor Ligachev, and KGB chief Victor Chebrikov.⁸ In his memoirs, Gromyko noted that he had been strongly impressed by Gorbachev's outstanding statesmanship, his farsightedness and his strong conviction for what he believed was best for his country.⁹ Whether for these or other reasons, Gromyko was apparently convinced that the ideas expressed by Gorbachev represented the best hopes for the USSR, and he backed Gorbachev's candidacy. (Gorbachev also likely offered to support Gromyko as a candidate for the presidency of the USSR, in return for the latter's support.) Perhaps seeking to reassure some of the other leaders who might still have doubts about Gorbachev's capabilities, Gromyko in his nominating speech for Gorbachev spoke glowingly of the younger man and said of him, "Comrades, this man has a nice smile, but he's got iron teeth."¹⁰ Gromyko is said to have later remarked to another high official that he was sincerely concerned that the USSR was drifting

⁷Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, Gorbachev: Heretic in the Kremlin (New York: Viking Press, 1990), 60-61.

⁸Ibid., 62.

⁹Andrei Gromyko, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday Publishers, 1989), 341-42.

¹⁰Dusko Doder, Shadows and Whispers: Power Politics Inside the Kremlin from Brezhnev to Gorbachev (New York: Random House Publishers, 1986), 266-67.

dangerously and that he felt that his siding with the younger and more vigorous Gorbachev was an act of great patriotism.¹¹

Perhaps even more intriguing than the story of Gorbachev's rise to power is some of the speculation on the origins of his political philosophy and why he chose to adopt as his own the comparatively revolutionary reform programs which have emerged under "new thinking." One Gorbachev biographer, Dusko Doder, asserts that Gorbachev's deep concerns for his country's problems, especially in the economic realm, are rooted in Gorbachev's upbringing in the largely agricultural district of Stavropol.¹² Writer David Remnick claims that the era of political and ideological thaw under Nikita Khrushchev had an even more profound influence on the young Gorbachev and his entire generation.¹³ Gorbachev's college friend, Zdenek Mlynar, states that even before Khrushchev came to power, Gorbachev had already begun to privately criticize the harsh Stalinist system and the political dogma which they were required to study.¹⁴ After Gorbachev arrived in Moscow in late 1978, he was closely associated with the anti-corruption and other reform campaigns backed by his patron Yuri Andropov both before and during the latter's reign as general secretary.¹⁵ Since then, Gorbachev has become most famous for his adoption

¹¹Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, Gorbachev: Heretic in the Kremlin (New York: Viking Press, 1990), 64-65.

¹²*Ibid.*, 5-7.

¹³David Remnick, "The Pioneers of Perestroika," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 19-25 March 1990, 8-9.

¹⁴Zdenek Mlynar, in an interview in L'Unita, 9 April 1985. Quoted in Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, Gorbachev: Heretic in the Kremlin (New York: Viking Publishers, Inc., 1990), 11.

¹⁵See Chapters 1-3 of Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, Gorbachev: Heretic in the Kremlin (New York: Viking Publishers, 1990).

of the reform programs which fall under the broad umbrella of "new thinking." As it happens, Gorbachev did not develop these theories himself, but adopted as his own programs originated by others. For example, many of the principles which later formed the heart of "perestroika" were pioneered by a small group of economists working in the Siberian city of Akademgorodok. This team, which included such notables as Tatyana Zaslavskaya and Abel Aganbegyan, first became famous in 1983 when it released the so-called "Novosibirsk Report." This report, initially sponsored by Yuri Andropov, provided the essential framework for "perestroika."¹⁶ Gorbachev, then, did not originate these programs, but he still must be given credit for recognizing their potential and backing them. Granted, it may be argued that he did not have too much of a choice; nothing else seemed to be working at the time, and his country was rapidly approaching an economic collapse.

As if the dismal domestic situation did not pose enough problems for Gorbachev, he found Soviet foreign affairs in equally dire straits. During the 1970s, the Soviet Union had emerged as a world superpower and had been recognized as an equal to the United States during the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, or SALT negotiations, of that era. Moscow had assumed this superpower status, according to Soviet claims, since by the end of the 1960s a concept known as the "correlation of forces" had moved irreversibly in the favor of socialism. To understand why the "correlation of forces" had, by the time Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power only fifteen years later, once again shifted away from the favor of socialism, entails a closer examination of this principle.

¹⁶David Remnick, "The Pioneers of Perestroika," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 19-25 March 1990, 8-9. See also "Z" (pseud.), "To the Stalin Mausoleum," Daedalus (Winter 1989/90): 322.

As explained by Dr. Robert Legvold, Director of Columbia University's Harriman Institute, the concept of the "correlation of forces" is "...an essentially economic, rather than military, notion of power."¹⁷ The "correlation of forces" encompasses a vast array of components, incorporating such diverse factors as the momentum of the worldwide struggle for national liberation, the tenor of the world peace movement, and even the militancy of capitalist trade unions. In addition, the four traditionally recognized tracks of a nation's foreign policy--political, cultural, military and economic--are core elements of this panorama of forces. Under Leonid Brezhnev, the military had dominated the Kremlin's foreign policy. Before Brezhnev, Khrushchev had boasted of the superiority of Soviet science and had even proclaimed that the USSR's economy would quickly overtake and surpass that of the United States. By the time Gorbachev took power, however, all this had changed. Although the military component of Soviet power had remained intact and had in fact expanded throughout the 1970s, the same could not be said of the economic factor.

B. ECONOMIC RISE AND FALL

During his tenure, Nikita Khrushchev had good reason to be optimistic about the Soviet economy, which seemed to boom during the late 1950s and the 1960s. The country's gross national product, or GNP, grew 4.5 times between the mid-1950s and the mid-1980s.¹⁸ This statement is somewhat misleading, though. During the same period, growth rates continually declined from a high of seven percent in the 1960s to under two percent in the

¹⁷Robert Legvold, "War, Weapons, and Soviet Foreign Policy," in Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy, ed. Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1988), 101.

¹⁸Richard Parker, "Assessing Perestroika," World Policy Journal 6 (Spring 1989): 268.

early 1980s. The decline in overall growth has been accompanied by a parallel decline in productivity growth.¹⁹ According to a 1989 study published in the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco's FRBSF Weekly Letter, the annual growth in labor productivity fell from 6.2 percent in the period from 1966-78 to only three percent in the period 1981-84. As a result, total factor productivity growth fell from a high of 3.2 percent from 1966-78 to a low of 1.1 percent in the early 1980s.²⁰ Other western economists have painted an even bleaker picture; according to economist Anders Aslund, the overall Soviet economic growth rate plummeted to zero perhaps as early as 1978.²¹

The resulting economic situation is bleak. Shortages are endemic. The few consumer goods which are available are poor in quality and are usually overpriced. The typical Soviet mother is estimated to have to stand in shopping lines for two to three hours each day. Basic commodities and even simple foods are often hard to find. Medications like aspirin--considered everyday household items in the West--are scarce, and goods such as antibiotics are generally available only to the privileged or through the black market. There is a tremendous housing shortage. The list of problems seems endless. In short, to characterize the Soviet economic situation as gloomy is to risk grossly understating the issue.

The sense of decline created by the economic stagnation lies at the heart of Gorbachev's impetus for revolutionary reform. In his book Perestroika, Mikhail Gorbachev described his country's alarming economic plunge in strikingly pessimistic terms. He

¹⁹Ibid., 269.

²⁰Ramon Moreno, "Why Perestroika?", FRBSF Weekly Letter, 3 March 1989, 3.

²¹Anders Aslund, Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 15.

observed, "A country that was once quickly closing on the world's advanced nations began to lose one position after another."²² Thomas Naylor, of Duke University, contends that the world situation has convinced Gorbachev to reevaluate the relative priority of military policy over economic factors. Naylor writes,

Gorbachev seems to have learned from Japan that the rules of international politics have changed and that the number of nuclear warheads in a nation's arsenal is not nearly so important a measure of political power as it once was. Economic clout has become a more important indicator of political influence than military might.²³

According to Robert Legvold, Gorbachev sees the national security of the USSR tied directly to the future vigor of the domestic economy. Dr. Legvold proclaims that Gorbachev's domestic reform program is his most important foreign policy statement. Legvold notes,

Gorbachev has said since he came to prominence that, unless something is done to correct economic trends, the Soviet Union will not enter the twenty-first century as a great power worthy of the name. Military might will not do it alone.²⁴

C. GORBACHEV'S RESPONSE: "PERESTROIKA"

To resuscitate the staggering Soviet economy, Gorbachev in 1987 unveiled his bold new program of economic reforms called "perestroika," or "restructuring." The large

²²Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1987), 19.

²³Thomas H. Naylor, The Gorbachev Strategy: Opening the Closed Society (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, Inc., 1988), ix.

²⁴Robert Legvold, "War, Weapons, and Soviet Foreign Policy," in Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy, ed. Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1988), 102.

majority of the original program became effective in June 1987 when the Supreme Soviet approved by decree two laws, "The Basic Provisions for Fundamentally Reorganizing Economic Management" and the "Law on State Enterprise."²⁵ According to Richard Ericson, six intermediate objectives can be discerned in this sweeping package of reforms:

- an emphasis on technological modernization, raising the level of Soviet technology to developed world standards;
- modernizing organizational structures and management methods;
- eliminating the inherently wasteful nature of Soviet production and distribution activity;
- modernizing the sectoral structure of the economy;
- modifying the structure of consumption and raising the standard of living for common people, and
- bringing the USSR into the mainstream of the world economy in the direct sense of participation commensurate with its size and importance.²⁶

Ericson believes that achieving these highly ambitious intermediate goals demands that, in the short term, Gorbachev acquires a breathing space to allow the reforms to work, that he gains and maintains political support for those leaders who favor reform, and that he releases or acquires resources to devote to "perestroika."

Where will Gorbachev find the vast quantities of resources required for "perestroika" to succeed? Economist Robert Campbell has conducted a survey of Mikhail Gorbachev's writings and speeches in an effort to determine what those sources will be. According to

²⁵Anders Aslund, Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 111.

²⁶Richard E. Ericson, "Soviet Economic Reforms: The Motivation and Content of Perestroika," Journal of International Affairs 42 (Spring 1989): 318.

Campbell, the initial source of the needed intensive growth must come through either resource savings or increased productivity.²⁷ Toward these goals, Gorbachev had instituted, as early as 1986, campaigns aimed at improving worker discipline, combatting corruption and discouraging the use of alcohol. All these programs have received mixed reviews.

As a second means to gain more inputs, Gorbachev emphasized that productivity improvements can be accomplished by renovating the economy's huge capital stock. Campbell observes that "...existing productive facilities embody obsolete technologies that waste labor and intermediate inputs and bind the economy to the production of outdated products."²⁸ To improve productivity, planners must increase the ratio of labor to capital and design more energy-efficient production facilities. Four technologies and their associated hardware—microelectronics, computers, measuring and control instrumentation, and information processing—have been identified by planners as having special catalytic properties for transforming the technology of all the other equipment-producing branches. Production of these kinds of hardware therefore must grow faster than the average rate for all other machinery.²⁹ It is no coincidence that all four of the specialized technologies crucial to rapid economic transformation are derived from the economic sector which was consolidated in 1987 under the new Bureau of Machine-building. This bureau was set up under the Council of Ministers in July of that year after two pairs of similar ministries were

²⁷Robert W. Campbell, "The Soviet Future: Gorbachev and the Economy," in Gorbachev and the Soviet Future (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1988), 47.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 47-48.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 48-49.

merged.³⁰ Gorbachev himself has proclaimed that the new machine-building sector will be "...the most vital and urgent task for us, even a top priority."³¹

D. THE MILITARY FACTOR

The rapid modernization of capital stock, and especially drawing of resources from the machine-building sector, is bound to cause friction between Gorbachev and the traditional chief benefactor of the machine-building sector, the Soviet military. Soviet consumers and the nation's economy as a whole have for decades taken a back seat to military interests. Furthermore, military interests have long dominated the USSR's foreign policy priorities as well. Soviet leaders have generally placed inordinate weight on military objectives and strongly heeded the advice of top Soviet military men.

Under Gorbachev, the Soviet Armed Forces have not enjoyed the preeminent position which they did under previous Kremlin leaders. One likely contributing factor is that Gorbachev believes that Soviet military adventurism in the 1970s was largely responsible for the dismal economic situation which he inherited. Military ventures in Angola and in the Horn of Africa had gained little for the USSR and had almost certainly further destabilized the international environment. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 had finally pushed the U.S. too far; after a decade of hopeful strategic arms negotiations under the umbrella of detente, U.S.-Soviet relations in 1985 seemed at an impasse. As Robert Legvold notes, "Nowhere in the fusion of arms and Soviet policy was

³⁰Anders Aslund, Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 114.

³¹Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1987), 93.

more damage done to U.S.-Soviet relations over the last fifteen years than in the Soviet exploitation of force in Third World crises." ³²

Gorbachev's evaluation of the grim domestic and foreign policy situation led him to adopt an unprecedented outlook on internal and foreign affairs. He is the first Soviet leader to say and to think that his country cannot pursue its own security at the expense of others, particularly that of the United States. ³³ By introducing "new thinking," which encapsulates all of these revolutionary ideas, Gorbachev hoped to break the domestic and foreign policy deadlock which he inherited. He laid the groundwork for his new policies in his report to the Twenty-Seventh CPSU Party Congress in February 1986.

An excellent analysis of Gorbachev's speech is offered by Charles Glickham of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Mr. Glickham details five major points he derived from Gorbachev's address:

- a recognition of the existence of "global problems" that could only be resolved by "cooperation on a worldwide scale;"
- a new, and surprising, stress on the interdependence of states;
- the elaboration of a set of "principled considerations" derived from an examination of the present world situation;
- a recognition that if the nuclear arms race were to continue, "...even parity will cease to be a factor of political-military restraint...;" and
- a harsh condemnation of the rigidity of previous Soviet foreign policy.³⁴

³²Robert Legvold, "War, Weapons, and Soviet Foreign Policy," in Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy, ed. Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1988), 125.

³³Ibid., 103.

³⁴Charles Glickham, "Sources of Security Reconsidered," in Soviet-East European Survey 1986-87, ed. Vojtech Mastny (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1988), 120.

From his analysis, Mr. Glickham determined that "new thinking" consisted of three basic components. The first was a revitalization of foreign policy by explicitly rejecting certain aspects of policy under Brezhnev and emphasizing flexibility in the implementation of policy objectives. Second, two innovative concepts--global problems and interdependence--had been placed on the highest political agenda. And third, a reevaluation had occurred at the highest level on the sources of national security.³⁵ This reevaluation had yielded the basic conclusions which Gorbachev presented to the Twenty-Seventh CPSU Party Congress. Gorbachev's central points were that the Soviet Union could not in a modern world imperiled by nuclear war achieve its own security at the expense of other nations, and that Soviet foreign policy must henceforth present a multifaceted approach, with more emphasis placed on political rather than military objectives. Glickham interprets Gorbachev's call for a multifaceted approach as a tacit admission that, under Brezhnev, "...the USSR had relied too heavily on the military factor alone in its foreign policy." ³⁶

It is no coincidence that the Soviet military under Gorbachev has not enjoyed the dominant role which it did under previous leaders. Even at Konstantin Chernenko's funeral, only a few military officials were included in the government delegation. The new general secretary has also dealt with the military in far less subtle ways. When West German pilot Mathias Rust landed his Cessna 172 in Red Square on 28 May 1987, Gorbachev lost no time in sacking the defense minister, Marshal Sergei Sokolov, and the commander of the Air Defense Forces, Marshal A. Koldunov. Taking advantage of this

³⁵Ibid., 121.

³⁶Ibid., 122-23.

opportunity to peacefully purge the military command structure of Brezhnev holdovers, Gorbachev named Army General Dmitri Yazov as the new defense minister. Yazov, although generally an ally to Gorbachev, was only recently promoted to the rank of marshal, and still has not been given full membership in the Politburo, as have some previous defense ministers. Many western analysts interpret this non-granting of higher status as further evidence that the Soviet commander-in-chief is seeking to diminish the military's role. Even though it was delayed for almost three years, Yazov's promotion on 28 April 1990 ³⁷ will likely be interpreted by some observers as evidence of a resurgence of the military's influence. At least two respected analysts disagree. Stephen Foye asserts that Yazov's promotion "...represents another effort by Gorbachev to placate his disgruntled High Command." ³⁸ Stephen Meyer concurs with Foye's assessment, describing Yazov's promotion not as a sign of rising influence, but one of tokenism. Meyer claims that the promotion of the defense minister is "...more likely a gold watch for an impending retirement." ³⁹ As of this writing, no convincing evidence has emerged which would suggest a reversal in Gorbachev's efforts to reduce the profile of the military.

But the controversy surrounding today's Soviet military does not end there. A great debate has arisen inside the USSR and abroad regarding what role Gorbachev intends for the Soviet Armed Forces to play in the future, the nature of revolutionary new military concepts, and how the military-industrial complex can contribute to Gorbachev's planned

³⁷Radio Liberty Daily Report, 30 April 1990. Yazov, although now a Marshal, will be referred to in these pages as Army General, since that was the rank he held at the time.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Stephen M. Meyer, "The Army Isn't Running Gorbachev," New York Times, 8 May 1990, A19.

reforms. The next chapter will examine some of the methods through which Gorbachev is attempting to divert military resources into the lagging civilian economy.

III. THE MAIN OBJECTIVE: CONVERSION OF DEFENSE RESOURCES INTO THE CIVILIAN ECONOMY

A. GORBACHEV'S MILITARY-RELATED OBJECTIVES IN "PERESTROIKA"

The previous chapter described the increasingly abysmal condition of the Soviet domestic economy and explained how economic concerns are a central driving force to Gorbachev's reform programs. This chapter will describe how Gorbachev intends to divert resources from the economy's military and military-industrial sectors in an effort to stimulate the civilian sector. Other issues addressed will include the dependence of the success of these measures on that of the overall economy, and how these programs may impact the Soviet military establishment.

Central to Gorbachev's plans to acquire resources for rebuilding the Soviet domestic economy are two security policies—"reasonable sufficiency" and the "defensive doctrine"—which will be examined at length in Chapter Five. These two programs will serve a number of purposes simultaneously. A primary goal will be to reduce defensive commitments abroad and decrease military expenditures in order to make available additional resources to the process of economic modernization. These new principles will also serve as potent propaganda tools for convincing foreign leaders and their publics of the Kremlin's peaceful intentions. Gorbachev also undoubtedly wishes to buy time for his domestic reforms to take effect by decreasing international tensions. More directly connected with his economic reforms, however, are Gorbachev's appeals to Soviet military leaders that they, too, will benefit from new technological developments as the economic modernization program begins to bear fruit. During the first three years of the Gorbachev

era, most Soviet commanders seemed to have supported Gorbachev's reforms. According to F. Stephen Larrabee of the Institute for East-West Security Studies, the Soviet military recognizes that a strong economy is a prerequisite for the maintenance of the Soviet Union's status as a first-class power. They acknowledge that the crucial issue "...is not gross output but technological change and innovation, particularly the acceleration of progress in high-technology areas such as computers, microprocessors and electronics."⁴⁰ These sectors are considered critical in ensuring that the Soviet Union will be able to compete with the United States in "leading technologies" such as precision-guided munitions, sensors and electronic guidance systems, which will dominate tomorrow's high-technology battlefields.

B. THE BURDEN OF DEFENSE

Since the first days of his administration, Gorbachev has continually warned his military leaders that the staggering economy must be attended to if the base of Soviet military power is to be preserved. It is rumored that Gorbachev flew to Minsk in July 1985, just four months after taking office, to hold a secret meeting with his key military leaders. The exact details of that meeting remain a mystery, but Gorbachev reportedly warned the military chiefs not to expect large increases in the defense budget.⁴¹

Defense spending continues to be a key bone of contention. Western analysts estimate that between 1965 and 1976, Soviet military spending increased by nearly three percent annually. A Central Intelligence Agency report presented to the Joint Economic

⁴⁰F. Stephen Larrabee, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military," Foreign Affairs 66 (Summer 1988): 1017.

⁴¹Ibid., 1016.

Committee of Congress in 1976 claimed that Moscow was spending fifteen percent of its \$900 billion annual GNP on defense expenditures.⁴² This staggering sum was roughly double the amount invested in the civilian sector (about 26 percent of GNP).⁴³ Although the annual growth rate decreased in the late 1970s to just over two percent, the share of GNP devoted to defense actually increased, accounting for between fifteen and seventeen percent of GNP by the early 1980s, compared to about twelve percent earlier.⁴⁴ (More recent statistics on Soviet defense spending are also considered in Chapter Five in relation to indications of a change in overall Soviet military doctrine.)

Defense outlays have traditionally been a tremendous drain on the Soviet economy in more than simply monetary terms. It is estimated that weapons procurement consumes about one-third of machinery production and even larger shares of the high-technology sectors, such as precision instruments and electronics.⁴⁵ The disproportionately large share of industrial and high-technology production allocated to defense has diverted resources from other sectors, has sacrificed capital which might have otherwise been devoted to future innovation, and helps to account for the low growth of productivity. Large amounts of the highest-quality materials have been diverted to the military sector, along with some of the most talented workers. The military's priority claim on the nation's most productive and valuable resources has deprived the civilian side of the economy of

⁴²The Soviet Union (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1982), 69.

⁴³U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Estimated Soviet Defense Spending: Trends and Prospects (Washington, D.C.: CIA, SR-78-10121, 1985), 1.

⁴⁴U.S. Congress, Subcommittee on National Security Economics of the Joint Economic Committee, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China-1986, 6. Report given by CIA and DIA on March 19, 1987 to the 100th Congress, 1st Session.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 123.

key inputs needed for rapid technological advance. Vital components such as microelectronics, computers and information-processing equipment, have before gone mostly to defense industries.

C. THE MILITARY LINKAGE TO "PERESTROIKA"

Since he assumed power in 1985, there have been growing signs that Gorbachev sees a deep interconnection between his program of economic modernization and the need to restructure the military. Not only has Gorbachev reduced the profile of the military in important forums, but he also apparently intends to shift vast resources from the defense establishment into the faltering civilian economy. Dale Herspring observes,

In addition to downplaying public support for the military budget, the Gorbachev regime has taken the unprecedented step of calling on the armed forces to make a major contribution—out of their own budgets—in upgrading the civilian economy.⁴⁶

The significance of this move is underscored by the fact that some of the most powerful men in the USSR have called for direct military support to implement "perestroika." Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov, speaking on 18 June 1986, noted that the leadership is determined to involve all machine-building industries, including the defense industries, in the building-up of light industry.⁴⁷ Another Politburo member, Lev Zaikov, reiterated Ryzhkov's message while in Irkutsk in July 1986:

⁴⁶Dale Herspring, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military," Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: The Academy of Political Science, 1987): 49.

⁴⁷Nikolai Ryzhkov, "Concerning the State Plan for Economic and Social Development from 1986-90," Pravda, 19 Nov 1986. Quoted in Dale Herspring, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military," Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: The Academy of Political Science, 1987): 49.

It has been decided that the military sector of industry will not only take an active part in the production of civilian production and nationally needed goods, but also cooperate in the technical reequipping of light and food industries, public services and trade.⁴⁸

Gorbachev intends, therefore, for the military-industrial sector to play a vital role in economic restructuring. Since he was impressed that the Soviet defense sector has traditionally performed so much better than the civilian sector, Gorbachev originally wanted to use the defense sector as a model against which the civilian economy's performance could be judged. In a book published in 1988, Sergei Zamascikov described his findings from extensive research on the Soviet reform movement. He outlined three major ways in which defense industries were intended by Gorbachev to be used to transform the civilian sector:

- Nikolai Ryzhkov, a former top defense manager, was made the chairman of the Council of Ministers and put in charge of economic restructuring;
- the system of independent quality-control bodies formerly used only in defense sectors was introduced into civilian industries; and
- two new "super ministries," the Agricultural-Industrial Complex and the Bureau of Machine-building, were patterned after a military-industrial organizational model.⁴⁹

For reasons that will be explained in a later section of this chapter, the original plan was largely abandoned in 1988. However, a review of Soviet goals under this program is

⁴⁸Lev Zaikov, "A Tribute to the Motherland—Stimulus for New Progress," Pravda, 29 June 1986. Quoted in Dale Fierspring, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military," Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: The Academy of Political Science, 1987): 49.

⁴⁹Sergei Zamascikov, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military," in Gorbachev and the Soviet Future (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1988), 66-67.

instructive in understanding some of the major factors which will determine the ultimate success or failure of "perestroika."

A central element in Gorbachev's reform campaign was to have been sharply upgrading those crucial industries which produce machinery and equipment that in turn would modernize a host of other industries. This proved to be a gargantuan, and apparently largely futile, task. To accomplish what Nikolai Ryzhkov called the "retooling and reconstruction of existing production," the Soviet leaders intended to double the retirement rate of capital stock and increase capital investment in the machine-building sector by eighty percent during the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, in relation to the preceding five-year period. The magnitude of this effort can be appreciated when you realize that it would have required replacing up to one-half of the nation's machinery stock with new equipment by 1990.⁵⁰ Soviet planners established lofty targets for raising product quality during the period from 1986-90; they claimed that by 1990 eighty-five to ninety percent of all machinery would meet world standards.⁵¹ The newly installed equipment was to have included doubling the use of lasers, plasmas and other "progressive" technologies, and adopting digital electronics, robots and a whole host of other highly productive devices and techniques.⁵² By implementing this wide range of reforms and installing vast quantities of new capital, the USSR hoped to increase factor productivity, to sharply increase labor productivity and to encourage domestic production of high-quality, high-

⁵⁰Alan B. Sherr, The Other Side of Arms Control: Soviet Objectives in the Gorbachev Era (Boston: Unwin Hyman, Inc., 1988), 50.

⁵¹U.S. Congress, Subcommittee on National Security Economics of the Joint Economic Committee, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China-1986, 23. Report by the CIA and DIA on March 19, 1987, to the 100th Congress, 1st Session, 1987.

⁵²*Ibid.*

technology machines and equipment. A compelling reason for this effort was to halt the deterioration of Soviet research and development, or R&D, which had occurred at least in part due to the massive imports of foreign technology under detente in the 1970s.⁵³ By increasing the domestic R&D effort, the Soviet leaders intended to break the cycle of domestic stagnation, reduce dependency on outside infusions of equipment and technology, and rejuvenate Soviet production of high-quality goods.

D. THE PROBLEM OF RESOURCE CONVERSION

The question of transferring large quantities of resources from defense industries to the civilian sector is apparently complex and uncertain. Author Alan Sherr has found several factors which may explain some of the difficulties already encountered by the Soviets. First, these two spheres of economic activity have in the past operated under very different rules and conditions. Western economists have long described the Soviet system as a "dual economy" featuring tight controls on defense-related items and virtually no quality controls on other products. Second, a possible implication of the present split system is that the part of the machine-building sector dedicated to serving defense needs has become so specialized that it could not easily transfer its services to the civilian sector if ordered to do so.⁵⁴ Over time, this changeover could be accomplished, but time is a precious commodity to Gorbachev. Alan Sherr reports that an even more compelling implication is that the defense sector is designed to take advantage of high-quality machinery and equipment when, in general, the civilian sector could not efficiently absorb

⁵³Alan B. Sherr, The Other Side of Arms Control: Soviet Objectives in the Gorbachev Era (Boston: Unwin Hyman, Inc., 1988), 51.

⁵⁴Ibid., 52-53.

such resources.⁵⁵ It is evident that merely shifting even huge amounts of resources from the defense sector into the civilian economy will not guarantee the improvements which Gorbachev desires.

E. THE ROLE OF ARMS CONTROL

Another facet of Gorbachev's strategy to reinvigorate the economy—as well as his campaign to improve international relations—lies in the area of arms control. A hallmark of Gorbachev's foreign policy to date has been his vigorous arms negotiations and streamlining and enervation of the arms control process. Success in arms negotiations brings multiple benefits to Gorbachev's reform program. Achievements in negotiations such as the signing of the "Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter-Range Missiles" with the U.S. in December 1987, increase Gorbachev's prestige and his political capital at home and abroad. Arms negotiations not only help to stabilize the international climate, but also secure for Gorbachev badly needed time for his domestic reforms to take effect. (In addition, a not insignificant factor is that successful arms agreements and other foreign policy victories tend to divert Soviet public attention away from troubles at home.) Improved international relations engender a spirit of cooperation and encourage foreign investment in the Soviet Union. New business ventures inside the USSR deliver badly needed technology and additional capital to the country. Finally, any resources freed from defense commitments—such as monetary outlays, equipment and manpower—subsequently become available for use in the civilian economy.

However, just as there are complications in transferring technology from the defense sector into the civilian economy, one should not assume that resources freed in deep

⁵⁵Ibid.

reductions of offensive nuclear missiles, for example, will automatically invigorate the Soviet civilian economy. Alan Sherr has extensively researched the issue of what impact freeing large amounts of such resources will have upon the Soviet civilian sector. He has determined that the amount of resources dedicated to strategic nuclear weapons amounted to only slightly more than ten percent of total defense spending. After extensive calculations, Sherr projected that a total elimination of the entire Soviet ICBM force, and the shutting down of all existing ICBM production facilities, would result in a savings equal in magnitude to nearly one percent of Soviet GNP. ⁵⁶

Since a total elimination of all Soviet ICBMs is highly improbable, Sherr also computed the savings made available if only fifty percent of those nuclear missiles were eliminated. At first glance, the result would appear to amount to one-half of one percent of GNP; however, actual savings would be even less, because they would be realized largely in the forms of operational and maintenance costs of older weapon systems rather than in the research, development, procurement, and operating costs for new missiles. In the final analysis, Sherr estimates that a fifty percent reduction in missiles would yield an overall savings of substantially less than one-fourth of one percent of GNP. ⁵⁷ In strictly monetary terms, then, Sherr declared that resource allocations based on this magnitude of savings in defense would have almost no impact on overall economic growth in the near term.

Alan Sherr then took his analysis one step farther; he examined the hypothesis that reductions in nuclear weapons could have an effect on the economic transformation not

⁵⁶Ibid., 52-53.

⁵⁷Ibid., 53-54.

through strictly monetary considerations, but if the resources freed in this manner were the same ones most crucial to relieving bottlenecks in the Soviet civilian sector. In this regard, Sherr sought to determine resources that were currently consumed by the military sector which:

- are sorely needed for machine-building;
- are not readily available from sources outside the machine-building sector, and
- would be used in civilian applications sufficiently similar to the military applications to hold out high prospects of successful transfer.⁵⁸

As it happened, a joint analysis by the CIA and DIA in 1986 had identified a set of resources which conformed to Sherr's criteria. These resources included: engineering fibers; microelectronics, microelectronic components and microprocessors; engineering plastics; computer programmers; electronics technicians, and software engineers.⁵⁹ A comparison of the resources described in the CIA-DIA report with those required in the production, acquisition and operation of nuclear missiles revealed that many of the same resources determined as crucial to revitalizing the Soviet civilian economy are heavily absorbed in the deployment of nuclear missiles. As a result, Alan Sherr declared that nuclear weapon systems "...are positioned at a crucial juncture of the [Soviet] economy where bottlenecks will almost inevitably develop..." and that "...deep reductions in nuclear

⁵⁸Ibid., 57-58.

⁵⁹U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency, Gorbachev's Economic Program: Problems Emerge, a report to the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, 13 April 1988. Quoted in Alan Sherr, The Other Side of Arms Control: Soviet Objectives in the Gorbachev Era (Boston: Unwin Hyman, Inc., 1988), 57-58.

weapons spending could have a significant impact on the implementation of civilian economic modernization." ⁶⁰

A second point given less emphasis by Alan Sherr is the savings in defense resources which could be garnered through significant reductions in conventional, rather than nuclear, forces. The large-scale conventional forces of the Soviet military establishment absorb a proportionately much larger share of GNP than do the nation's nuclear forces. For this reason, Gorbachev stands to gain far more from the ongoing unilateral force reductions in Eastern Europe than simply lessening international tensions. The amount of resources which can be saved through these unilateral reductions is, I believe, a very important factor in Gorbachev's decision to cut back Soviet defense commitments abroad. Furthermore, it is likely that the USSR would significantly reduce conventional forces stationed abroad even in the absence of conventional arms talks now under way. The far-reaching implications of this point will not be addressed in this thesis, but should have an important bearing on U.S. decisionmaking in such forums as START, CFE, etc. For the purposes of this study, it is sufficient to note that Gorbachev will likely continue to draw down the USSR's bloated conventional forces in order to divert greater amounts of resources into the civilian sector.

F. HUMAN RESOURCES

Gorbachev's proposed military reductions could have yet another highly significant impact on the economic modernization process—the freeing up of manpower. In December 1988, in a speech to the United Nations in New York City, Gorbachev announced huge

⁶⁰Alan B. Sherr, The Other Side of Arms Control: Soviet Objectives in the Gorbachev Era (Boston: Unwin Hyman, Inc., 1988), 58.

future unilateral troop reductions. The Kremlin leader declared that the Soviet Union would soon reduce Soviet active duty forces in Eastern Europe by 500,000 troops, or almost fifteen percent.⁶¹ It is unclear at this time what percentage of these forces will be disbanded once they return to the USSR, but a significant percentage likely will be. The question arises of how easily this freed-up manpower can be absorbed into the Soviet economy.

At least one prominent Soviet official has expressed concern in this regard. Victor Gelovani, a member of Moscow's Institute for Systems Studies in the Soviet Academy of Sciences, foresees difficulties as the Kremlin's planned military cuts become a reality. Gelovani predicts "...a big problem of conversion arising from bringing into the Soviet civil service [sic] half a million people from the military."⁶² Many of these young men, as Gelovani points out, will have to be retrained before they can enter the civilian economy. Many articles expressing similar concerns on the separation of thousands of young men from the Soviet military, have continued to appear since 1988.

Another matter further complicates this situation. Since the USSR has until very recently denied that unemployment even existed there, the nation has never developed any sort of referral system for unemployed workers. It seems that now a move is under way to set up just such a service. In May 1989, the deputy director of the Soviet Union's USA and Canada Institute revealed Soviet action in this area. Andrei Kokoshin, testifying before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee in May 1989, announced that he would soon

⁶¹Robert Legvold, "The Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 68 (Winter 1988/89): 95.

⁶²Rushworth M. Kidder, "Consumer Needs Challenge USSR," Christian Science Monitor, 28 July 1989, 12.

chair a commission which will help monitor the upcoming troop cuts and direct government efforts to find adequate housing, jobs and schools for the families of soldiers returning to civilian life.⁶³ A flood of new labor into the Soviet Union is not necessarily a boon to the economy; if Gorbachev's moves to increase labor productivity through increased mechanization and use of robots is successful, a significant percentage of the work force already in place may lose their jobs. Five hundred thousand more young men entering the work force in a short period of time could have severe consequences and further complicate the already tenuous situation.

G. SOME INITIAL FAILURES

This chapter has so far described how Mikhail Gorbachev intends to divert resources from the military-industrial sector in an attempt to revitalize the Soviet civilian economy. As previously mentioned, some aspects of Gorbachev's original programs have already been scrapped. One example is the plan to dramatically upgrade product quality by using military industries as a model for the civilian sector. This scheme ultimately failed, but a close examination of this program is very instructive and helps us comprehend some of the immense obstacles faced by Gorbachev in implementing "perestroika."

As described by author Anders Aslund, this program (which became known as "gospriemka," or "state acceptance") was originally promoted by Lev Zaikov, Central Committee Secretary for Economic Affairs and for Military Machine-building.⁶⁴ "Gospriemka" was actually a governmental organ founded to enforce qualitative standards

⁶³Jeffrey Smith, "Soviet Analyst Predicts Military Production Cut," Washington Post, 10 May 1989, A34.

⁶⁴Anders Aslund, Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 77.

at state enterprises producing the most important commodities and consumer goods. The body was established on 12 May 1986 when the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers adopted a decree "On Measures to Fundamentally Raise the Quality of Production."⁶⁵ Launched in November 1986, "gospriemka" was intended to be a harsh measure, with inspectors mercilessly reducing the wages of workers and the earnings of enterprises whose products failed to achieve the required high standards of quality. Effects of this program were far-reaching because it was extended to include 1500 enterprises in 28 different ministries. According to Anders Aslund, the problem with this system was that it worked too well; in the first months of the program, from 15-18 percent of all products failed to pass initial inspection and, in 1987, outputs nominally worth about six billion rubles were rejected altogether.⁶⁶ The impact on output volumes was dramatic. In January 1987, the production of civilian machine-building fell sharply by 7.9 percent. Production recovered slightly in the following month, but overall outputs remained very low. "Gospriemka" was the obvious villain. Alarming reports appeared about controllers who stopped production for days at a time. In many places, output targets were not reached and workers were refused their standard bonuses. Enterprise bosses scrambled to attribute the shortcomings to various culprits: they complained of bureaucratic "red tape" and unjustified production delays, unreasonably high standards, and defective inputs. Even equipment captured from Germany in the form of war reparations after World War Two, was blamed as being obsolete. "Gospriemka" was the dominant economic theme featured in the Soviet press in the spring of 1987, and was lauded by such leading figures

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Ibid., 78.

as Zaikov and Gorbachev. In the wake of such tremendous production shortages, however, the publicity ceased and the controls eased.⁶⁷

Although it was reduced in profile, "gospriemka" was not discarded. Instead, inspectors began to concentrate not on the quality of final products but on that of designs, organization and inputs. In 1988, "gospriemka" was expanded to include over 700 more enterprises, and Gorbachev and Zaikov continued to endorse the program. However, Anders Aslund writes that the quality control system had already been perceived as a failure, although its sponsors were unwilling to give it up entirely.⁶⁸ The program was ultimately quashed not because it did not work, but because it pointed out just how corrupt and inefficient the machine-building sector was. However, the resulting declines in gross output and the accompanying cuts in workers' bonuses were deemed politically unacceptable. Aslund speculates that workers' strikes which erupted in the wake of the denied bonuses became widespread enough to threaten paralysis of the overall economy, and, in this scenario, the program's sponsors relented. By the end of 1988, "gospriemka" passed from the scene.⁶⁹

The case of "gospriemka" highlights many of the systemic weaknesses which have so far proven so damaging to Gorbachev's plans for economic recovery. The program produced the results which its designers intended. The inspectors were conscientious and effective in their work, and their reports pointed out many enterprises and enterprise divisions which were grossly mismanaged or corrupt. Ultimately, the public outcry of bureaucratic abuses and threatened strikes proved untenable and the government

⁶⁷Ibid., 79.

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹Ibid., 80.

leadership chose to condemn the quality control system rather than to correct the shortcomings which the inspectors uncovered. This case points out in dramatic fashion some of the deep-rooted problems of the present Stalinist economy. For example, it reveals that mid-level bureaucrats are well-entrenched, that the leadership deeply fears unleashing widespread worker strikes, and, most importantly, that a great inertia exists to resist any reforms to the present system. In Aslund's words, "...the system itself rejected the new quality control as an alien body, since it endangered plan fulfillment on a large scale." ⁷⁰

Gorbachev's backing of this particular scheme failed, but one failure should not be interpreted to mean that the overall rationale of economic reform is faulty. Under closer scrutiny, the selection for improvement of the machine-building sector as a means to stimulate the overall Soviet economy is very logical and practical. Indeed, although its analysts have continually criticized Gorbachev's overall reform program, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has credited Gorbachev as having correctly selected the machine-building sector as the area most crucial for significant expansion of capital productivity. In essence, the CIA found that only great progress in the machine-building and other high-technology sectors can reinvigorate the USSR's economy. ⁷¹ However, the CIA predicted that even these measures would ultimately fail since simply investing more heavily in the machine-building sector to speed production of new equipment does not come to grips with the basic problem, the failure of the Soviet system to foster sufficient innovation and risk-taking. ⁷² Producing more high-technology machinery and equipment will not be an

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹U.S. Congress, Subcommittee on National Security Economics of the Joint Economic Committee, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China-1986, 118. Report presented by CIA and DIA, 19 March 1987, to the 100th Congress, 1st Session, 1987.

⁷²Ibid.

effective solution if plant managers are not given the time, training and incentive to use them efficiently. And even spectacular successes in the vital machine-building sector will not alone guarantee survival for the overall economy.

H. A "PERESTROIKA" REPORT CARD

Initial indications for the first full year of Gorbachev's tenure revealed an upturn in economic performance and gave hope that "perestroika" might be working. The GNP grew by more than four percent in 1986, with agriculture and industry leading the way to the best showings in almost a decade.⁷³ Another key point is that machine-building grew by 4.4 percent in 1986; that was, however, only slightly higher than the rate of 4.2 percent in 1985, and was almost certainly a disappointment to Soviet economic planners. Probably the single most important factor in the growth of industrial output (which amounted to 3.6 percent) was a sharp rise in labor productivity which was thought to be due to the anti-alcohol campaign and a toughening of labor discipline.⁷⁴ However, some western economists were unconvinced of Soviet successes; they attributed these dramatic statistics to "...a lot of luck and perhaps a little sleight of hand..."⁷⁵ Suspicions to that effect grew even more when 1987 statistics revealed an economic growth rate of only one-half of one percent; the Five-Year Plan had called for a growth rate of a minimum of 4.1 percent.⁷⁶

Initial indicators for 1988 only added to the confused picture. In the continuing economic roller coaster, Soviet data for 1988 revealed that GNP had dramatically improved

⁷³Ibid., 20.

⁷⁴Alan B. Sherr, The Other Side of Arms Control: Soviet Objectives in the Gorbachev Era (Boston: Unwin Hyman, Inc., 1988), 68.

⁷⁵Peter Passell, "Soviet Reforms Vie With Reality," New York Times, 4 May 1989, C2.

⁷⁶Ibid.

over the figures for 1987; GNP in 1988 had grown by five percent.⁷⁷ This reportedly marked the strongest economic showing in ten years. In the two critical areas of retail sales and consumer savings, the growth rates were seven percent and eleven percent, respectively. Even more impressive—and absolutely essential to civilian economic revitalization—the critical machine-building sector grew by 6.3 percent.⁷⁸

A published Soviet report released in July 1989 initially seemed to provide some evidence that "perestroika" had still yielded marginal progress in the first half of that year. As described in an article by economist John Tedstrom, the report stated that there had been some growth of economic output during the first half of 1989. The USSR State Committee for Statistics (Goskomstat) claimed that a good deal of that growth resulted from reducing military expenditures and converting military production capacity to civilian purposes.⁷⁹ Although that may be true, according to John Tedstrom, some of the statistics revealed in this report were highly inflated to support Soviet claims of continued economic success. For instance, Tedstrom notes that the favorable increases in national income contained in the report were based on the official inflation rate of two percent, while the actual inflation rate was more on the order of seven to ten percent. Tedstrom claimed that "real economic growth so far this year is much less than reported and could even be negative."⁸⁰ He concluded that the Soviet economic situation as of mid-1989 seemed to be worsening, with inflation accelerating rapidly. Tedstrom's findings would

⁷⁷Richard Parker, "Assessing Perestroika," World Policy Journal 6 (Spring 1989): 277.

⁷⁸Ibid.

⁷⁹John Tedstrom, "Mid-Year Economic Results: 'Perestroika' Takes a Fall," Report on the USSR, 18 August 1989, 3.

⁸⁰Ibid., 4.

seem to reinforce the claims of other western economists that actual Soviet economic performance under "perestroika" has been significantly worse than that claimed by the Kremlin. Furthermore, according to the author, the Soviet government throughout this period continued to postpone enacting the revolutionary steps required to salvage the lagging economy and improve the lot of the Soviet consumer.⁸¹

This latter predicament was described in some detail in a highly acclaimed article written by "Z" in late 1989.⁸² According to the author, the Soviet leadership has continually postponed sweeping economic reforms because to do so would entail running a high risk of unleashing social chaos and perhaps even revolution. One of the most difficult obstacles faced by the Kremlin leadership is the question of reducing or eliminating entirely heavy state subsidies on basic consumer goods and housing, which the government has financed for decades in order to help pacify the Soviet populace. The dilemma which confronts the Kremlin leadership is this: heavy state subsidies cannot be abolished without drastically increasing prices and risking rampant inflation. But unless these subsidies are abolished, or at least reduced, the economy cannot move to real prices; and without real prices there can be no dilution of the Stalinist system by marketization or privatization.⁸³ "Z" asserts that the end result of over four years of "perestroika" has been that the half-reforms introduced so far have unsettled the old economic structures without putting new ones in their place. The author concludes that "...Gorbachev is left

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²See "Z" (pseud.), "To the Stalin Mausoleum," Daedalus (Winter 1989/90): 295-343.

⁸³Ibid., 330.

with the worst of two possible worlds: an old one [system] that refuses to die and a new one without the strength to be born." ⁸⁴

I. PROGNOSSES FOR "PERESTROIKA"

The findings of John Tedstrom and "Z" fall into step with those of many other western economists. Another analyst, Gertrude Schroeder, characterizes Gorbachev's economic reforms through 1988 as half-measures which will achieve at best only partial success. She states, "In the long run, Gorbachev will be disappointed in the present package of reforms, which do not go nearly far enough to achieve his ambition of creating a dynamic, self-regulating 'economic mechanism' capable of narrowing the technological gap with the West." ⁸⁵ Dr. Steven Rosefielde of the University of North Carolina concurs with Gertrude Schroeder that the prospects for the current Stalinist economic model are hopeless and that the USSR has no choice but to radically alter the present system. Rosefielde believes, moreover, that the USSR's economy faces so many obstacles that even abandonment of the current system in favor of a rapid transition to market communism is almost certainly destined to fail. He terms the chances of significant economic reform in the USSR as "extremely bleak." ⁸⁶

Anders Aslund reports that the Soviet leadership has been well aware of the poor showings of "perestroika" all along. For example, at the 19th CPSU Party Conference in June 1988, Deputy Prime Minister Leonid Abalkin soberly sized up the situation: "...a

⁸⁴Ibid., 331.

⁸⁵Gertrude Schroeder, "Anatomy of Gorbachev's Economic Reform," Soviet Economy 3 (July-September 1987): 240.

⁸⁶Steven Rosefielde, "Market Communism: Perestroika at the Brink," p. 16. Unpublished paper. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, November 1989.

radical breakthrough in the economy has not occurred and [the economy] has not departed from its state of stagnation."⁸⁷ Faced with continued lackluster progress, Abalkin and Gorbachev's other economic advisers continued to search for alternate means of improving the system. According to Anders Aslund, three possible scenarios most likely will serve as future Soviet economic models. The first is "radicalized economic reform with far-reaching democratization," a model which would press ahead farther toward a market economy and incorporate such features as ownership of private property and increased democratization. A second scenario provides for a "reactionary or neo-Stalinist system" which would improve economic performance marginally by employing repressive measures, greater discipline and increased centralization, most likely in the wake of Gorbachev's ouster. Finally, a third model, called "Brezhnevite," would "muddle through" using reforms already introduced without much more repression and without major economic or political reforms.⁸⁸ Aslund believes that one of the first two scenarios will most likely be chosen by the Soviets to alter the existing system.

Indeed, during the fall of 1989, Deputy Prime Minister Abalkin appeared to be promoting a more radical reform plan which would move quickly toward a market economy and allow true market regulation of prices and allocation of resources through supply and demand.⁸⁹ This push toward more radical economic reform increasingly came under fire, however, due to continued poor performance by those programs already in place. According to the results of a public opinion poll administered in the autumn of

⁸⁷Pravda, 30 June 1988. Quoted in Anders Aslund, Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 178.

⁸⁸Ibid., 194.

⁸⁹D.J. Peterson, "'Perestroika' At the Crossroads: Preview of the Forthcoming Conference on Economic Reform," Report on the USSR, 17 November 1989, 18.

1989, Soviet citizens have become increasingly pessimistic about the prospects for "perestroika" and are uncertain whether implementation of the program should continue. Results of the poll were mixed, and demonstrated—more than anything else—a complete lack of understanding of basic economics by the average Soviet citizen. Some of the more meaningful results included bad news for Gorbachev. Of those polled, 52 percent said the country's economic situation has grown "significantly worse" in the last three years.⁹⁰ Invited to assess blame for the state of the economy, 13 percent said the fault lay mostly with "mistakes of the period of perestroika," while some 46 percent more said that current and past mistakes were "equally to blame."⁹¹ According to this poll then, some 59 percent of Soviet citizens placed at least partial blame for the current economic crisis on the measures introduced under "perestroika." Although I believe these statistics to be inconclusive, they do seem to support the claims of many western economists that the majority of the Soviet public now blames the Gorbachev administration for the country's economic woes.⁹²

J. DECEMBER 1989: PERMANENT SETBACK OR MERELY A TACTICAL RETREAT?

Against this background, the Soviet leadership in December 1989 faced a crucial decision—whether to slow down or accelerate the transformation of the centrally

⁹⁰"Soviet Poll Finds Public Pessimistic On Economy," New York Times, 5 November 1989, 5, 13.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, 13.

⁹²See, for example, D. J. Peterson, "Perestroika' At the Crossroads: Preview of the Forthcoming Conference on Economic Reform," Report on the USSR, 17 November 1989, 17-19.

administered economy into a market economy. The announcement on 14 December 1989 of the nation's Thirteenth Five-Year Plan revealed that a high-level decision had been made to at least temporarily postpone more radical economic reforms. This announcement by Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov followed closely on the heels of a Central Committee meeting on 9 December. In the earlier meeting, a more radical economic plan—proposed by Abalkin and reportedly sponsored by Gorbachev—was soundly defeated by conservative members who then embraced the alternative, more conservative, model announced by Ryzhkov.⁹³ In his public statement, Ryzhkov listed four main reasons for the country's poor economic condition which he said determined the nature of the adopted plan. Those reasons were: underestimation of the scale and complexity of problems encountered in heavy industry coupled with a low level of innovation; insufficient elaboration of the new economic mechanism and its lack of proper economic controls; basic "mistakes" in the reform plan, such as the anti-alcohol campaign and the "inconsistent" fight against unearned income, and industrial disruption caused by strikes, interethnic conflicts and other civil unrest.⁹⁴ As described by Ryzhkov, the new plan is divided into two phases. In the first phase, from 1990-92, a significant shift is envisioned for the transfer of large amounts of resources into the production of consumer goods and to improve the financial standing of the country. Only after 1993, during the second phase, would more radical reforms such as market-driven prices be employed. Ryzhkov's description of those measures and how they would be implemented seemed extremely vague.⁹⁵

⁹³Anders Aslund, "The Soviet Economy: From Bad to Worst," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 5-11 February 1990, 23.

⁹⁴John Tedstrom, "The Soviet Economy: Planning for the 1990s," Report on the USSR, 22 December 1989, 4.

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, 5.

Interpretations of the results of this recent defeat of "perestroika" have varied widely among a number of authorities. John Tedstrom sees the December maneuver as a decided setback for Gorbachev's reforms. He predicts that a failure to employ more radical reforms in the next year will strengthen the position of more conservative forces who favor a complete abandonment of "perestroika."⁹⁶ In a recent article, economist Anders Aslund also interprets the results of the December announcement as a significant defeat for Gorbachev, and foresees an increasingly bleak economic situation for the USSR with the ouster of Gorbachev very likely.⁹⁷ To avoid an ultimate political defeat, Aslund predicts that Gorbachev may give up his post as CPSU General Secretary but stay on as President of the USSR, a position whose powers were considerably broadened after Gorbachev was elected to the office in March.

There are growing signs that such a move may be exactly what Gorbachev has in mind. The shrewd Kremlin leader seems to be distancing himself more and more from a Communist Party which he may view as increasingly discredited in the eyes of the Soviet populace. For instance, in his acceptance speech after being elected to the office of President in March, Gorbachev made only one fleeting reference to the CPSU, a move very much out of character with typical official statements. My own interpretation is that Gorbachev will abandon the party only if he believes that he has sufficiently strengthened the new "executive presidency" into a position more powerful than that of the general secretary and if he feels that the party will no longer help, but only hinder, the chances for "perestroika's" success.

⁹⁶Ibid., 6.

⁹⁷Anders Aslund, "The Soviet Economy: From Bad to Worst," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 5-11 February 1990, 23.

K. A NEW SPRING OFFENSIVE?

Events in the last weeks of March 1990 seemed to indicate that Gorbachev was planning once again to renew his push for radical economic reform. Despite the setback in December, Gorbachev apparently decided that radical reform cannot be forestalled until the mid-1990s, as envisioned in the conservative five-year plan. On March 27, Gorbachev declared, "It is obvious that new approaches and decisive steps in the economy are needed today."⁹⁸ This call by Gorbachev was probably spurred on partly by even gloomier economic reports from December-February, which revealed that overall production had slumped more each month due to mass absenteeism, work stoppages, and ethnic conflicts.⁹⁹

An earlier report, described in the New York Times on 20 March, stated that Gorbachev has submitted a new package of seventeen emergency economic plans with the aim of enacting those measures no later than July 1, 1990. The author, Francis Clines, interprets this move as an indication that Gorbachev wants to quickly assert his new executive powers to aid the ailing economy.¹⁰⁰ According to Clines, the initial Soviet report did not indicate the timetable for enactment of these measures, nor did it explicitly state that all central planning would be curtailed. Very interestingly, the report did indicate that the Soviet Government was closely monitoring the economic progress of Poland, where economist Jeffrey Sachs has advised that country to enact swift adoption of market-style reforms which have already caused great economic hardships for the Polish

⁹⁸Linda Feldmann, "Gorbachev Outlines Urgent Economic Reforms," Christian Science Monitor, 29 March 1990, 3.

⁹⁹Ibid.

¹⁰⁰Francis X. Clines, "Moscow Is Said to Consider Urgent Economic Measures," New York Times, 20 March 1990, A7.

people. Clines reports that Interfax, a Soviet press agency, claims that an economic plan similar to that already adopted in Poland has been determined to be "most fitting for our country at this moment, when the time for more mild reforms has expired." ¹⁰¹

Here, again, the Kremlin leadership faces a cruel dilemma. As mentioned previously, salvaging the Soviet economy requires introducing new and, by Soviet standards, revolutionary, market mechanisms, but unleashing these mechanisms will lead to a further erosion of the Soviet people's already meager standard of living. The Polish government under the leadership of Prime Minister Mazowiecki and with the help of Lech Walesa will likely be able to salvage that nation's economy by introducing very harsh market forces which at least in the short term will cause great deprivations for the Polish people. Such a system will probably work in Poland, if for no other reason than the Polish people have a great deal of trust in the government's leadership, which translates into considerable legitimacy for the Mazowiecki government. The Soviet government has no such legitimacy with its people, and as time goes on, their patience wears thinner. This conclusion is one of several themes highlighted in the famous "Z" article of late 1989. According to the author, the faith of the Soviet people has been steadily eroded as Gorbachev's reform programs, especially "glasnost," or "openness," has exposed more and more of the evils of the Stalinist system and its history. "Z" writes that, despite Gorbachev's herculean efforts, the entire Soviet system has reached an impasse, and that it "...cannot be restructured or reformed, but can only either stagnate or be dismantled and replaced by market institutions over a long period of time." ¹⁰²

¹⁰¹Ibid.

¹⁰²"Z" (pseud.), "To the Stalin Mausoleum," Daedalus (Winter 1989/90): 315, 338.

Despite such ominous assessments, throughout March and early April, rumors circulated in Moscow that Gorbachev was planning just such a form of "shock therapy" to energize the lagging economy. And then, without warning, the Kremlin seemed again to lose its collective nerve. After a two-day Cabinet meeting where the new proposals were aired, President Gorbachev and his advisers announced that the transition to a market economy would take place gradually, and only after "painstaking public discussions" were held.¹⁰³ During the next month, Gorbachev seemed to sharply contradict himself regarding his economic policy. On the second day of a whirlwind trip through the Urals—which reportedly was an attempt to drum-up public support for "perestroika"—the Soviet president sounded a note of alarm: "If we do not get out of the system we're in—excuse my rough talk—then everything living in our society will die...we will begin to asphyxiate."¹⁰⁴ Yet, at another stop on the same trip, Gorbachev took a much more conservative position, and obviously distanced himself from the more radical economic proposals which would be necessary for marked economic reform. He stated, "I cannot support such ideas, no matter how decisive and revolutionary they might appear. These are irresponsible ideas, irresponsible."¹⁰⁵

The path toward economic recovery has almost always been very troubled and the issues sometimes hard to sort out, but the reports which have emerged in the past few months are, quite frankly, baffling. It now appears that an intense debate is under way

¹⁰³Bill Keller, "How Gorbachev Rejected Plan to 'Shock Treat' the Economy," New York Times, 14 May 1990, A1.

¹⁰⁴Francis X. Clines, "Gorbachev Urges New Economy, Otherwise 'Our Society Will Die,'" New York Times, 27 April 1990, A6.

¹⁰⁵Bill Keller, "How Gorbachev Rejected Plan to 'Shock Treat' the Economy," New York Times, 14 May 1990, A1.

between those who contend that a great leap toward implementing market forces would create chaos and possibly bring down the government, and those who argue that the nation's economic woes will only worsen if true market measures are delayed further. Where Gorbachev stands in this controversy remains unclear.

The leadership's decision on this latest round of economic policymaking will hold many profound implications for "perestroika" and for Mikhail Gorbachev. If Anders Aslund is correct, Gorbachev may soon shift his base of power from the CPSU to the newly strengthened presidency. A renewed strong show of support for these latest measures by Gorbachev would also almost certainly lead to a showdown between him and more conservative forces, including Yegor Ligachev. Above all, I would interpret a renewed push by Gorbachev to mean that the Kremlin leader has decided that dramatic systemic reform can no longer be postponed. This is certainly not the only reason why Gorbachev would make such a move now, but it seems to me that Gorbachev would ordinarily be far more concerned with more immediate issues like the threat of secession from the Baltic states and rising nationalist movements elsewhere. Using the terminology proposed by Gertrude Schroeder, I would rate those measures implemented so far by Gorbachev as "half-measures," and the provisions of the newest economic package do not seem to be any more decisive. But the Kremlin leadership, including Gorbachev, dreadfully fears that the implementation of true market forces will unleash civil unrest, and I do not believe they will introduce radical reforms unless they feel compelled to do so. If in the near future Gorbachev decides to risk far-reaching economic changes, it would indicate to me that he feels he must take drastic steps to improve the economy now, or risk losing the very base of Soviet power. That would only reinforce my conviction that the

central driving force to all of Gorbachev's reforms has been, and remains, economic in nature.

L. "PERESTROIKA"--THE DANGER FROM WITHIN

In my estimation, the single greatest danger to "perestroika" and to its godfather, Gorbachev, lies in the very reforms which the Kremlin leader unleashed to reinforce his own reform program. In an effort to increase public support and encourage greater productivity and labor discipline, Gorbachev instituted a sweeping array of democratic measures, allowing, for example, public protests and the first semi-legitimate legislative elections since 1917. Over the last three years, the relaxation of coercion has encouraged not only the desired public interest, but also has brought on dreaded nationalist uprisings and paralyzing worker strikes. In early 1990, Mikhail Gorbachev has seemingly painted himself into a policy corner, having denounced the very use of military force to which he may have to resort if he is to preserve what remains of the crumbling Soviet Empire. True, Gorbachev did order limited military actions against Lithuania, but he has so far shown great restraint in comparison to measures which any of his predecessors would certainly have resorted to by now. Gorbachev is walking a shaky political tightrope. He desperately wants to avoid widespread violence and bloodshed which would wreck his plans for economic interaction with the West. But if he allows actions which further destabilize the country's political situation or increase the economic suffering of the populace, he risks losing all control. It is precisely this loss of control which could lead to Gorbachev's ouster or, in the least, convince him to abandon his reform programs and order a crackdown on the troubled Soviet populace. For the West, a miscalculation in foreign policy regarding Eastern Europe could mean increased tensions with Moscow or

perhaps even a renewal of the Cold War. For Gorbachev, a miscalculation in dealings with any one of a number of troublesome issues--mainly nationalist uprisings like that in Lithuania--could mean a total disintegration of Soviet power or even civil war. If Gorbachev reaches a point where he is convinced that further political and economic reforms pose an undue risk of widespread popular unrest or civil war, let there be no doubt, he will abandon "perestroika."

M. THE QUESTION OF MILITARY SUPPORT

As the Kremlin continues to divert precious resources into the civilian sector, the continued support of the Soviet military will remain very important to Mikhail Gorbachev. But as he continues to chip away at the military's stockpiles, Gorbachev is certain to encounter mounting opposition. As early as 1986, there were rumblings of discontent in military circles against forthcoming military budget cuts. Those rumblings grew steadily in 1987-88 and some senior officers openly voiced their concerns over the announced cuts. Gorbachev's announcement in December 1988 of his intention to withdraw 500,000 troops from Eastern Europe was followed almost immediately by a second announcement of a fourteen percent reduction in the USSR's military budget and a nineteen percent cut in weapons procurement.¹⁰⁶ According to one news story, even Army General Dmitri Yazov, generally a supporter of Gorbachev's reforms, subsequently had misgivings on the policies of his commander-in-chief.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶Richard Parker, "Assessing Perestroika," World Policy Journal 6 (Spring 1989): 291.

¹⁰⁷Bernard E. Trainor, "Soviet Leaders Debating Shape of Future Army," New York Times, 31 July 1989, A3.

Late in 1989, General Yazov and other military leaders began to voice their objections more loudly. For example, in September 1989, Yazov stated,

It is economically groundless and politically shortsighted...to try to make reduction of defense expenditures the sole means to liquidate the budget deficit and resolve all of today's social problems.¹⁰⁸

The defense minister's comments, though qualified somewhat, are nonetheless quite critical when compared to earlier statements. It is likely that the military's leadership is becoming more alarmed over defense reductions amidst the wave of nationalist uprisings which have erupted across the USSR in the last year. Another cause for the rising hostility, according to author Stephen Foye, is the military's growing perception that conversion of resources from the defense sector into the civilian economy, is meeting with only minimal successes.¹⁰⁹ This apparent mounting opposition to "perestroika" within military circles adds one more problem to the sea of hostility besieging the Kremlin leader.

Gorbachev has warned his military leaders all along that they will have to, in essence, do more with less, in order to preserve the Soviet economic base. Senior Soviet military leaders continue to support a large military establishment and will in the short run attempt to preserve a sizeable military budget. However, they will eventually be forced to accept increased reductions in spending and perhaps even a drastic alteration of the military establishment. Even if Gorbachev's plans for economic recovery succeed, the accompanying political reforms unleashed under "new thinking" will subject the heretofore

¹⁰⁸Army General D. Yazov, "Armed Forces: How the Reductions Are Going," Izvestiya, 17 September 1989, 2. Quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (henceforth cited as "FBIS") FBIS-SOV-89-179, 18 September 1989, 2.

¹⁰⁹Stephen Foye, "Rumblings in the Soviet Armed Forces," Report on the USSR, 16 March 1990, 5.

sacred cow of the Soviet military budget to greater scrutiny from civilian "think tanks" and a more aware and educated public. On the other hand, if the economy does not improve, the military budget will be further reduced in order to divert more and more resources to salvage the civilian economy. In sum, although some of his original programs for diversion of resources from military stocks into the civilian economy foundered, Gorbachev has and will continue to reduce military expenses in favor of improving the civilian sector and to promote better international relations. His success in influencing western opinion will be the subject of the next chapter.

IV. WHAT THE WEST THINKS ABOUT "NEW THINKING"

The mass of new policies evolving from Mikhail Gorbachev's program of "new thinking" is immense and the pace at which they have been proposed has been dizzying. Previous chapters have reviewed specific military and economic policies and their likely implications for the Soviet domestic situation. This chapter will briefly analyze western reaction to Gorbachev's overall program of "new thinking." In these pages, I will review what I consider to be a representative sampling of western opinion taken from a variety of books, journal articles and newspaper accounts from 1986 to the present. I have arranged the surveyed writings into three groups. Viewed as a continuum, the groups represent a broad spectrum of opinions on the motives for, and veracity of, Gorbachev's revolutionary programs.

A. THE NON-BELIEVERS

Perhaps the darkest interpretation of Gorbachev's initiatives is summarized in an article entitled "New Soviet Thinking Is Not Good News." The author, a Frenchman writing under the pseudonym of Jean Quatras, paints a gloomy picture of Gorbachev's programs and his motives in offering compromises to the West. Quatras portrays Gorbachev as a wolf in sheep's clothing. According to the author, the new Soviet proposals are not new, but are now being restated in terms more pleasing to western ears. Quatras declares, "Gorbachev's skill lies in his ability to present traditional doctrine in appealing terms..." He states that, in all likelihood, "...there has not been a real turning point in Soviet thinking; instead, observers see a new subtlety of language for strictly

tactical purposes." ¹¹⁰ The author points out that Gorbachev's escalation of rhetoric on such issues as "mutuality" and "globalism" closely coincided with successive Soviet campaigns against nuclear modernization and INF deployments, and especially against President Ronald Reagan's proposed Strategic Defense Initiative. Quatras believes that the Soviets plan to "...consecrate a decoupling between Europe and the United States...to lead the Europeans...into a kind of political complacency vis-a-vis Moscow." ¹¹¹ Quatras counsels extreme caution in reading and acting upon Gorbachev's proposals. He sums up his own opinion of the new Soviet proposals on a somber note: "The Soviets offer bait in the form of great institutional schemes or huge programs that are essentially declaratory."¹¹²

Another Frenchman offers a slightly less pessimistic appraisal of Gorbachev's reforms. Pierre Hassner, research director at Paris's Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, concludes that Gorbachev's reforms reflect past Soviet proposals cloaked in more western-sounding terms. He characterized "new thinking" as being reactive in nature. Hassner says of the new Kremlin leader:

Gorbachev is neither an anonymous product of an unchanging system nor a heroic reformer secretly won over by liberal values. Above all, he ought to be seen as 'the great co-opter,' concurrently the agent and the instrument of a dialectic mixing both adaptation and manipulation. ¹¹³

Hassner is especially distrustful of Soviet motives in the military sphere; he states,

¹¹⁰Jean Quatras (pseud.), "New Soviet Thinking Is Not Good News," Washington Quarterly (Summer 1988): 175.

¹¹¹*Ibid.*, 117.

¹¹²*Ibid.*

¹¹³Pierre Hassner, "Gorbachev and the West," Washington Quarterly (Autumn 1988): 95.

Whether Gorbachev's intentions are defensive or offensive, the USSR certainly has an interest in blocking new strategies for NATO as well as European military cooperation so as to emerge as the dominant power on a demilitarized continent.¹¹⁴

The author sternly warns that the West should remain firm and offer compromises of its own "...only when concrete actions follow Soviet promises and when structural changes follow gestures or good graces." ¹¹⁵

A fear that the West is being lured to compromise its security by a Gorbachev siren emerges as a prevalent theme among a number of prominent and respected western authorities. In a 4 August 1989 interview on Cable News Network's program "Crossfire," former American Secretary of State Alexander Haig was outraged that the U.S. Congress had during the previous week slashed several major U.S. defense programs in light of Gorbachev's promise of forthcoming defense reductions in Europe. Haig complained bitterly that the U.S. was "...making concrete cuts based on Gorbachev's mere promises of cuts." ¹¹⁶ Granted, Secretary Haig is famous for taking a hard-line stand on almost any issue, but we can easily find other prominent Americans who share his doubts on the new Soviet reforms. In a 10 May 1989 Washington Post article, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak described how President Bush's deputy national security adviser, Robert Gates, warned of quick and ill-considered western responses to Gorbachev's proposals. Gates stated, "We cannot ignore Soviet history or...the cyclical turn to reform, 'detente' and

¹¹⁴Ibid., 101.

¹¹⁵Ibid., 102.

¹¹⁶Alexander Haig, in an interview with Pat Buchanan on Cable News Network's series "Crossfire," aired on 4 August 1989.

foreign assistance each time the [Soviet] system has hovered on the brink of catastrophe." ¹¹⁷

Former director of the U.S. National Security Agency, General William Odom, also remains skeptical of Gorbachev's proposals. He advises a cooperative, but carefully considered U.S. response to tangible Soviet progress. The general states,

It would be a grave error for the new administration to relax all the competitive pressures the Soviet Union feels from the sustained U.S. military buildup and from U.S. assertiveness in regional conflicts. An equally grave error would be to offer massive credits and economic assistance without a political quid pro quo. ¹¹⁸

A resistance to offer lucrative economic incentives and western credits is evident in many writings. Some refusals of economic aid to the Soviets are based purely on ideological or geopolitical concerns, with the idea that a failure of the Soviet system will simply remove a thorn from America's side. Others argue against aid to Gorbachev's programs on more pragmatic grounds. For example, Dr. Steven Rosefielde of the University of North Carolina believes that the Soviet economy is so hopelessly mired down that no amount of western aid will improve the situation. ¹¹⁹ Dr. Rosefielde's dreary assessment of the Soviet system is also shared by the author of the highly acclaimed "Z" article from December 1989. As previously noted in Chapter Three, that author believes that any further efforts by Gorbachev to salvage the existing system and any aid rendered by the West would be futile. "Z" concludes that the present Soviet system cannot be

¹¹⁷Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Is Bush Being Taken In By Gorbachev?" Washington Post, 10 May 1989, A15.

¹¹⁸William E. Odom, "Soviet Military Doctrine," Foreign Affairs 67 (Winter 1988/89): 134.

¹¹⁹Steven Rosefielde, "Market Communism: Perestroika at the Brink," p. 17. Unpublished manuscript. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, November 1989.

reformed, and that it will either stagnate or be dismantled and replaced eventually by market institutions over a long period of time.¹²⁰

This section has presented a sampling of highly pessimistic views of Gorbachev's proposals. Except for Dr. Rosefielde and "Z," the authors cited here either doubted the veracity of Soviet reforms or at least were suspicious of the Kremlin's motives. A second group of writers views Gorbachev's program as genuine, and in general sees Soviet motives as less menacing to the West. We will now turn to this second group.

B. THE MODERATES

Dr. Graham Allison, Dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, declares that Gorbachev's reforms are authentic, and views them as a desperate attempt to salvage the Soviet economy. Allison concedes that Gorbachev's reforms could produce a more formidable adversary in years to come, but he believes that the USSR by that time will not be the same dangerous entity which we know today. He suggests Gorbachev's main objective in granting foreign policy concessions is to secure a breathing spell to rebuild the Soviet economy. Short of trusting the security of the West to Gorbachev's word alone, though, the author advocates formulating a set of carefully considered bilateral agreements which, if fulfilled, would reflect good Soviet intentions. Allison closes by urging NATO to assume a proactive, or more vigorous, posture; he states, "The United States and its allies must now reach beyond containment to aggressive engagement of the Soviet Union in ways that encourage Gorbachev's reformist instincts to restructure Soviet external relations and internal institutions."¹²¹

¹²⁰"Z" (pseud.), "Toward the Stalin Mausoleum," Daedalus (Winter 1989/90): 338.

¹²¹Graham T. Allison, Jr., "Testing Gorbachev," Foreign Affairs 67 (Fall 1988): 32.

Professor Mark Katz, of Virginia's George Mason University, also finds an economic impetus for the Soviet overtures. He submits that Gorbachev's military reforms came about because the Kremlin could not keep pace with President Reagan's military buildup without sacrificing badly needed economic improvements. Although he maintains that Soviet military doctrine now poses much less danger to the U.S., he urges that America must still not let down her guard. Katz warns,

Should the Bush administration not support a strong defense policy or should the American public, Congress and the allies again reduce their support for one, Soviet efforts to seek concessions from the United States...may well expand.¹²²

Like Professor Katz, Andrew Goldberg of the Center for Strategic and International Studies finds the rationale for Gorbachev's military reforms originating from Soviet economic constraints. Katz declares that not only were military expenditures diverting badly needed resources from the civilian economy, but an offensive strategic orientation was frustrating good relations with the West which were in turn *so vital* to Soviet economic development. The author is very pragmatic in his outlook on future U.S.-Soviet relations; he predicts, "Even in the best of expected futures, the U.S.-Soviet relationship will remain adversarial."¹²³ To him, the most important question is how the West will take advantage of Soviet policy changes. He urges the NATO allies to agree upon a common defense agenda and then to aggressively challenge the Kremlin in pursuing military

¹²²Mark N. Katz, "Evolving Soviet Perceptions of U.S. Strategy, Washington Quarterly (Summer 1989): 166.

¹²³Andrew C. Goldberg, "The Present Turbulence in Soviet Military Doctrine," Washington Quarterly (Summer 1988): 168.

reductions in Europe. Dr. Goldberg closes by observing, "What is unquestionable is that Gorbachev's new thinking demands new thinking of our own." ¹²⁴

C. THE OPTIMISTS

The following, and final, group surveyed includes four authors who are decidedly more favorable in their opinions of Soviet reforms. To one degree or another, they believe the West should pursue a cooperative strategy with the USSR to reinforce Gorbachev's reform movement.

Michael McGwire of the Brookings Institution does not view the new Soviet reforms as economically oriented. Instead, he suggests that Gorbachev's new approach to national security lies at the heart of the "new thinking." He refers to Soviet agreements for intrusive on-site arms verifications and inspections, along with offers of unilateral force reductions, as concrete proof that changes have already occurred in Soviet foreign policy. The author sternly demands action from the West: "NATO must avoid self-righteousness and recognize the radical nature of the doctrinal change underlying the Soviet proposal for a new security regime." ¹²⁵ McGwire believes it imperative for NATO to carefully review its own forces and policies in light of the new Soviet proposals and then to work closely with the Warsaw Pact to lessen tensions in Europe.

The very title of Michael Mandelbaum's article—"Ending the Cold War"—reveals his impressions of Gorbachev's reforms. Mandelbaum states, "Mikhail Gorbachev has launched the most ambitious, sweeping and, from the West's point of view, promising

¹²⁴Ibid.

¹²⁵Michael McGwire, "A Mutual Security Regime for Europe?" International Affairs 64 (Summer 1988): 377.

program of reform in the history of the Soviet Union." ¹²⁶ He believes that, for the first time in forty-five years, there is a real chance to end the most serious of East-West differences. Professor Mandelbaum cautions that the nationalist uprisings within the Soviet Union, if they become violent and uncontrollable, could force Gorbachev to use coercive force and abandon his reform program. Although he does not advocate economic aid or other assistance to encourage Soviet reforms, Mandelbaum thinks we should carefully avoid taking advantage of any weakened Soviet position. Such actions on our part could give Gorbachev's rivals the ammunition they need to halt the reform movement which they view as destabilizing to the Soviet empire.

The final two authors surveyed present the most positive analyses of Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms. In "New Thinking' and Soviet Foreign Policy," Dr. Seweryn Bialer points to the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, a lessening of Soviet incursions in the Third World, and dynamic movement in arms negotiations as incontrovertible proof that Gorbachev's reforms are real. Dr. Bialer believes that NATO should act quickly to encourage reforms that are to its advantage. In contrast to the failed detente of the 1970s, Dr. Bialer states, "The new detente holds the promise of being deeper and much longer lasting than the old." ¹²⁷

Finally, Dr. Robert Legvold of the Harriman Institute at Columbia University, declares not only that sweeping changes have occurred inside the USSR but that those changes have altered "...the very assumptions by which the Soviets explain the functioning of international politics and from which they derive the concepts underlying the deeper

¹²⁶Michael Mandelbaum, "Ending the Cold War," Foreign Affairs 68 (Spring 1989): 16.

¹²⁷Seweryn Bialer, "New Thinking' and Soviet Foreign Policy," Survival (July/August 1988): 309.

pattern of their actions." ¹²⁸ Dr. Legvold highlights two significant and innovative principles which Gorbachev has repeatedly stressed: the insufficiency of military power as the way to national security and, second, the link between national and mutual security. The author states that Soviet foreign and security policy have changed substantially on three different levels: basic concepts, policy concepts and fundamental assumptions. Citing Soviet moves previously referred to by Dr. Seweryn Bialer, as well as Gorbachev's offer to unilaterally cut active Soviet military forces by 500,000 troops, Dr. Legvold claims that the very basis of Soviet foreign policy decisionmaking has changed. The author describes western responses so far to Gorbachev's initiatives as cautious. In his prescription for future western actions, he minces no words: "This time, caution is the enemy of the sensible." ¹²⁹ Dr. Legvold believes that the goal of U.S. foreign policy for over four decades--an end to the Cold War--is now within reach. Hesitation on the part of the West may rob it of this fleeting opportunity.

D. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS

A review of this survey reveals the broad range of western opinion regarding the veracity and extent of Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking." Those analyzed in this chapter fell into three groups. Members of the first group were largely skeptical of the true extent of Gorbachev's reforms with some finding sinister motives behind the Kremlin's overtures. Those who made up the second group were moderates who generally thought the reforms authentic but had differing opinions as to how the West should respond. The

¹²⁸Robert Legvold, "The Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 68 (Spring 1989): 82.

¹²⁹Ibid., 95.

final group offered what they claim is substantial proof of genuine reforms and advocated a vigorous and positive western response to Gorbachev's initiatives. Of all those surveyed, the majority believed that Gorbachev's reforms are real and generally found an economic basis as the core rationale for the Soviet reform program.

Several members of this survey still have serious doubts about the military objectives of Gorbachev and question the validity of the "defensive doctrine." In the following two chapters, I will examine some of the central issues surrounding the debate over this concept, and describe some changes now under way in Soviet forces in Eastern Europe as well as possible future deployments of Soviet forces on home soil.

V. THE CONTROVERSY OVER SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE

A. TWO "NEW" SOVIET SECURITY POLICIES

Gorbachev's efforts to deemphasize the role of the military in Soviet foreign policy have centered around two security policies in particular, "reasonable sufficiency" and the "defensive doctrine" or "defensive defense." Like many other aspects of Gorbachev's reform programs, these two concepts have stirred-up intense controversy. They will have a profound effect on the future of western security and East-West relations. When these new concepts became known in the West, the common perception was that Gorbachev himself had introduced them and that they were dramatically different from anything seen before. This chapter will analyze those issues and attempt to shed more light on the true content of these concepts. Finally, it will highlight some of the main points in the controversy surrounding these new principles and review the likely implications they will have for western, especially American, security.

1. "Reasonable Sufficiency"

In 1985, during a visit to France, Mikhail Gorbachev unveiled a new concept which he called "reasonable sufficiency." This announcement spurred a great deal of discussion not only in the West, but in the USSR as well. In short order, a flurry of articles was published in the military press debating the meaning of the term and its implications. The issue produced sharply differing opinions among top military officials. Some, such as Lt Gen of Aviation V. Serebryannikov and First Deputy Minister of Defense, Army General P. Lushev, took a more conservative line; they suggested that the current concept of strategic parity meets the requirements of "reasonable sufficiency" as defined in Warsaw

Pact announcements. Others, such as Minister of Defense, Army General D. Yazov, took a more progressive approach and emphasized that military potentials must be reduced to a point where, in the future, neither the Warsaw Pact nor NATO will possess forces enabling them to mount offensive operations. Some scientists, retired military personnel and researchers assigned to civilian "think tanks" sided with the progressives. The impetus generally cited for this new doctrine was a reduction of defense expenditures, savings from which would be diverted into the faltering civilian economy. One of the keynote articles on the topic was published in New Times in December 1987. In "Reasonable Sufficiency: Or How To Break the Vicious Circle," authors V. Zhurkin, S. Karaganov and A. Kortunov defined "reasonable sufficiency" as being determined "...not by the ability to win a large-scale regional conflict, but by ensuring an adequate defense potential so that the aggressor should not be able to count either on a 'regional blitzkrieg' or on escalating such a conflict with impunity." ¹³⁰

Western analysts also struggled with the new Soviet terminology. According to Mary Fitzgerald, formerly of the Center for Naval Analyses, the concept of "reasonable sufficiency" exists on two levels, nuclear and conventional. At the nuclear level, the concept results from the Kremlin's acceptance of the principle of "mutual assured destruction." Fitzgerald points to Leonid Brezhnev's 1977 Tula speech--in which he affirmed that the Soviet Union was not striving for superiority in nuclear armaments or in any other category of military power--as the first watershed event indicating Soviet

¹³⁰V. Zhurkin, S. Karaganov and A. Kortunov, "Reasonable Sufficiency: Or How to Break the Vicious Circle," New Times 40 (December 1987): 13.

acceptance of MAD.¹³¹ She also associates this evolution in Soviet doctrinal thinking with the Kremlin's adoption of a policy of "no-first-use" of nuclear weapons. (Although Fitzgerald interprets Brezhnev's "Tula line" as a Soviet declaration of "no-first-use" of nuclear weapons, the reader should note that the Kremlin did not publicly proclaim such a policy until it was announced in a statement by former Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in June 1982.¹³²) Fitzgerald maintains that the Kremlin adopted a philosophy of "mutual assured destruction," probably in the mid-1970s, after judging that the military utility of nuclear weapons had declined drastically at the same time that combat capabilities of advanced conventional munitions, or ACMs, had expanded. During the 1970s, the Soviets showed increasingly greater interest in ACMs versus nuclear weapons. Soviet military writings in that decade and in the early 1980s noted a qualitative transformation in conventional weapons flowing from combinations of technological advances in improved electronics, electro-optical components, computers, and improved munitions. These advances marked the onset of what the Soviets called a new "revolution in military affairs."

Mary Fitzgerald goes on to point out that the new interest in ACMs has stimulated a reevaluation of the role of the defense in modern warfare. This emphasis on the expanding role of ACMs links the nuclear level of "reasonable sufficiency" to the conventional level. The Soviets view ACMs as weapon systems capable of accomplishing

¹³¹Mary C. Fitzgerald, "Gorbachev's Concept of 'Reasonable Sufficiency.'" A paper presented at the Annual Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies in Boston, MA, 5-7 November 1987. Citation is from p. 3.

¹³²See David S. Yost, Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and the Western Alliance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 112. Dr. Yost also presents an excellent analysis of the much disputed "Tula line" in pp. 187-92 of the same book.

some tasks formerly given to nuclear weapons. According to Fitzgerald, the Soviets now believe that the potential of ACMs to deliver decisive strikes throughout the enemy's depth has dramatically increased the capabilities of the defense, causing a reevaluation of the previously held conviction that only a decisive offensive leads to victory. That reevaluation in turn altered the perceived relationship between the roles of the offense and defense in war, after their respective advantages and disadvantages were transformed in the nuclear age.¹³³

2. "Defensive Doctrine"

The new emphasis on the role of the defensive in warfare was also reflected in a series of articles reexamining more closely the 1943 Battle of Kursk, and Soviet analyses of U.S. and NATO defensive strategies. In 1986, Maj Gen A. Maryshev argued that the modern Soviet military should strive to create precisely such an intentional defense as was demonstrated in the Battle of Kursk.¹³⁴ Mary Fitzgerald views this article as having been a litmus test to judge the likely reception of the Warsaw Pact's newly declared "defensive doctrine." This new doctrine, announced in May 1987, has also incited considerable debate. According to the official Warsaw Pact announcement, the essence of this principle is the reduction of conventional forces in Europe to a level "...where neither side, in ensuring its defense, would have the means for a surprise attack on the other side or for mounting general offensive operations."¹³⁵

¹³³Ibid., 16.

¹³⁴Maj Gen Maryshev, "Some Problems of Strategic Defense in the Great Patriotic War," Military History Journal, No. 6, 1986: 16.

¹³⁵"On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Member States," Soviet Committee on European Security and Cooperation : Information Bulletin, No. 42, 1987. In Joint Publications Research Service (henceforth cited as "JPRS") JPRS-UMA-88-010-L, 2 Aug 88, 3.

B. ARE THESE CONCEPTS REALLY NEW?

Although the name of Mikhail Gorbachev is now popularly associated with the two "new" Soviet military concepts, a search of the available literature reveals that he did not originate either of these two principles. I will now describe the origins of each of these two concepts, in turn.

1. Origin of "Reasonable Sufficiency"

Looking first at the origin of "reasonable sufficiency," we find that, ironically enough, the concept was "borrowed" from American pronouncements from as far back as the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Nixon administrations. Even more ironic, as Ambassador Raymond Garthoff notes, is the fact that Soviet commentaries historically roundly criticized American allusions to "sufficiency" as "vague and intended to mask a pursuit of superiority."¹³⁶ It seems also that Gorbachev was not the first Soviet official to advance the idea of "sufficiency." The late Leonid Brezhnev stated, as far back as 1982, "...we have not spent, nor will we spend, a single ruble more for these [defensive] purposes than is absolutely necessary for assuring the security of our people..." because defense expenditures "...require diverting considerable resources to the detriment of our plans for peaceful construction."¹³⁷ Ambassador Garthoff also points out that a prominent Soviet spokesman had directly referred to "sufficiency" as a principle for regulating defense outlays before Gorbachev came to power; Lt Gen Dmitri Volkogonov wrote in January 1985

¹³⁶Raymond L. Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine," Washington Quarterly (Summer 1988): 138.

¹³⁷"Speech of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev to the Seventeenth Congress of the Trade Unions of the USSR," Pravda, March 17, 1982. Quoted in Raymond Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine," Washington Quarterly (Summer 1988): 138.

that, "...the Soviet Union, proceeding from the principle of sufficiency, does not strive to compete with the United States and NATO over the whole span of the arms race." ¹³⁸ Finally, Gorbachev himself had declared in 1983 that arms reductions should be based on "...preserving the overall balance, but at the lowest possible levels." ¹³⁹

2. The Case of the "Defensive Doctrine"

As in the case of "reasonable sufficiency," we find that the idea of a "defensive doctrine" also preceded the new Kremlin leader. Official Soviet pronouncements as far back as 1955 depicted the Warsaw Pact as a defensive alliance, founded to "...defend the gains of socialism." ¹⁴⁰ And, as already mentioned, the early 1980s witnessed a new emphasis on the role of defensive combat in Soviet military planning. Many scholars pointed out that traditional Soviet military thinking concentrated almost solely on the role of offensive actions with a resulting virtual exclusion of studies of defensive missions. As indicated by Mary Fitzgerald's description of changing Soviet views on warfighting, many western analysts believe that the "defensive doctrine" is related to evolving Soviet concerns on war prevention, especially the prevention of an accidental nuclear war. This assertion seemed to be confirmed in part by a statement made in 1989 by Army General Petr Lushch, Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Forces of the Warsaw Pact:

¹³⁸Lt Gen Dmitri A. Volkogonov, "Political Lessons of the Victory and the Present Day," Questions of Philosophy, No. 1, 1985: 39. Quoted in Raymond Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine," Washington Quarterly (Summer 1988): 138.

¹³⁹Mikhail Gorbachev, "Leninism is a Living, Creative Teaching and Correct Guide to Action," Pravda, 23 April 1983. Quoted in Raymond Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine," Washington Quarterly (Summer 1988): 139.

¹⁴⁰"Unequalled Historical Victory of the Soviet People," Military Thought, No. 5, 1955. Quoted in Stephen R. Covington, "NATO and Soviet Military Doctrine," Washington Quarterly (Autumn 1989): 73.

What is new and most important here is the fact that whereas military doctrine was previously defined as a system of views on preparing for a possible war and how to fight it, the key point in the definition now is the prevention of war. The task of preventing war is becoming the highest goal, the nucleus of our military doctrine and the main function of our states and their joint Armed Forces.¹⁴¹

C. THE RELATIONSHIP OF "REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY" TO THE "DEFENSIVE DOCTRINE"

The two concepts of "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive doctrine" are key to Gorbachev's plan for military reform; they are also closely linked to one another. "Reasonable sufficiency" is intended by Gorbachev to be used as a yardstick by which to measure the level of forces needed for the "defensive doctrine." This position is confirmed by Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, former chief of the Soviet general staff. He noted in 1987 that

The defensive character of Soviet military doctrine manifests itself in the fact that the Soviet Union resolutely advocates maintaining the balance of military forces at the lowest possible level, reducing military potentials to levels of sufficiency necessary for defense.¹⁴²

More recently, Army General A. D. Lizichev discussed what he termed "certain nuances" of the defensive doctrine:

Defensive doctrine...is a principle of reasonable sufficiency. What does it consist of? It consists of...general purpose forces being maintained at the minimum level which will enable us to preserve political stability and make our country safe from

¹⁴¹Army General Petr Lushev, "Soviet and Warsaw Pact Goals and Developments," RUSI Journal (Autumn 1989): 4.

¹⁴²Marshal S. Akhromeyev, "The Glory and the Pride of the Soviet People," Soviet Russia, 21 February 1987. Quoted in Raymond Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine," Washington Quarterly (Summer 1988): 139.

the strike of an aggressor. Insofar as the strategic nuclear forces are concerned, we have been maintaining them at a level equal for us and the United States. We will maintain that parity in nuclear missile forces and that equilibrium...¹⁴³

D. THE CONTROVERSY

Our research so far indicates that the two "new" military doctrines predated Gorbachev. If the ideas manifested in these two concepts are not new, then why are many western authorities so concerned? In my judgement, the controversy surrounding the new Soviet proclamations centers around three main points:

- To the West, there seems to be a conflict in definitions between the formally declared Warsaw Pact "defensive doctrine" and the apparent very offensively-oriented nature of its military forces.
- Many authorities fear some sort of a Kremlin trick, a foreign policy "Trojan Horse."
- Finally, many observers claim that, as of late 1989, the West had seen little concrete evidence of a change in the Warsaw Pact force structure.

Let us briefly analyze each of these points.

1. A Contradiction Between Claims and Reality?

a. *Clues in Soviet Terminology*

A close reading of Soviet military literature gives some valuable insights into the apparent duality of their new doctrine. "Military doctrine," as defined by the Soviets, has two levels or dimensions: the socio-political and the military-technical.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³Army General A. D. Lizichev, in a statement aired on Radio Moscow on 12 February 1989.

¹⁴⁴Dictionary of Basic Military Terms: A Soviet View. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), 37. Translated and published in English by the U.S. Air Force (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973)

The socio-political aspect establishes the political objectives in war and the economic, social and legal basis for the fulfillment of these objectives. The military-technical aspect encompasses problems of force development, technical equipping of forces, and forms and methods by which peacetime operations and warfighting would be conducted. ¹⁴⁵ Author Stephen Covington aptly describes the differences in the two aspects as follows: the socio-political aspect establishes the political rationale for possessing armed forces, while the military-technical establishes requirements for war preparation. ¹⁴⁶ Historically, the socio-political aspect has been determined almost solely by the party leadership, whereas the military-technical area has traditionally been the domain of the military.

A second point crucial to understanding Soviet thinking is that stated military doctrine is intended only as a general guideline for the conduct of war; in a war, doctrine is largely overshadowed by the immediate requirements of military strategy. As outlined in the Soviet Officer's Handbook, this principle is defined as follows:

In wartime, military doctrine drops into the background somewhat, since in armed conflict, we are guided primarily by military-political and military-strategic considerations, conclusions and generalizations which stem from the conditions of the specific situation. Consequently, war and armed conflict is governed by strategy, not doctrine. ¹⁴⁷

Considering the 1987 Warsaw Pact "defensive doctrine" in this regard, the socio-political aspect of the doctrine would provide for a stated non-offensive and non-provocative

¹⁴⁵Ibid.

¹⁴⁶Stephen R. Covington, "NATO and Soviet Military Doctrine," Washington Quarterly (Autumn 1989): 74.

¹⁴⁷Maj Gen S. Kozlov, ed., The Officer's Handbook (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971). Published in English by the U.S. Air Force (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 65.

peacetime doctrine which, in war, would be immediately superseded by a military strategy which would not fail to employ offensive thrusts against the enemy. What appears to the western reader as a misleading if not duplicitous conflict between the stated policy and the factual force structure therefore represents no controversy whatsoever to a Red Army steeped in the tenets of traditional Soviet military terminology. Soviet Minister of Defense Yazov himself has declared, "There is no contradiction between the adoption of a defensive doctrine and the combination of offensive and defensive operations in the defeat of the enemy." ¹⁴⁸

b. Soviet Differences of Opinion

Adding to western confusion and suspicion is the existence of great differences of opinion among various Soviet officials as to the meanings of "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive doctrine." I have already described the debate over the meaning of "reasonable sufficiency;" the concept of "defensive doctrine" has sparked an equally vigorous debate. There are even cases where the same official gives differing opinions on the issue. For instance, in June 1987 Colonel General Gareyev stated that "...the basic method of action of the Soviet Armed Forces for repelling aggression will be defensive operations and combat actions." ¹⁴⁹ In his book published during the same year, however, Gareyev wrote that a decisive defeat of the enemy can only be attained by

¹⁴⁸Army General D. Yazov, On Guard for Socialism and Peace (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987), 33.

¹⁴⁹"Doctrine on the Prevention of War," Krasnaya zvezda, 23 June 1987, 3. Quoted in Josephine J. Bonan, The Current Debate Over Soviet Defense Policy, P-7526, (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1989), 25.

conducting decisive counteroffensive operations.¹³⁰ Granted, Gareyev's book may represent views which he held previous to the May 1987 declaration of the "defensive doctrine," and he may now have changed his opinion on the matter. There have been many pronouncements since 1987 which tend to indicate a decided shift in Soviet doctrinal thinking. Representative of these views is one posited by Colonel G. Ionin in 1988:

Soviet military doctrine...is thoroughly defensive in nature. This means that we will not begin military operations if we are not subjected to armed attack. If the imperialists unleash war, we will be forced from the very outset to repel the invasion of the aggressor, and only after that will we transition to a decisive offensive.¹⁵¹

The Minister of Defense himself, Army General Yazov, has added to the confusion by publicly supporting the new defensive doctrine while at the same time appearing to denounce a strictly defensive doctrine in his 1987 book. In the book, he stated that "...it is impossible, however, to smash the enemy with defense alone. Therefore, after the repelling of the attack, land and naval forces must be capable of conducting a decisive offensive."¹⁵²

Although the foregoing discussion of the definition of "military doctrine" and its various aspects explains to some degree the perceived contradiction between declared Warsaw Pact doctrine and actual force levels and structure, there remains a great deal of evidence that the Soviets themselves have not resolved exactly what is to be made

¹³⁰M.A. Gareyev, Soviet Military Science (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987), 36. Quoted in Josephine J. Bonan, The Current Debate Over Soviet Defense Policy, P-7526, (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1989), 25.

¹⁵¹Colonel G. Ionin, "Foundations of the Modern Defensive Battle," Military Herald, No. 3, 1988.

¹⁵²Army General Dmitri Yazov, On Guard for Socialism and Peace (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987), 33.

of the new "defensive doctrine." This suspicion was confirmed in a December 1989 lecture by Soviet Lt General S. Starodubov, of the Voroshilov General Staff Academy, in a visit to the West German Bundeswehr's Staff Academy in Hamburg. In that lecture, Starodubov admitted that there had been a contradiction in the past between the defensive nature of the socio-political side of Soviet military doctrine and the military-technical side which had previously emphasized offensive actions to defeat an aggressor. Lt Gen Starodubov declared in that lecture that the previous contradiction has been overcome and that both the theory and the practical part of military art are now determined by the concept of a defensive strategy.¹⁵³

The existence of major differences of opinion inside the USSR is especially evident between the aforementioned military officials and members of the new civilian "think tanks" which, although not formally a part of the military policymaking process, seem to be having an ever greater impact on the thinking of senior officials. Civilian defense analysts largely echo Gorbachev's contention that the security of the USSR is best guaranteed through political means rather than by a continued military buildup. Valentin Falin observed that Soviet security has become "...mostly political, and its military solution is becoming increasingly inappropriate."¹⁵⁴ Writers V. Zhurkin, S. Karaganov and A. Kortunov were even more forceful in advocating political rather than military means in preserving Soviet national security; they said that "...by relying exclusively on military-technical means a state [the USSR] inevitably set its own security against international

¹⁵³Brigitte Sauerwein and Matthias Plugge, "New Soviet Military Doctrine: The Voroshilov Academy's Interpretation," International Defense Review, No. 1, 1990: 21.

¹⁵⁴V. M. Falin, Moscow News, 8 November 1987. Quoted in Josephine J. Bonan, The Current Debate Over Soviet Defense Policy, P-7526, (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1989), 25.

security..."¹⁵⁵ This statement hearkens to Mikhail Gorbachev's 1987 pronouncements that the USSR could no longer ensure its own security at the expense of other countries, especially the United States.¹⁵⁶

2. A Soviet "Trojan Horse?"

Even more vitriolic than the internal Soviet debate over terminology is the western debate on these concepts. Although many in the West accept as valid Soviet claims of military reforms, a number of very respected observers still distrust Soviet motives under "new thinking." According to Josephine Bonan of the RAND Corporation, a vocal minority of western analysts views recent Soviet proposals as merely temporary changes instituted to gain a breathing space during which the USSR can concentrate on resuscitating its lagging economy. These analysts fear that, once the Soviet economy is back on track, the West will face a heightened threat characterized by three conditions:

- The USSR will no longer be constrained by an unwieldy economy.
- The West will have been lulled into a false sense of security.
- The USSR will have used the resulting breathing space to develop a new generation of high-technology weapons that would pose a serious threat to the U.S. and its allies.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁵V. Zhurkin, S. Karaganov and A. Kortunov, "Reasonable Sufficiency: Or How to Break the Vicious Circle," New Times 40 (December 1987): 13.

¹⁵⁶Robert Legvold, "War, Weapons, and Soviet Foreign Policy," in Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy, ed. Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1988), 125.

¹⁵⁷Josephine J. Bonan, The Current Debate Over Soviet Defense Policy, P-7526, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, January 1989), 2.

The worst fears of this group are perhaps best summed-up by Mr. James McConnell of the Center for Naval Analyses; Mr. McConnell notes,

A government [of the USSR] able to impose a real burden of defense on its own people two to three times more onerous than its capitalist competitors is not likely to forget where its competitive advantage lies. If Gorbachev is proposing that the USSR retire from the military competition today, that is probably only so it can return with a greater effectiveness tomorrow.¹⁵⁸

Those who remain unconvinced of Soviet good will are increasingly finding themselves ignored or shunned amidst the celebration of the purported ending of the Cold War. Despite the prevailing spirit of euphoria, many noted western authorities remain skeptical of the apparently slumbering Soviet bear. Mr. Leon Goure, for one, is deeply suspicious of Soviet motives. Goure claims,

...the putative 'new' Soviet military doctrine is not a military doctrine at all, but rather a political propaganda statement primarily intended to reinforce the image of the Soviet Union's peaceful intentions. A careful reading of Soviet sources reveals considerable confusion and controversy... but no real substance. It remains to be seen whether Gorbachev's enthusiasm for change will also give rise to a really new and different Soviet military doctrine...¹⁵⁹

Former French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac also remains unconvinced of Soviet sincerity. While acknowledging that more time needs to elapse before final judgments can be made, Chirac remarks, "As far as Moscow's strategic objectives are concerned, nothing to this day indicates that they have been drastically modified."¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸James M. McConnell, "Reasonable Sufficiency" in Soviet Conventional Arms-Control Strategy (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1987), 12-13, (CNA) 87-1918.

¹⁵⁹Leon Goure, "A 'New' Soviet Military Doctrine: Reality or Mirage?" Strategic Review (Summer 1988): 25.

¹⁶⁰Jacques Chirac, "Soviet Change and Western Security," Strategic Review (Winter 1989): 9.

Other authors do not buy the idea of a "Trojan Horse." Although uncertain of what will ultimately transpire, these writers point to contemporary Soviet doctrinal statements and arms control initiatives as proof that a significant shift is occurring in Soviet military doctrine and military affairs. Writers Phillip Petersen and Notra Trulock, for example, believe that Soviet political leaders are attempting to acquire more control over the formulation of military doctrine; in return, they have gained the military's cooperation with the promise of future dividends in the form of improved technologies provided by a revived and more vigorous Soviet economy. Petersen and Trulock state that, most importantly,

It is in the linkage between the military's forecast of [a revolution in military affairs] and the positive political developments in the Soviet Union where a new basis may emerge for a potentially more stable East-West security relationship.¹⁶¹

3. Changes Noted As of the End of 1989

Let's now review some factors which may indicate the validity of claimed Soviet military reforms. One clear indication of Soviet sincerity would seem to be found in Kremlin adherence to its promised unilateral force reductions announced by Secretary Gorbachev in December 1988. The essential points covered in those reductions were:

- the size of the Soviet armed forces will be cut by 500,000 men;
- six tank divisions will be withdrawn from Eastern Europe and disbanded;
- 50,000 men and 5,000 tanks will be removed from Eastern Europe; and

¹⁶¹Phillip A. Petersen and Notra Trulock III, "A 'New' Soviet Military Doctrine: Origins and Implications," Strategic Review (Summer 1988): 21.

- Soviet forces in the western USSR will be reduced by 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery pieces, and 800 combat aircraft.¹⁶²

How have these cutbacks proceeded so far? According to Army General Moiseyev, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, as of 1 October 1989, the following forces had already been withdrawn from Eastern Europe into the USSR:

- 3 tank divisions;
- 3 tank training regiments;
- 2 SAM training regiments;
- 1 air regiment;
- 1 helicopter regiment;
- 2 SAM brigades;
- 4 assault battalions;
- and 2 assault river crossing battalions, along with "other special troop units."¹⁶³

In addition to the above cuts announced by Army General Moiseyev in the closing weeks of 1989, talks are under way to provide for the withdrawal of additional Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, and in fact agreements have already been reached to withdraw all Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia and from Hungary. The implications of the specific agreements in Eastern Europe will be addressed in greater detail in the following two chapters.

¹⁶²James A. Thomson, Implications of the Gorbachev Force Cuts, P-7533, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1989), 1.

¹⁶³"Moiseyev Details Armed Forces Cuts," Jane's Defense Weekly, 11 November 1989, p. 1050.

Another gauge of Soviet intentions being closely scrutinized is the Kremlin defense budget. Despite Gorbachev's pledge in early 1988 to reduce military spending, some sources until recently maintained that the USSR had in truth not cut spending at all. In May 1989, the Committee on the Present Danger released a lengthy report stating that "...the Soviets continue to produce military equipment and hardware at a rapid pace..." and that "...the problems of the Soviet economy have not forced a significant shift in resources away from the military to the civilian sector."¹⁶⁴ One would naturally expect a highly conservative viewpoint from this particular source, but until the Bush administration on 13 November 1989 issued a report favorable to Soviet claims, the preceding view was the commonly held western opinion. The November 1989 government report indicated that the Soviets had indeed reduced their military spending in 1989. Final figures for the year have not yet been tabulated, but the report indicated that "...Soviet military spending as a percentage of the Soviet GNP would slip to between 14-16 percent," as compared to between 15-17 percent for 1988.¹⁶⁵ Although this news was received with great enthusiasm in Washington, initial reports of only a one- or two-percent decrease left ample room for doubt regarding a hoped-for more significant reduction.

Reports in the closing days of 1989 gave additional reason to believe in Soviet good intentions. In a 16 December 1989 Izvestiya article, the Soviet Ministry of Defense announced that its total defense budget in 1990 will amount to 70,975.8 million rubles, a

¹⁶⁴Committee on the Present Danger, Soviet Defense Expenditures. A report released on 16 May 1989 (Washington, D.C.: Committee on the Present Danger, 1989), 1.

¹⁶⁵Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. Says Soviets Apparently Cut Arms Spending," Washington Post, 14 November 1989, A9.

figure which the Kremlin claims is 8.2 percent lower than total defense outlays for 1989.¹⁶⁶

The last figures, if verified, would indeed provide a hopeful sign that the Kremlin leadership is taking concrete steps to reduce the Soviet threat to western nations and lend greater credibility to Soviet claims of "defensiveness." However, a firm appraisal of real reductions in Soviet defense spending is made difficult due to disagreements over the true extent of total Soviet defense expenditures and even the true size of the Soviet GNP, which serves as the basis for the overall comparison. For instance, Leon Goure points to a series of confusing statistics on the USSR's defense budget released last year in the Soviet press. On May 30, 1989, Secretary Gorbachev stated that the Kremlin's defense budget for 1989 was 77.3 billion rubles. Gorbachev also alluded to defense spending in the previous two years. According to Goure, claimed Soviet defense spending based on these figures is sharply at odds with most U.S. estimates.¹⁶⁷ Granted, the U.S. still has a lot to learn about Soviet defense budgets, but a lack of "openness" in the realm of defense spending is making a belief in Soviet pronouncements all the more difficult.

Despite the doubts engendered by such varying indicators, more and more western authorities are now becoming convinced of dramatic shifts in Soviet military doctrine and military policy. One such expert, Mr. Robert Bathurst, a former U.S. assistant naval attache to Moscow, has drawn some dramatic conclusions from recent events in the USSR. Bathurst believes that the new "defensive doctrine" or "non-provocative defense"

¹⁶⁶"USSR Defense Ministry Announcement," Izvestiya, 16 December 1989, 16. Quoted in FBIS-SOV-89-242, 19 December 1989, 1.

¹⁶⁷Leon Goure, "The Strange Soviet Defense Budget," Strategic Review (Summer 1989): 83.

is real, and that it results directly from the Soviet military failure in Afghanistan. Its inability to win a decisive victory against a Third World power at its very doorstep, when combined with previously mentioned evolving Soviet conceptions about modern war, has robbed the Soviet military of its credibility with the CPSU and with the Soviet people. According to Bathurst, the Soviet leadership views the Brezhnev Doctrine as outdated and impotent, but they are unsure of what should replace it. The new "non-provocative defense" has been adopted in an attempt to avoid starting a war which the Soviets may not be capable of winning.¹⁶⁶ Mr. Bathurst believes that the Warsaw Pact military doctrine has been altered not only due to Gorbachev's desire to divert more resources into the domestic economy, but also because the very conceptual basis of the Soviet military doctrine has changed.

While evidence does exist that Soviet thinking may be changing, what proof have we seen of a lessened military threat from Moscow? In a lecture presented in November 1989, Mr. Andrew Marshall, the Pentagon's Director of Net Assessments, said that limited evidence then existed indicating possible changes in Warsaw Pact doctrine and force structure, but that the results were inconclusive at that point. Specifically, Marshall noted that the Soviets have modified their recent military exercises to increasingly emphasize defensive actions. Also, some changes had been noted in the last eighteen months which indicate a more limited Soviet naval deployment. Asked to name other factors that would to him be substantial proof of actual doctrinal changes, Mr. Marshall outlined the following: a withdrawal of all Soviet forces to home soil, a reduction of forward-deployed offensive forces, and the preparation of fortifications or static defensive

¹⁶⁶Robert Bathurst, in a lecture presented to the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, on 7 December 1989.

positions within the borders of the USSR. (These indicators will be discussed in greater length in the next chapter.) Mr. Marshall stated that "...we have seen none of the latter changes..." and indicated that he was as yet unconvinced of a real change in Soviet military doctrine.¹⁶⁹

This chapter has explored the origins of the "defensive doctrine" and the principle of "reasonable sufficiency" and has described the intense debates surrounding these issues in both East and West. Much of the research represented in this chapter was completed before the onset of the democratic revolutions which swept over Eastern Europe in the final weeks of 1989; as will be depicted shortly, these dramatic events have already had a profound effect on the Soviet military establishment and on the western perception of the Soviet threat. The following two chapters will discuss the impact of force structure changes under way in Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and how these issues will affect the future security environment in Europe.

¹⁶⁹Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessments, U.S. Department of Defense, in a lecture presented at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, on 29 November 1989.

VI. THE EVOLVING SOVIET FORCE STRUCTURE: PROSPECTS AND POTENTIALS

The political tidal wave which cascaded over Eastern Europe in the closing months of 1989 poses critical new questions regarding the future of Soviet and Warsaw Pact military forces. In this chapter, I will examine some of the mounting evidence of significant changes under way in the force structure of Soviet forces deployed in Eastern Europe and will also describe some possible scenarios for the future deployments of those forces. Taking the analysis one step farther, I will then review a number of Soviet proposals concerning forces stationed in the USSR. The latter issue will increase in importance as more and more Soviet forces are withdrawn from Eastern Europe into the Soviet Union. All of the ideas presented in this chapter are highly speculative in nature. They involve questions which may not have been decided yet even by the Soviets, and which will certainly not be readily apparent to the West for months or years to come. They are, however, issues which must be thought out by western analysts.

A. A CONTINUING PATTERN OF CHANGE

The changes apparently under way in Soviet force structure were reviewed by Colonel David Glantz of the U.S. Army's Soviet Army Studies Office in an article published in the September 1989 edition of the Journal of Soviet Military Studies.¹⁷⁰ Colonel Glantz places the ongoing force changes in context by demonstrating that this is not the first, but the fifth time, since 1945 that the Soviets have restructured their forces in Europe.

¹⁷⁰David M. Glantz, "Soviet Force Structure in an Era of Reform," Journal of Soviet Military Studies, No. 3, 1989: 361-93.

The first post-World War II conversion occurred in 1946 when the Soviets transformed their tank armies, tank corps and mechanized corps into mechanized armies, tank divisions and mechanized divisions. The resulting forces were better balanced combined-arms units which could serve as counterattack forces and at the same time provide a defensive dimension.¹⁷¹ The second transition was undertaken in 1956 when the Soviet High Command replaced their large mechanized armies and mechanized and rifle divisions with smaller tank armies and motorized rifle divisions. The Kremlin considered this structure to be less susceptible to atomic attack while it still possessed sufficient strength in infantry, tanks and artillery to provide a strong conventional capability. After about 1960, the Soviets decided that any future war would be fought with nuclear weapons, and the force structure was again altered to reflect the new strategy. This time, the tank and combined-arms armies and the motorized rifle divisions were decreased in manpower and the tank forces were restructured. Following Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, Soviet thinking turned once more to a more conventional posture, but the transition took several years to complete. The ground forces gradually expanded and, although remaining armor-heavy, added to their strength additional mechanized infantry and artillery. The force became more mobile and better streamlined for sustained, deep conventional operations.¹⁷²

Since the late 1960s, the Soviets have retained the theme of deep conventional operations while experimenting with a wide variety of force mixes. They have introduced a broad array of new weaponry to reflect their interpretation of the evolving military

¹⁷¹Ibid., 362.

¹⁷²Ibid., 363-64.

situation, placing great emphasis on the lessons learned vicariously from Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli Wars, and the Falklands.¹⁷³ Advanced weapon systems, including antitank guided missiles, new armored vehicles, tanks, self-propelled artillery, and mobile bridging equipment, were added to the inventory. These features gave the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces tremendous new offensively-oriented capabilities. And, in a move that gave Pact forces a more menacing offensive capability, the Soviets experimented with corps- and brigade-size elements designed to conduct deep operational maneuver, the so-called "operational maneuver groups."¹⁷⁴ These and other structure modifications created more flexible forces capable of performing the critical functions of tactical and operational maneuver in theater war.¹⁷⁵

Since 1982, writes Colonel Glantz, Soviet recognition of new realities—some political and economic and some related directly to evolving weapons technology—has prompted a new wave of even more fundamental changes. The most recent series of changes appears intended to further streamline Soviet forces to make them less offensively-oriented, or to at least appear less menacing within the context of more peaceful Soviet overtures to the West. Specifically, Colonel Glantz feels that the Soviets have begun to replace the old "tank-heavy" structure with a more balanced combined-arms force which can better cope with warfare in an age of high technology weaponry on an increasingly urbanized and heavier forested battlefield in central Europe.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷³Ibid., 364.

¹⁷⁴Ibid., 365.

¹⁷⁵Ibid.

¹⁷⁶Ibid.

B. DEFINITION OF "REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS"

Soviet military thinking is pervaded with the idea that all military issues can be quantified in a scientific way along the dialectical lines of Marxist-Leninist principles. According to this rationale, the level of Soviet military art and the international security environment at any chosen time results from the "means of material production" or the state of technological advancement. At different stages in history, advancements such as the introduction of firearms and nuclear weapons so drastically alter the level of military technology that they cause a revolutionary, rather than evolutionary, shift.¹⁷⁷ Such momentous changes are termed by the Soviets as "revolutions in military affairs," which in turn spur a change in basic military doctrine and strategy. According to Soviet military writings, such a revolution in military affairs occurred during the 1970s and early 1980s with the introduction of advanced conventional munitions. As described in the last chapter, the Soviets reevaluated such basic principles as their policies toward "mutual assured destruction" at the strategic nuclear level and the prevailing attitude that a decisive offensive was superior to defensive actions. One product of this reevaluation was the May 1987 declaration of the Warsaw Pact's new "defensive doctrine." The tangible results of even such a dramatic doctrinal shift do not appear overnight, but require as much as several years to "trickle down" to the operational and tactical levels.¹⁷⁸ In accordance with this view, the changes in Soviet force structure resulting from the May 1987 doctrinal shift may only now be coming into evidence.

¹⁷⁷See for example Colonel General F. Gayvoronskiy, The Evolution of Military Art: Stages, Tendencies, Principles (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987). Translated and published in English by Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS-UMA-89-012-L, 12 October 1989. See citations on pages 6, 8.

¹⁷⁸*Ibid.*, 13.

C. EVIDENCE FROM SOVIET MILITARY WRITINGS OF A POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL CHANGE

Quite often, hints of changes in Soviet doctrine and force structure can be gleaned from debates on Soviet military science which are published from time to time in the military press. Colonel Glantz believes that one such clue on the evolving force structure can be found in the republication in September 1985 of a speech made by Soviet General P. Rotmistrov in 1945. In the original speech, General Rotmistrov, Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, had analyzed the operations of the 1st Byelorussian Front in the Second World War, along with the storming of Berlin. The general concluded that the Soviet force structure was too "tank-heavy" and that it lacked the combined-arms balance necessary to fight successfully in a more heavily forested, urbanized, and hilly central Europe.¹⁷⁹ Colonel Glantz conjectures that the republication of this article in 1985 indicates that the changeover to a new force structure was already well under way.

D. THREE POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL MODELS POSED BY COL GLANTZ

One future model of Soviet force posturing envisioned by Colonel Glantz involves the conversion of front operational maneuver units into a corps configuration. Dr. Daniel Goure, Director of Soviet Studies at SRS Technologies, provides additional evidence of such a transformation in the Fall 1989 issue of Strategic Review. Dr. Goure describes experiments conducted in 1987 by the Soviets and Hungarians in which brigades and corps replaced the traditional regimental and division structure. This new structure, according

¹⁷⁹From the Report of the Commander of Armored and Mechanized Forces of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, Marshal of Armored Forces, P. A. Rotmistrov, at a military-scientific conference on the study of the Berlin Operation," Military History Journal, No. 9, 1985: 43-50. Quoted in David M. Glantz, "Soviet Force Structure in an Era of Reform," The Journal of Soviet Military Studies, No. 3, 1989: 366.

to Goure, would offer a more flexible design for controlling forces on the battlefield, offensively as well as defensively.¹⁸⁰ Author John Lough provides more evidence of these alterations in a January 1989 issue of Soviet Analyst. According to Lough, the Hungarian Army's spring 1987 reform involved modernizing its force structure by streamlining five previous divisions into three corps, making it better equipped overall to face potential enemies on a variety of terrains. Notes Lough,

The Warsaw Pact is too integrated for the Hungarian move to be seen as an isolated case. This has been confirmed by similar reorganizational changes afoot in at least two significant divisions in the West of the Soviet Union. Similar changes are certain to affect the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) and are, probably, already underway.¹⁸¹

Finally, author Graham H. Turbiville declares that there are indications that the Soviet divisions being reorganized will become combined-arms corps, with each division's regiments restructured as brigades. These brigades may consist of combined-arms battalions with motorized rifle and tank companies.¹⁸²

Currently, the Soviet wartime force structure, as postulated by David Glantz, would consist of fronts containing three or four combined-arms armies and two to four tank armies. Under a corps configuration, tank armies, for example, would consist of a combination of tank and mechanized corps, with tank corps being "tank-heavy" and mechanized corps being balanced combined-arms forces. In a second possible model, the Kremlin could convert the entire force structure into a corps configuration, rather than just

¹⁸⁰Daniel Goure, "A New Soviet National Security Policy for the 21st Century," Strategic Review (Fall 1989): 43.

¹⁸¹John Lough, Soviet Analyst, 11 January 1989, 3.

¹⁸²Graham H. Turbiville, "Soviet Troop Reductions in Europe: Changing the Engineer Force Structure," The Military Engineer (March-April, 1989): 11.

the front operational forces. According to the author, such a new corps structure would allow the Soviets to conceal operational and tactical maneuver elements within their force structure. This would also blur distinctions and comparisons between NATO and Soviet forces and possibly give the USSR an additional advantage in ongoing conventional arms talks. Finally, a third option open to the Soviets would call for drastically reducing the size and offensive capabilities of most or all units. In this model, throughout the entire force, the most offensively-oriented elements (e.g., armor, air assault and assault bridging) would be severely curtailed or even abolished altogether.¹⁸³

An interview with USSR Defense Minister D. T. Yazov in February 1989 confirms Colonel Glantz's contention that some sort of restructuring is occurring in Soviet groups of forces. In the interview, Yazov described how the Soviet unilateral withdrawal from Eastern Europe will consist of two phases. In the first phase, a number of measures will be implemented to give the forces a more defensive orientation. One such measure will include "...converting combined-arms formations to a new organizational structure."¹⁸⁴ Judging from this interview, the announced Soviet force alterations appear to be conforming more along the lines of Colonel Glantz's third, most defensive, model. According to Yazov:

Tank regiments will be removed from the motorized infantry divisions of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the Central Group of Forces. They will be left only with motorized infantry regiments, and the number of tanks will fall by 40 percent. The number of tanks in tank divisions will fall by more than 20 percent as a result of excluding one tank regiment from them. In the reorganized divisions

¹⁸³David M. Glantz, "Soviet Force Structure in an Era of Reform," Journal of Soviet Military Studies, No. 3, 1989: 361-93.

¹⁸⁴Army General D. T. Yazov, "In the Interests of Universal Security and Peace," Izvestiya, 28 February 1989, 3. Quoted in FBIS-SOV-89-038, 28 February 1989, 3.

there will be an increase in the number of antitank and antiaircraft means, means for creating obstacles and laying minefields, and also engineering position camouflage equipment. As a result, these formations and units will acquire a qualitatively different structure, namely a defensive one.¹⁸⁵

E. "OFFENSIVE" VERSUS "DEFENSIVE" SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

In a related article, Colonel Glantz again focuses on the ongoing restructuring of Soviet forces in Europe.¹⁸⁶ In that piece, Colonel Glantz discusses the debate now under way between two schools of thought in the Soviet military, one school arguing that the traditional offensive posture is still valid, and the second group favoring a more defensive posture. The author posits that adoption of a lighter force structure, whose forward-deployed elements lack components critical to conducting large-scale maneuvers, may indicate that the defensive school predominates. The adoption of a heavier force structure, in terms of armor and mobility assets, would conversely indicate that the old school still prevails. Colonel Glantz believes that development of a lighter force structure is reflected in recent Soviet pronouncements concerning the reorganization of tanks and motorized rifle formations, the creation of artillery/machine gun formations and the reductions of tank strength in these formations.¹⁸⁷

F. A SOVIET MODEL: FROM THE KOKOSHIN-LARIONOV ARTICLE

Assuming that the Soviets are indeed transforming their European force structure, what form is the resultant force expected to assume? Once again we look to Soviet

¹⁸⁵Ibid.

¹⁸⁶David M. Glantz, "Soviet Operational Maneuver in a Period of Reform," Military Review, No. 12, 1989: 31-43.

¹⁸⁷Ibid., 42.

military literature for clues. An extremely interesting article appeared in the June 1988 edition of World Economics and International Relations. In it, the authors Andrei Kokoshin and Maj General (Ret.) V. Larionov discussed four hypothetical variants of force deployments that might be assumed by both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces under the newly declared "defensive doctrine."¹⁸⁸ In the first variant, each of the sides is oriented in a heavily offensive mode with the goal of conducting "...rapid counteractions, toward the conduct of strategic offensive operations." Under this scenario, the opposing sides would each attempt to shift combat operations into enemy territory as soon as possible. The writers depict these conditions as highly unstable, giving the opposing sides' political authorities a minimum of control, which, in extreme cases, "...can take the shape of an irreversible escalation of military activities, right up to the use of tactical nuclear weapons."¹⁸⁹ The authors note that this first variant is a traditional one which predominated in both world wars. This particular model is also the one assumed by Soviet forces at least until May 1987.

Whereas the first variant envisioned by the authors provides for each side to undertake decisive offensive and counteroffensive operations at the strategic level, the second variation assumes that each side would construct deeply echeloned, pre-positioned defensive lines prepared in advance of the start of war. The attacked side would fight to bring the invader to a halt, possibly withdrawing and giving-up some territory in the process. Once the enemy's initial attack is halted, defending forces would then launch

¹⁸⁸ Andrei Kokoshin and Major General (Ret.) Valentin Larionov, "Counterpositioning Conventional Forces in the Context of Ensuring Strategic Stability," World Economics and International Relations, No. 6, 1988: 23-31. This article was translated into English by the U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Group, Charlottesville, VA.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 5.

decisive counteroffensives to repel the enemy back to his own territory. This scenario provides for decisive counteroffensives at the operational and strategic levels. The model is loosely based on Soviet experiences at the Battle of Kursk in 1943, although the authors seem to imply that the analogy should not be pushed too far. The threat of escalation in this second scenario, according to Kokoshin and Larionov, "...remains as high as in the first variant."

The first two models implied that defending forces might pursue the enemy into his own territory until a decisive defeat was attained; in contrast, the third version specifically rules out pursuit of the enemy onto his own territory. Instead, the side attacked would seek to restore the situation to the original status quo existing at the outset of hostilities. The authors strongly imply that counteroffensives would be allowable on the operational and tactical levels, but not at the strategic level; they specifically point out that neither side would seek to achieve a victory at the strategic level in this scenario.¹⁹⁰ Soviet actions against the Japanese in the 1939 Khalkin-Gol operations in Mongolia and the combat experiences of the Korean War are cited by the authors as examples of such a scenario.

Finally, the fourth variant assumes that each of the opposing sides would select, based on mutual agreement beforehand, to establish a more purely defensive stance. Decisive counteroffensives would be conducted only at the tactical level (including battalion, regimental or, at most, division-size units) and the opposing sides would not seek a decisive military victory at either the operational or strategic level.¹⁹¹ Under these conditions, the authors point out, such capabilities as air attack assets, "reconnaissance-

¹⁹⁰Ibid., 6.

¹⁹¹Ibid., 8.

strike" systems and strictly offensively-oriented units would be severely curtailed or prohibited.

The authors acknowledge that achieving a more stable and less offensively-oriented posturing of forces, as well as convincing the other side of peaceful intentions, presents great difficulty. According to Kokoshin and Larionov,

The most appropriate [variant] for the idea of strengthening strategic stability and reducing military potentials of each of the sides to the limits of sufficiency, dictated only by the needs of the defense in its semblance brought to a logical end, is the fourth variant.¹⁹²

G. A PROGRESS REPORT BY ANDREI KOKOSHIN IN DECEMBER 1988

Were the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies to adopt and then clearly implement a force posture resembling the fourth variant described above, that would go a long way toward erasing western doubts regarding the validity of the "defensive doctrine." Despite the recommendations of Kokoshin and Larionov, a purely defensive force posturing may be under consideration, but was not immediately adopted. This observation was confirmed by Andrei Kokoshin, one of the two original authors, in an interview published in Detente magazine in December 1988.¹⁹³ The correspondent refers to the previously cited article and asks Kokoshin to confirm that, of the four variants of force deployments described, the USSR's current structure most closely resembles the second. Kokoshin's response is revealing:

¹⁹²Ibid., 9.

¹⁹³Interview with Andrei Kokoshin, Deputy Director of the USA and Canada Institute, by an unnamed correspondent: "Rethinking Victory. An Interview with Andrei Kokoshin," Detente, No. 13, 1988. Quoted in FBIS-SOV-88-238, 12 December 1988, 13.

That assessment could have been regarded as accurate even three months ago, but is already out-of-date. Things are moving very quickly here. There is now a real possibility that the USSR will adopt the third model as its goal. We shall see what are the results of the current major review of military strategy.¹⁹⁴

Kokoshin does not explicitly deny the interviewer's presumption concerning the current Soviet force posturing, and his wording clearly implies that the USSR at that time had not adopted the third model. They also clearly had not yet adopted the fourth. Through elimination, we can probably assume then that Kokoshin believed the force structure at that time to be in a period of transition between the second and the third models. Unfortunately, the precise date of the interview is not annotated in the FBIS translation. I can only tell the approximate date of the interview as being after the publication of the Larionov-Kokoshin article in June 1988 and before the date of publication of the follow-up interview in November of that year. Kokoshin referred to some sort of change occurring some "three months ago..." This indicates a transition of some form that must have fallen between March and September of 1988.

The November interview with Kokoshin is notable for its validation of other points as well. For instance, Kokoshin reveals that the military department of the USA and Canada Institute was then conducting a discussion on the changing meaning of the term "victory." This would influence the Soviet view of the necessary military force deployments since the leadership must determine at what point in a conflict to end hostilities; this would also define whether Soviet forces would pursue an enemy into his own territory and whether this would be accomplished at the strategic, operational or tactical level of military art.

¹⁹⁴Ibid.

Second, Kokoshin stated that "...the main obstacles to implementing non-offensive defense in practice are material, not doctrinal, ones." For example, Kokoshin explained that the USSR had encountered complex problems in withdrawing forces and removing installations from East Germany. In explaining the sort of problems to be surmounted before the "non-offensive defense" can be implemented, Kokoshin tacitly admits that the "defensive doctrine" had not then been fully implemented. This reinforces western claims that, regardless of the Warsaw Pact declaration of May 1987, the defensive doctrine had not yet taken effect.

Third, Kokoshin states that Maj Gen Larionov's colleagues at the General Staff Academy felt that the four-model scheme presented by the two authors provides a good framework within which to consider current issues. I would interpret this to mean that the four models presented by Larionov and Kokoshin bear a reasonable approximation to the variants then under consideration by others in the Soviet military leadership. Finally, the interviewer asks Kokoshin to confirm whether it is true that "...only a narrow circle of specialists like yourself fully appreciate the meaning of the non-offensive defense." Kokoshin again does not directly answer the question, but states, "We are making efforts to correct that situation."¹⁹⁵ By admitting that such a situation exists, Kokoshin is indirectly verifying another suspicion of western analysts: that there is (or at least was in late 1988) still a great deal of confusion even within Soviet circles concerning the meaning of the "defensive doctrine."

Most important to our current discussion, though, is Kokoshin's belief that the USSR will eventually adopt the third model of force deployment. In this model, a

¹⁹⁵Ibid., 14.

counteroffensive phase follows an initial defensive phase on the part of both sides, but the objective of the counteroffensive is limited—such attacks would be allowable only at the tactical and the operational levels, but not at the strategic level. Furthermore, the side attacked would not seek total annihilation of the enemy, but only to restore the original status quo which existed before the war. While an understanding of the rough outlines of likely future Soviet defense deployments is important, it remains difficult, if not impossible, to speculate exactly how such a structure will appear. Furthermore, it is hard to imagine that either side would be able to limit counteroffensives strictly at or below the operational level, especially in the confused environment of a modern war. Some clues to future force dispositions may be gleaned from Soviet actions in demobilizing some of their forces in Eastern Europe.

H. ONGOING SOVIET REDUCTIONS: REASONS FOR CONCERN?

The unilateral Soviet troop reductions have been under way in Eastern Europe since 1988. An accurate assessment of the deactivation and demobilization of Soviet forces withdrawn from Eastern Europe is of great concern to western analysts. In an interview published in Izvestiya in February 1989, Minister of Defense, Army General Yazov was emphatic concerning the ultimate disposition of the units being withdrawn:

The six tank divisions that are being removed from the GDR, the CSSR, and Hungary are being disbanded. I repeat: disbanded, not deployed elsewhere. The divisions remaining on our allies' territory are being reformed and given a clearly marked defensive structure.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁶Army General D. T. Yazov, "In the Interests of Universal Security and Peace," Izvestiya, 28 February 1989. Quoted in FBIS-SOV-89-038, 28 February 1989, 2.

Despite General Yazov's assurances, Mr. Graham Turbiville believes that the demobilization process bears close watching. He points out many parallels between today's reforms and force reductions implemented in the Red Army's post-World War Two demobilization between 1945-48. This historical precedent may provide some insights into the current reduction process. It may also give us some clues regarding what pitfalls to avoid. Turbiville is particularly concerned with the demobilization of the six divisions commented upon by General Yazov, which are due to be withdrawn by the end of 1990. Turbiville explains his concerns as follows: After World War Two, several Soviet units ostensibly slated to be disbanded were in fact preserved by being scaled down in size and incorporated into existing military units. For instance, divisions often became brigades while many regiments were reduced to the status of a battalion.¹⁹⁷ Instead of being dismantled, these smaller units were designated to form cadre bases for rapid expansion of each unit back to its full wartime capacity, if necessary. According to Turbiville, many of these cadre bases were later fleshed-out once the Cold War intensified and the USSR increased the number of divisions opposing NATO.

The concerns expressed by Mr. Turbiville are supported by scattered evidence from Soviet military literature. There have been calls in the Soviet military press to preserve several of the units being withdrawn within existing organizations.¹⁹⁸ If the Soviets follow the course of the post-World War Two demobilization, at least some of these units will be preserved as cadre nuclei. Turbiville declares that preserving these units as cadre

¹⁹⁷Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., "Restructuring the Soviet Ground Forces," Military Review, No. 12, 1989: 21-22.

¹⁹⁸Several examples are cited in Graham H. Turbiville, "Restructuring the Soviet Ground Forces," Military Review, No. 12, 1989: 23-24.

nuclei would allow the Soviets to rapidly remobilize these units should they decide to do so. His concerns are reinforced by Mr. Christopher Donnelly of the Soviet Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. Mr. Donnelly believes that "...a full-strength [Soviet] division can be reduced to anything between 15 and 50 percent strength, safe in the knowledge that, in the event of crisis, it can be reformed effectively in about 3 weeks." ¹⁹⁹ If the Soviets do preserve some of their original divisional cadres within existing units—and we manage to substantiate this point—then some in the West will undoubtedly "cry foul." Such a matter will have to be addressed within the context of the overall East-West force reduction process. Nonetheless, while I would agree with Turbiville that the West should closely monitor the demobilization this time around, I would also hasten to point out how events of early 1990 demonstrated that the Soviet mobilization process suffers from a number of deficiencies.

In an interview published in Krasnaya zvezda, Chief of the General Staff, Army General M. Moiseyev disclosed that, in the USSR's semiannual call-up for the draft last fall, over 6,000 draftees failed to even show up. Moreover, when the Soviet military leadership ordered a partial mobilization to provide forces to quell the nationalist uprisings in Azerbaijan, protests erupted and many recruits simply failed to report for duty. Moiseyev states that at least 1,200 deserters fled the army, many of them to join up with their respective ethnic armed groups. ²⁰⁰ There were reports that some Soviet soldiers of Armenian and Azeri descent simply deserted to fight for their respective sides. Some

¹⁹⁹Christopher N. Donnelly, "Gorbachev's Military Doctrine: Implications for Arms Control Negotiations," in Beyond Burdensharing: Future Alliance Defense Cooperation (Brussels, Belgium: The United States Mission to NATO, 1989), 94.

²⁰⁰Bill Keller, "Session Called on Soviet Chief's Role," New York Times, 11 February 1990, A4.

unsubstantiated reports even surfaced of entire Armenian and Azeri units—which had been mobilized by local authorities without permission from Moscow—clashing in open warfare, although their intention may originally have been merely to halt the bloody fighting under way between civilians. ²⁰¹ The resulting disorder was so great that the mobilization order was rescinded by Moscow within a week. ²⁰²

Christopher Donnelly highlights another factor which the West should consider regarding Soviet motives in pursuing troop reductions in Europe. Donnelly states that current Soviet assessments demonstrate that a fully deployed NATO can establish a defense so effective that it will resist attempts at breakthrough with conventional weapons alone. Success in a Soviet conventional offensive requires that they achieve a rapid destruction of NATO forces and prevent the war from escalating to the nuclear threshold. But a rapid victory, according to Donnelly, is inconsistent in conventional conditions in the presence of a dense defense. Therefore, the density of an opposing conventional defense must be reduced, and this is best accomplished either by achieving surprise in launching a war, or through negotiations before the onset of hostilities. Donnelly states that the Soviets have calculated that a 25 percent reduction in force densities on both sides will prevent the defender from fielding an impenetrable defense. Therefore, according to the stated Soviet calculations, a mutually-balanced force reduction at moderate levels actually

²⁰¹This information was related in an UNCLASSIFIED lecture presented by Lt Col Donald Vik, USA, on 7 February 1990 at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.

²⁰²Michael Dobbs, "'Afghanistan Syndrome' and Ethnic Strife Ambush the Army," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 5-11 February 1990, 18.

acts in the Soviets' favor.²⁰³ What Mr. Donnelly perhaps does not consider in this case is that significant force reductions could also rob Soviet forces of the overwhelming offensive edge which they now enjoy; simply put, below a certain threshold, Soviet forces would themselves be forced to take a more defensive stance, especially if deprived of their current overwhelming tank superiority and other offensively-oriented units.

I. SPRING 1990: AN ENTIRELY NEW PICTURE FOR THE KREMLIN

All the previously mentioned force structures and demobilization plans were developed under very different circumstances than where the Soviets find themselves today. Soviet war planners now face a drastically different scenario than they did only a short time ago. In early 1990, the Warsaw Pact appears to be in shambles. The Soviets have for years had doubts regarding how well their allies would fight alongside them in combat; now, no Kremlin planner can assume that any of them would fight, period. Now it is variously speculated that all Soviet forces in Eastern Europe will soon be withdrawn to the USSR. In this dramatically altered situation, we must ask a new set of questions: If most or all Soviet forces are withdrawn to the USSR, what sort of defensive stance would the Soviets then assume? What will be the future character of the Soviet Armed Forces?

J. EVIDENCE OF MOUNTING INTEREST IN "FORTIFIED REGIONS"

First, what structure will the Soviet Armed Forces assume inside the USSR? In an article in International Defense Review last summer, Charles Pritchard presents one idea.

²⁰³Christopher N. Donnelly, "Gorbachev's Military Doctrine: Implications for Arms Control Negotiations," in Beyond Burdensharing: Future Alliance Defense Cooperation (Brussels, Belgium: The United States Mission to NATO, 1989), 95.

According to Pritchard, there is mounting evidence to indicate that the Soviets will soon begin to construct a system of fixed, defensive fortifications in so-called "fortified regions" along the Soviet frontier. Specifically, Pritchard cites a February 1989 speech in which he claimed that Army General D. T. Yazov declared that the USSR would compensate for its large defensive reductions in Eastern Europe by constructing fortifications in the western USSR and converting motorized rifle divisions into "machine gun/artillery divisions" for defensive purposes in the eastern and southern USSR.²⁰⁴ A close inspection of that article, however, revealed that Yazov made no specific reference to constructing fortified regions, but that he did refer to the conversion of "machine gun/ artillery divisions" as Mr. Pritchard claimed. Although the Soviets as far as I know have not officially acknowledged that such "fortified regions" will be constructed, I agree with Mr. Pritchard that the Soviets have shown increased interest in such structures and that the subject therefore merits serious consideration by western analysts.

Pritchard demonstrates that the idea of "fortified regions" has received an unusual amount of attention in the Soviet military press in recent years. Among the works cited were: a book entitled Fortification, Past and Present, written by V.I. Levykin in 1987, and an article entitled "Fortified Regions in the Western Borders of the USSR," in the December 1987 issue of the Military History Journal.²⁰⁵

In the cited magazine article, Colonel A. G. Khorkov describes a "fortified region" of the Great Patriotic War era:

²⁰⁴Army General D. T. Yazov, "In the Interests of Universal Security and Peace," Izvestiya, 28 February 1989. Quoted in Charles G. Pritchard, "Soviet Fortified Regions: A New 'Cult of the Defense'?" International Defense Review, No. 7, 1989: 895.

²⁰⁵Ibid., 899.

A fortified area was a strip of terrain equipped with a system of permanent and field fortifications and prepared for extended defense by specially assigned troops in cooperation with the combined-arms units and formations.²⁰⁶

Between 1928 and 1941, a series of three different lines of defensive fortifications was built along the western Soviet frontier. Similar positions were also constructed in the eastern USSR to protect against a Japanese attack. According to Charles Pritchard, the western defensive lines lacked sufficient depth and frontage, advanced forward posts, all-around defense and defensive lines connecting the major positions.²⁰⁷ As a result, despite desperate Soviet defensive actions, these positions quickly fell victim to the Nazi onslaught in the summer of 1941. In the initial border battles, several "fortified regions" did hold sizeable German forces at bay long enough to buy time for the Red Army to frantically establish other defensive lines. So-called "field fortified regions"—brigade-strength units made up of machine gun, mortar and artillery battalions—were also used as anchors on hurriedly constructed defensive lines in front of Moscow and other major cities.²⁰⁸ Due to poor preparations, however, the "fortified regions" did little to halt the advancing German armies.

Given that the "fortified regions" of the Great Patriotic War fared so poorly, why would the Soviets again be interested in constructing such a system? Charles Pritchard speculates that two factors—the advent of nuclear weapons and the vicarious combat experience of the Korean and Vietnam wars—convinced the Soviets to again investigate the

²⁰⁶Col A. G. Khorkov, "The Fortified Areas on the Western Frontiers of the USSR," Military History Journal, No. 12, 1987: 47-54. Quoted in JPRS-UMJ-88-006, 14 June 1988, 25.

²⁰⁷Charles G. Pritchard, "Soviet Fortified Regions: A New 'Cult of the Defense?'" International Defense Review, No. 7, 1989: 898.

²⁰⁸*Ibid.*, 899.

idea of "fortified regions." The advent of nuclear weapons led to the construction of many hardened command and control bunkers, missile silos and fallout shelters of various sorts. The conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and to a lesser extent in the Middle East, witnessed the employment of extensive field fortifications for defensive purposes. According to Pritchard, adopting such a defensive system would allow the Soviets to protect border regions with small standing forces which could be reinforced by local reserve units.²⁰⁹ Charles Pritchard speculates that the new "fortified regions" would consist of state-of-the-art fortifications with sophisticated sensors, minefields, remotely-controlled automatic weapons (including mortars and artillery) and air defense systems. The facilities would also be sufficiently hardened to withstand the overpressures experienced in any attacks using nuclear weapons or fuel-air explosives.²¹⁰

Author Graham Turbiville has also extensively studied the question of Soviet interest in "fortified regions." In an April 1989 report, Mr. Turbiville outlines an impressive array of evidence from recent Soviet writings which does reveal a growing interest in the construction of "fortified regions." In addition to citing some of the same sources described by Charles Pritchard, Mr. Turbiville calls our attention to a series of articles discussing Soviet perceptions of the events occurring within the initial period of a war. These articles appeared during 1988 in the USSR's Military History Journal. Prominent among these articles was one by Colonel Yu. Perechnev in which he highlighted the importance of defensive lines.²¹¹

²⁰⁹Ibid.

²¹⁰Ibid., 897.

²¹¹Yu. Perechnev, "On Several Questions of Preparing the Country and Armed Forces to Repel Fascist Aggression," Military History Journal, No. 4, 1988: 42-50. Quoted in Graham H. Turbiville, Emerging Issues of Soviet Strategy in an Era of Reform: Preparing

More pertinent to the current debate over force deployments, Mr. Turbiville calls our attention to what he believes is a direct tie between recent interest in the historical models of World War Two "fortified regions" and the current Warsaw Pact "defensive doctrine." Notably, in the 1988 book Engineer Support of Combat, author Ye. Kolibernov writes,

In May 1987 at the Berlin Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the member states of the Warsaw Pact, a military doctrine having a defensive character was accepted. In this connection, the defensive actions of forces and their engineer support in the initial period of war acquired important significance. Special attention to preparing for such actions must be made in regard to the advance fortified equipping of positions, and the execution of preparatory measures for obstacle emplacement, the equipping of crossings and routes, water supply, and troop camouflage.²¹²

Mr. Turbiville also points out that Kokoshin and Larionov took special note of preparing field fortifications in their 1988 article discussing four possible deployments of general purpose forces.²¹³ Specifically, the authors noted,

As for the very nature of an organization for combat, the engineer preparation of defensive lines must become the subject of more detailed comparative research and joint discussions by representatives of each side. Questions on the degree of thinning out the defense and arraying forces according to depth may be examined in this regard, as may questions on the nature of the relationship of a positional defense to its activeness, etc.²¹⁴

for a New Military Posture for Theater War (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, 1989), 18.

²¹²Ye. Kolibernov, Engineer Support of Combat (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1988), 6-7. Quoted in Graham H. Turbiville, Emerging Issues of Soviet Military Strategy in an Era of Reform: Preparing for Theater War (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, 1989), 26.

²¹³A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov, "The Counterpositioning of General Purpose Forces in the Context of Strategic Stability," World Economics and International Relations, No. 8, 1988: 23-31.

²¹⁴*Ibid.*, 26.

Mr. Turbiville's impressive study largely echoes the findings of Charles Pritchard. Turbiville admits that efforts to predict future Soviet construction of "fortified regions" simply on the basis of the scattered literary evidence is clearly tentative. Still, he suggests the historical precedent cannot be ignored and that it is consistent with Soviet thinking on the "defensive doctrine" as highlighted in recent declarations by Soviet Defense Minister Yazov.²¹⁵ Furthermore, Turbiville speculates that the "fortified regions" may serve to cover the deployment of combined-arms forces positioned immediately to the rear, and provide time required for mobilization and movement of reinforcements from rear areas. These fixed fortified regions could pin down and channel any penetrating attackers and serve as cover and support areas for the launching of offensive or counteroffensive thrusts. This system would be compatible with combined-arms offensive operations by a force structure that was smaller and more mobile than the current Soviet structure.²¹⁶

Although the evidence indicating Soviet adoption of a system of "defensive regions" is still very sketchy, it is a tantalizing concept which deserves western attention. Exactly what is going on is uncertain, but changes are definitely occurring in the military's organizational structure inside the USSR. In 1989, two of the major defense administrative regions--the Central Asian and Ural Military Districts--were abolished and merged into

²¹⁵Graham H. Turbiville, Emerging Issues of Soviet Military Strategy in an Era of Reform: Preparing for a New Military Posture for Theater War (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, 1989), 23. Turbiville cites as evidence the same Yazov speech referenced by Charles Pritchard: "In the Interests of Universal Security and Peace," Izvestiya, 28 February 1989.

²¹⁶Graham H. Turbiville, Emerging Issues of Soviet Military Strategy in an Era of Reform: Preparing for a New Military Posture for Theater War (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, 1989), 23-24.

neighboring districts.²¹⁷ Any connection of this administrative reshuffling to the construction of the new "fortified regions" or adoption of a new military structure, if there is any, remains unclear.

K. A TRANSITION IN THE OVERALL SOVIET ARMED FORCES STRUCTURE?

If the Soviets do build a new version of the system of "fortified regions," it will mark a historic shift in their post-World War Two military strategy. It will also be a convincing step toward actual implementation of the declared "defensive doctrine." Finally, such a move would fit into Gorbachev's plans for a huge drawdown in military manpower, since it would allow the Soviets to man these frontier defenses with a relatively smaller force which could be rapidly reinforced in times of crises by territorial militia or reserve units.

Mikhail Gorbachev's planned cuts of more than half a million troops from the Red Army will, in the least, cause a major restructuring of that force, and may make necessary the transition to an entirely new force concept. In fact, the future structure of the Soviet Armed Forces has been the subject of a major debate both between military officials and civilian analysts, and within military circles. One fascinating glimpse into the military debate is described by Alex Alexiev. Alexiev writes of a roundtable discussion involving seven officers from the Main Political Administration and a like number of civilian researchers and journalists. This forum, which was sponsored by the magazine Twentieth Century and Peace, took place in 1988. Perhaps the most intriguing statement emerging from the conference was made by Maj General N. Chaldymov, the ranking member of the panel:

²¹⁷ This information was drawn from two Krasnaya zvezda articles of the same title ("In the USSR Ministry of Defense") printed on 3 June and 2 Sept 1989, as cited in Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., "Restructuring the Soviet Ground Forces," Military Review, No. 11, 1989: 27.

Such an army as we have today, an army that practically preserves its postwar structure, is no longer needed. The new circumstances require a radical restructuring of all army structures. The contemporary army must be built on different principles.²¹⁸

The participants of the roundtable discussed at length several alternatives to the current Soviet army structure. Among those discussed were a volunteer army, similar to that of the U.S., which the Soviets seem to consistently refer to as a "professional army." Two other variants, one a system of mixed cadre and militia units and the other a military based on a territorial militia, were also considered.²¹⁹ The participants discussed how the different variants could improve Soviet civilian-military relations as well as present a less threatening posturing of Soviet forces in the prevailing international environment. One participant noted that the transition to a cadre-militia system would halt the current Soviet military buildup and realign the present massive army structure which, despite the proclaimed Warsaw Pact "defensive doctrine," could be perceived as threatening by foreign countries.²²⁰ As pointed out by Alexiev, the contents of this roundtable should be noted but not blown out of proportion by analysts. Only one conclusion can be definitely drawn from this conference, that being that a debate on the future military structure is ongoing within the Soviet Armed Forces. However, I believe that one can safely assume that the views expressed and the variants discussed by the conference attendees reflect some of those being discussed by other leaders of the Armed Forces.

²¹⁸"Army and Society," Twentieth Century and Peace, No. 9, 1988. Quoted in Alex Alexiev, "Is There a Professional Army in the Soviet Future?" Report on the USSR, 6 January 1989, 10.

²¹⁹Alex Alexiev, "Is There a Professional Army in the Soviet Future?" Report on the USSR, 6 January 1989, 10.

²²⁰*Ibid.*, 11.

The debate over the future force structure first received widespread western attention in late 1988 when Lt Col Alexander Savinkin called for the military to undergo a transition into a "professional army," in order to shift additional manpower into the civilian economy and convince the West that the USSR no longer represented a threat to anyone. Savinkin maintained that such a transformation would upgrade the "quality and orderliness of the armed services" and convert them into "perfectly technically equipped, professionally trained [services]...supported by a vast network of local militia formations."²²¹

In December 1988, the controversy widened as members of some of the emerging civilian "think tanks" added their voices to the debate. Sergei Karaganov, deputy director of the Western Europe Institute in Moscow, declared that the future Soviet Army should consist of a small career force of military specialists who could better handle the increasingly more technical aspects of modern warfare.²²² In July 1989, another prominent official announced his support for a volunteer army. Professor Vladimir Lapygin, chairman of the newly created Committee on the Problems of Defense and State Security of the Supreme Soviet, stated that he supports the transformation of the force into a professional army.²²³ It should be noted, however, that Mr. Lapygin seemed to modify his position the following month, as revealed in an interview in the magazine Sovetskiy voin.²²⁴

²²¹A. Savinkin, "What Kind of Army Do We Need?" Moscow News, No. 45, 1988, 6. Quoted in FBIS-SOV-88-232, 2 December 1988, 90-91.

²²²Bernard E. Trainor, "Soviet Leaders Debating Shape of a Future Army," New York Times, 31 July 1989, A3.

²²³"Professional Army' Causes Debate," Jane's Defence Weekly, 29 July 1989, 172.

²²⁴Interview with V. Lapygin, Sovetskiy voin, No. 19, 1989. Quoted in Robert Arnett and Mary Fitzgerald, "Is the Soviet Military Leadership Yielding on an All-Volunteer Army?" Report on the USSR, 30 March 1990, 3.

Although there have been quite a few lower-ranking military officers who publicly supported a transition to a volunteer force, most of the senior military leaders still favor the old conscription system. So far, the only notable exception has been the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir Chernavin. The admiral's reasons for favoring a volunteer service seem primarily related to the specific needs of the navy. In response to a proposal to decrease the current term of service for naval enlistees from three to two years, Chernavin firmly stated that the navy would be unable to operate under those circumstances. Using as a vehicle for discussion the investigation into the April 1989 sinking of a Mike-class submarine, Chernavin publicly revealed that he had sent to the Minister of Defense a set of proposals for the creation of a volunteer navy.²²⁵ On a related note, as pointed out by Dr. Mikhail Tsypkin, political leaders like Vadim Medvedev and even General Secretary Gorbachev, while keeping out of the fray in the military, have publicly supported limited reforms of the military, including the reestablishment of draft exemptions for college students and the early discharge of currently conscripted students.²²⁶

Those in favor of a new volunteer force—mainly civilian analysts—say that the cost incurred by such a system may be much less than that predicted by defenders of the old system, and that a reduction in overall troop strength even beyond Gorbachev's announced cuts would make it possible to further reduce costs. Another factor that will undoubtedly figure prominently into the debate—although probably not in open forums—is the political advantage that could be secured by ethnic Russians in going to a volunteer force. If

²²⁵Mikhail Tsypkin, "Will the Soviet Navy Become a Volunteer Force?" Report on the USSR, 2 February 1990, 5-6.

²²⁶*Ibid.*, 5.

current demographic trends continue, the Great Russians will soon be a minority within the USSR. According to the 1989 Soviet census, the Great Russians constitute a slim majority of the Soviet population at 50.8 percent, down from 52.4 percent in 1979.²²⁷ Although the three Slavic nationalities of Great Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians still together constitute 69.7 percent of the population, Moscow's leadership is alarmed that the growth of the six Muslim ethnic nationalities ranged from two and a half times to five times that of the population as a whole.²²⁸ Since the Red Army is a microcosm of the society at large, it goes without saying that the percentage of non-Russians in the military is growing as well. Fears of Islamic fundamentalist movements in Central Asia and a general wariness of "minority" conscripts may make the Army's leadership more receptive to the idea of a smaller, regular army which could be kept predominantly Slavic.²²⁹

Except for Admiral Chernavin, the senior military hierarchy seems determined to maintain the old conscription system. Former chief of the General Staff Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev firmly opposes the alteration of the current system. He considers such proposals "...unacceptable for the formation of the Army and the Navy."²³⁰ Even more bitter was the response of Army General A. Lizichev, chief of the Main Political Administration. Lizichev rejected the idea of a territorial militia and pointed out that certain of the proposed variants had already been tested in the history of the USSR and

²²⁷Ann Sheehy, "Russian Share of Soviet Population Down to 50.8 Percent," Report on the USSR, 20 October 1989, 1.

²²⁸Ibid., 2-3.

²²⁹See, for example, Alex Alexdev's article "Is There a Professional Army in the Soviet Future?" Report on the USSR, 6 January 1989, 11.

²³⁰Sergei Akhromeyev, "Army and Restructuring," Soviet Russia, 14 January 1989, 3. Quoted in Stephen Foye, "Debate Continues on the Fundamental Restructuring of the Soviet Armed Forces," Report on the USSR, 14 April 1989, 13.

had been found unfeasible. On the other hand, Lizichev cited Soviet victories in the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War as ample proof that the existing conscription system was effective. ²³¹ In a more structured rebuttal to calls for military reform, Lt General of Aviation V. Serebryannikov analyzed why each of the major proposals was not suited for the modern world. ²³² Whereas Lt Col Savinkin had blamed the modern conscript army as being partly responsible for the early Soviet defeats in World War Two, Serebryannikov declared that these same defeats were due not to the existence of a large regular army, but because the USSR had not adopted the conscript system earlier. He pointed out deficiencies in both the territorial militia and the cadre-militia systems, and stated that these models "...never have been and could not have been implemented because modern warfare actually demands mass armies."²³³ Finally, Serebryannikov warned that, should the USSR drastically reduce the size of its armed forces, it "...would mean immediate loss of military-strategic parity." ²³⁴

In February 1989, Chief of the General Staff, Army General Moiseyev acknowledged that the General Staff had received "dozens of proposals" calling for a new force structure. While Moiseyev noted that some of the ideas were reasonable, most of them he strongly denounced:

There seem to be widespread opinions that we should unilaterally reduce the Army by fifty percent, switch to a territorial militia system and create a professional,

²³¹A. Lizichev, "In the Center of Restructuring--the Individual," Krasnaya zvezda, 3 February 1989, 1.

²³²V. Serebryannikov, "The Army: What Should It Be Like?" Krasnaya zvezda, 12 February 1989, 2. Quoted in FBIS-SOV-89-029, 14 February 1989, 88-90.

²³³*Ibid.*, 89.

²³⁴*Ibid.*

essentially volunteer, Army. These views ignore the fact that a militia system is absolutely unrealistic, given today's most complex means of struggle, while switching to a professional volunteer Army involves a sharp increase—by a factor of at least 5 to 8—in maintenance costs. Such proposals are naturally unacceptable, and our attitude toward them must be unambiguous... ²³⁵

It is highly unlikely that the senior military leadership is becoming more receptive to the idea of conversion to a different army structure, but recent statements by a number of officials would seem to indicate that they are being pressured to consider new options. In an October 1989 interview, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev seemed to give some ground on the issue and admitted that, under some conceivable conditions, a future shift to a voluntary army was possible. ²³⁶ In February 1990, Chief of the General Staff, Army General M. Moiseyev, highlighted some possible advantages which would be provided by an all-volunteer army. He even went so far as to state,

...we are studying this problem [the expediency of a professional army] attentively, and as soon as the international, economic, material, and spiritual prerequisites are ripe for such a transition, we shall be ready for it. ²³⁷

The debate over the future of the Soviet Armed Forces continues today. Some western analysts, like Robert Arnett and Mary Fitzgerald, believe that the most recent public statements by senior officials signal a definite shift in their attitude toward the viability of

²³⁵Army General M. A. Moiseyev, "From a Defense Doctrine Position, Col Gen M. A. Moiseyev Meets Communists from the USSR Armed Forces General Staff," Krasnaya zvezda, 10 February 1989. Quoted in FBIS-SOV-89-028, 13 February 1989, 77-81.

²³⁶Interview with Marshal S. Akhromeyev, Krasnaya zvezda, 6 October 1989. Quoted in Robert Arnett and Mary Fitzgerald, "Is the Soviet Military Leadership Yielding on an All-Volunteer Army?" Report on the USSR, 30 March 1990, 4.

²³⁷V. Litovkin, "Arguments of the General Staff," an interview with Army General M. Moiseyev, Izvestiya, 23 February 1990. Quoted in FBIS-SOV-90-038, 26 February 1990, 85-6.

an all-volunteer force.²³⁸ I would agree with the authors that the senior military leadership is being pressured by their civilian bosses to consider alternatives to the current force structure, but I do not believe that they will readily agree to such a transition. For instance, in the interview with Army General Moiseyev on 23 February—which is cited by Arnett and Fitzgerald as proof of a shift of military opinion in favor of a volunteer army—the overwhelming majority of the general's comments were in opposition to a force transition. The military leadership will undoubtedly point to the great uncertainties and civil unrest in border regions to reinforce their case that the massive military structure must be preserved in order to safeguard the USSR. Considering all these factors, I believe that a transition in the overall force structure, although possible, will be strongly opposed by the senior military leadership. As Alex Alexiev observes,

...genuine reform in the Soviet Armed Forces is neither easy nor certain. What is clear is that the Red Army finds itself today at a historic crossroads. Which direction it takes will affect decisively the future of 'perestroyka' and East-West relations alike.²³⁹

L. IMMEDIATE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONCEPTS DISCUSSED

In early 1990, there is mounting evidence to indicate that Soviet forces in Eastern Europe are being restructured into a more defensive stance. Granted, the transition in force structure now under way is the result of decisions which were made years ago, and plans in place only a few months ago almost certainly will be made obsolete by the

²³⁸See Robert Arnett and Mary Fitzgerald, "Is the Soviet Military Leadership Yielding on an All-Volunteer Army?" Report on the USSR, 30 March 1990, 5.

²³⁹Alexander Alexiev, "Is There a Professional Army in the Soviet Future?" Report on the USSR, 6 January 1989, 12.

political revolutions of late 1989 in Eastern Europe. However, so long as Soviet forces are stationed in that region, western analysts must be cognizant of the relative capabilities of those forces. Additionally, some of the concerns expressed by Graham Turbiville on the withdrawal and demobilization of Soviet forces will remain important in any scenario. Finally, as more and more Soviet forces are withdrawn to the USSR, the models of force deployments presented by Larionov and Kokoshin, along with Soviet interest in construction of "fortified regions" and the possible reorganization of the entire Soviet military structure, will become increasingly important.

As the Soviets continue to withdraw more forces from Eastern Europe, the threat to Western Europe decreases proportionately. These and similar future moves by the Kremlin will provide further evidence that the USSR has indeed adopted a "defensive doctrine." In the last chapter, I described some of the conditions depicted by Mr. Andrew Marshall, the Pentagon's Chief of Net Assessment, which to him would indicate serious Soviet intent in adopting such a "defensive doctrine." Three of the factors he described were: withdrawal of all Soviet forces to native soil, reduction or removal of forward-deployed offensive units, and construction of fixed defensive positions along Soviet frontiers. One of these conditions is already being met, assuming that the USSR fully withdraws all its forces from Eastern Europe. The second is simultaneously being fulfilled as the USSR reduces the numbers of tanks and artillery pieces in units still deployed in Europe and withdraws other offensively-oriented units such as assault-landing units and assault river-crossing assets. Should the Soviets begin to construct the so-called "fortified regions," they will have met the third of Mr. Marshall's requirements. I am not sure that Mr. Marshall would agree with my conclusions, but it is my belief that, based on the conditions which he described last November, the Soviets are moving farther toward assuming a truly

defensive doctrine. Furthermore, a future Kremlin decision to reduce its military forces beyond the levels already announced by Gorbachev, would furnish even more proof of peaceful Soviet intentions. Adoption by the Kremlin of a much smaller force structure, under any of the variants described in this chapter, would provide incontrovertible evidence of a genuinely "defensive" doctrine. While I do believe that the Soviets have already done much to make their military forces less threatening, the prudent course for the West at this time is not to rush blindly forward and take too much for granted. In the wake of the dramatic events of late 1989, however, there can be no doubt that we now face a less aggressive and somewhat reduced Soviet threat.

M. BLEAK PROSPECTS FOR MOSCOW

The original intent of Mikhail Gorbachev in unleashing the torrent of change which has swept the USSR and Eastern Europe since 1985, will probably never be known. Whatever his original intent, Gorbachev has in the past few months been unpleasantly surprised and disappointed with some of the fruits of those reforms. Now, in early 1990, a European security environment once dominated by a Soviet military juggernaut has crumbled into a very confused scenario which has virtually dissolved the Warsaw Pact and presents any Soviet war planner with a terribly complicated and bleak prospect.

Already this year, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary have all called on the USSR to withdraw troops from their soil. The Kremlin announced on 11 February that it was willing to begin negotiations on the pullout of all the more than 40,000 troops stationed in Poland.²⁴⁰ Due to the continued uncertainties over the Polish-German border question,

²⁴⁰"Moscow Open to Talks on Pullout in Poland," New York Times, 12 February 1990, A6.

however, Prime Minister Mazowiecki has requested that Soviet troops remain until the dispute is resolved. ²⁴¹ On 26 February, President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia traveled to Moscow to meet with President Gorbachev. In that meeting, the two leaders signed treaties providing for the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia. All 73,500 Soviet troops on Czechoslovakian soil are to be withdrawn by 1 July 1991. Even as the two leaders met, Soviet tanks were being loaded onto railcars for the return trip to the USSR. ²⁴² Hungary also demanded that Moscow withdraw all the 50,000 soldiers on her soil. However, on 1 March, talks on troop withdrawals were suspended, possibly as a result of Moscow's displeasure over very shrill Hungarian public pronouncements.²⁴³ Talks apparently resumed quickly, however, and on 10 March Hungarian and Soviet officials signed an agreement providing for a complete withdrawal of all Soviet troops in Hungary no later than 30 June 1991. ²⁴⁴

As mentioned previously, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Army General M. Moiseyev, declared that the USSR had by 1 October 1989 already withdrawn the following forces from Eastern Europe: 3 tank divisions, 3 tank training regiments, 2 SAM training regiments, 1 air regiment, and other assorted units. ²⁴⁵ Well in advance of Moiseyev's statements, other Soviet officials had claimed that force cuts had already drastically

²⁴¹Klas Bergman, "Poland Takes Border Question to the West," Christian Science Monitor, 6 March 1990, 4.

²⁴²Francis X. Clines, "Gorbachev Sees Havel and Agrees to Speed Withdrawal of Troops," New York Times, 27 February 1990, A1, A8.

²⁴³"Budapest and Moscow Suspend Troop Talks," New York Times, 2 March 1990, A4.

²⁴⁴Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, in a statement aired on Budapest Domestic Service Radio on 11 March 1990. Quoted in FBIS-EEU-90-048, 12 March 1990, 44.

²⁴⁵"Moiseyev Details Armed Forces Cuts," Jane's Defence Weekly, 11 November 1989, 1050.

reduced the USSR's military potential in Eastern Europe, in accordance with the declared "defensive doctrine." For example, in a January 1989 New Times article, Maj General G. Batenin noted how the Soviet peace initiatives had already gone a long way toward providing for the safety of the "common European home." Perhaps most startling in that article was the general's discussion of Soviet operational maneuver groups, or OMGs, which had been in place in Eastern Europe, but which now have been reportedly dismantled due to the unilateral Soviet cutbacks.²⁴⁶

Although a Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack on NATO was certainly conceivable in the past, any Soviet plans for an attack now seem almost absurd. Should the Kremlin still entertain any ideas of launching a conventional attack on Western Europe, the emerging situation will present Soviet war planners with a nightmarish scenario. NATO now should have increased warning time of any threatening Soviet moves. (As of April 1990, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had publicly modified its assessment to state that the U.S. and NATO would have at least one to six months warning of an impending Soviet attack, given the changed European defensive environment.²⁴⁷ Other media and even Congressional sources have since given estimates of warning times up to one year or more.) Once Soviet troops are withdrawn to native soil, they will face an additional march of over 300 miles in any advance toward the Rhine. Moreover, the Warsaw Pact, except for its not inconsiderable Soviet forces, has practically collapsed. Whereas most of Moscow's allies presented dubious reliability in a war scenario in the past, Soviet troops

²⁴⁶Maj General G. Batenin, "It Takes Two to Build a Bridge," New Times, No. 3, 1989: 10-11.

²⁴⁷Molly Moore and Patrick E. Tyler, "Richard Cheney on the Defensive," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 23-29 April 1990, 6.

would now certainly be on their own. In addition, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary are all moving rapidly down the path toward becoming western-style democracies, and the GDR will soon be absorbed into a democratic, unified Federal Republic of Germany. If these trends continue, an attacking Red Army would face not only the prospect of having to advance an additional three hundred miles or more through those countries to reach NATO states; once Soviet troops have been withdrawn from Eastern Europe, they would almost certainly have to fight their way back in.

While the United States faces certain dilemmas in determining its future military and foreign policies, the Soviet Union's scenario is drastically more complicated. In sum, whether this sort of withdrawal of forces from Eastern Europe is what Mikhail Gorbachev had in mind is well on its way to becoming a moot point. If these reductions and withdrawals proceed as expected, Kremlin military planners will face a drastically different and more complicated security situation in Europe, which would certainly make any Soviet attack toward the West a much more perilous enterprise than before.

The trends discussed in this chapter—changes in the force structure of those Soviet forces which still remain in Eastern Europe, mounting Kremlin interest in constructing new "fortified regions," and a possible remodeling of the entire Soviet Armed Forces—will play a crucial role in the preservation of Soviet military power, which to date has embodied that country's only true claim to superpower status. With due consideration of all these factors, the United States must move quickly to construct and propose a decisive but well-considered and reasonable foreign policy to deal with the new and ever more complex

security environment. The next chapter will address in some detail how the events of 1989 will alter the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the single most important theater of relations between the two countries: Europe.

VII. U.S. RESPONSE TO THE CHANGING EUROPEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Since the closing days of the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union, along with their respective allies, have faced-off across the borders between Eastern and Western Europe. This region was armed progressively to the point that it became the most heavily fortified place on Earth. And then suddenly, the earthshaking events of the closing months of 1989 ushered in a new era for all the powers involved there. The apparent dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, or Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), along with the inevitable reunification of Germany, confronts the U.S. and her NATO allies with crucial, landmark decisions regarding the future security of the continent. As Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick noted in her recent article in Foreign Affairs, the Cold War may nearly be over; the postwar era is absolutely finished.²⁴⁸

In this dramatically new environment, the U.S. and the USSR must both refocus their foreign policies. Ambassador Kirkpatrick observes that both superpowers, after forty-five years as the undisputed leaders in a bipolar world, now have in common the prospect of facing an increasingly diminished role in Europe.²⁴⁹ The object of this chapter will be to examine some of the most important factors in the new superpower relationship; explore the crucial issues involved, and analyze some of the approaches which might be available to both countries. Of central importance in this discussion will be the security environment in Europe as it affects future U.S.-Soviet relations.

²⁴⁸Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "Beyond The Cold War," Foreign Affairs 69, No. 1, 1990: 1.

²⁴⁹Ibid., 11.

Since 1945, the perceived threat of Soviet domination—if not outright invasion—of Western Europe, prompted the U.S. to abandon its traditional isolationist policy and assume a leadership role in the defense of the region. Almost all of the great hallmarks of U.S. foreign policy over the last four decades—among them the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the policy of containment, and the formation of NATO—were elements of the American and Western European response to the stimulus of Soviet aggression. Now, as the Kremlin appears to be releasing its stranglehold on Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact seems every day to be more of a reality, the very existence of NATO has been called into question and, with it, the need of the continued presence of the U.S. in Europe.

A. SHARED U.S. AND SOVIET INTERESTS

So far, the Bush Administration has shown great sensitivity toward the decline of Soviet power in Europe, and President Bush has assured Moscow that Washington will not seek gains at the expense of Kremlin interests. In May 1989, President Bush declared that it was time "to move beyond containment" and to integrate the Soviet Union into the "community of nations."²³⁰ In a series of meetings between U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze throughout the year, the two countries made substantial progress toward future treaties on both conventional and nuclear forces. In what was characterized as a successful mini-summit at Malta in December, President Bush and President Gorbachev agreed to a follow-on summit in 1990, and also discussed the tremendous changes under way in Eastern Europe.

²³⁰Arnold L. Horelick, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: Threshold of a New Era," Foreign Affairs 69, No. 1, 1990: 56.

B. AMERICA MOVES TO BOLSTER ITS EUROPEAN POSITION

While carefully avoiding stepping on Kremlin toes, the U.S. has moved to bolster its position in European relations. Ever mindful of the expanding importance of the European Community (EC), Secretary of State Baker declared that the U.S.-EC link "should become stronger, the issues we discuss more diversified, and our common endeavors more important."²⁵¹ While seeking to strengthen its positions in the EC and other forums, the U.S. also began promoting the idea that NATO continues to be relevant in Europe's future. It is the position of the U.S. that NATO should be continued as a multipurpose alliance and that we will continue to play a large role in that body. In a February visit to Europe, Secretary of State Baker proposed measures that would establish new functions for NATO. These new functions would include: formation of a NATO arms verification staff; expansion of NATO's role in dealing with regional conflicts and unconventional weapons, and allied cooperation to promote human rights and democratic institution-building in Eastern Europe under the auspices of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).²⁵² If given the choice, the U.S. will be reluctant to abandon a policy which has worked so well for the past four decades. So far, the countries of Europe seem to desire a continued U.S. presence on the continent, but that situation is likely to change. At best, the U.S. will be forced to accept a much reduced presence on the continent. According to British political science professor Ken Booth, support should be given to the

²⁵¹Amy Kaslow, "European Community Sizes Up Its Growing Voice in Geopolitics," Christian Science Monitor, 7 March 1990, 1-2.

²⁵²Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Beyond the Cold War," Foreign Affairs 69, No. 1, 1990: 15.

maintenance of American interests in a reformed NATO, but at the same time the "European pillar" should be strengthened and the number of U.S. troops reduced.²⁵³

C. DIMINISHING KREMLIN PROSPECTS

While the position of the U.S. in Europe remains quite strong, that of the USSR appears considerably less certain. In a recent article, Arnold Horelick of the RAND Corporation examined the future role of the Soviets in Europe. The author presents a mixed picture of Mikhail Gorbachev's motives for loosening the Kremlin's grip on Eastern Europe. It is his contention that Gorbachev had hoped to spread "perestroika" to Eastern Europe and construct a less militarized and more cooperative socialist community which would still be largely controlled by Moscow.²⁵⁴ Horelick believes that, at some point, Gorbachev had a "game plan," but that the political revolt of Eastern Europe destroyed the balance which he had hoped to achieve between a lessening of tensions in the East and Soviet gains through arms control and trade with the West. According to Horelick, the democratic genies unleashed by Gorbachev have now far outstripped his "game plan" and gravely weakened the USSR's position in Eastern Europe.

Ironically, according to Arnold Horelick, Moscow's best—if not its only—hope for preserving a future role in the continent resides in close cooperation with Washington. In the events of the past few months, Horelick notes that Washington and Moscow have demonstrated a strong interest in maintaining stability and working together toward gradual changes in Europe. The leaders of each side have sought to avoid the perception

²⁵³Ken Booth, "Steps Toward Stable Peace in Europe: A Theory and Practice of Coexistence," International Affairs, No. 1, 1990: 41.

²⁵⁴Arnold Horelick, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: Threshold of a New Era," Foreign Affairs 69, No. 1, 1990: 59.

of taking undue advantage of the other side's weaknesses. Perhaps through cooperation with Washington in such forums as Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), CSCE and the "two plus four" negotiations, Moscow can attempt to maintain stability in Europe while also preserving its own interests in the region. Mr. Horelick writes,

For the Soviet Union there can only be the hope that, by slowing down the process of change in the East and buying time, Moscow can still keep open the option for developing some kind of community of interests between a vaguely socialist Eastern Europe and a reconstructed Soviet Union. On this basis, the Soviet Union as well as the East Europeans could begin to share in the economic and technological benefits of closer ties with the West. Being left out altogether is Moscow's nightmare.²³⁵

In the same issue of Foreign Affairs in which Mr. Horelick's article appeared, Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick also analyzed the future Soviet role in Eastern Europe.²³⁶ She believes that the USSR is now faced with two alternatives. First, it can try to maintain the status quo, somehow preserve communist parties and governments, and keep Soviet troops and the Warsaw Pact in place. This option also requires preserving an East German state while accepting the continued presence of NATO and U.S. troops on the continent. Or, second, the USSR could sacrifice the East German state for a unified but neutral Germany, with the expectation that a neutral Germany would spell the end of NATO and of the U.S. presence on the continent. This option would also re-create in Germany a major rival in the heart of Europe.²³⁷

As Communist power continues to decline in most of Europe, the second scenario proposed by Ambassador Kirkpatrick--Soviet acceptance of a neutral Germany or at least

²³⁵Ibid., 61.

²³⁶Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "Beyond the Cold War," Foreign Affairs 69, No. 1, 1990: 1-16.

²³⁷Ibid., 10.

a considerably less threatening Germany in a modified European security environment-- seems much more realistic. As will be addressed in more detail later in this chapter, even the idea of keeping Soviet troops in place in Eastern Europe is coming more and more into question. In many respects, the wishes of Moscow regarding the future of Germany are becoming less important. In the "two plus four" negotiations, Moscow may try to insist that a unified Germany be neutral, but is unlikely to win on that issue. As Arnold Horelick points out, a stated position of German neutrality would probably still amount to nothing but empty words; Horelick observes,

With West Germany in such a powerful position and still so firmly anchored economically and politically to the West, even formal neutralization could not ensure a benign balance for Soviet interests.²⁵⁸

D. THE DOMINANT ISSUE: GERMANY

In all of Europe, the single most dominant issue is the imminent reunification of East and West Germany. Now, as the Soviet tide recedes, a fear of Moscow is being replaced with a growing fear of a reunited Germany. It is in the peaceful settlement of the "German question" where the interests of all countries involved are most concerned. The geographic position, economic capacity and military potential of a reunited Germany will make it the keystone in any future security framework in Europe.

The country most nervous about the reunification of Germany is, understandably, Poland. On February 14, Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki of Poland demanded that his country be allowed to participate in the negotiations which will decide Germany's

²⁵⁸ Arnold L. Horelick, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: Threshold of a New Era," Foreign Affairs 69, No. 1, 1990: 65.

future.²⁵⁹ Central to Polish concerns are the questions of state borders which were set in the Yalta Conference of 1943. In that connection, the Polish prime minister has called for a treaty to insure the stability of Poland's postwar borders with Germany.²⁶⁰ Adding to the problem is Poland's perception that West German chancellor Helmut Kohl is straddling the border issue. In early March, Kohl's insistence on placing added conditions on such a treaty visibly rankled Mazowiecki.²⁶¹ Under increasing pressure from several western nations, Kohl on 6 March agreed to withdraw his demands.²⁶² The gravity of the border question is reflected in a statement made on 20 February by Bronislaw Geremek, leader of the Solidarity bloc in the Polish Parliament; Geremek warned, "The only way to change the border is war, and Germany knows it."²⁶³ Furthermore, the border dispute complicates other matters. Until the border question flared up, a number of Polish leaders, including Lech Walesa, had called for the immediate withdrawal of the approximately 40,000 Soviet troops garrisoned in the country; in February, however, Prime Minister Mazowiecki asked that the Soviet troops remain until the border dispute is resolved.²⁶⁴

²⁵⁹Paul Lewis, "United Germany Urged to Be in NATO," New York Times, 15 February 1990, A8.

²⁶⁰*Ibid.*

²⁶¹Francis S. Kiefer, "Kohl Fuels Fire Over Polish Borders," Christian Science Monitor, 5 March 1990, 1.

²⁶²Serge Schmemmann, "Bonn Cabinet Acts to Reassure Poles on Border Policy," New York Times, 7 March 1990, A1.

²⁶³Steven Greenhouse, "Polish Official Vows to Defend Border," New York Times, 21 February 1990, A8.

²⁶⁴Klas Bergman, "Poland Takes Border Question to the West," Christian Science Monitor, 6 March 1990, 4.

Is the concern over a reunified Germany being oversold? The answer to that question must be seen from a European point of view. In the long historical memories of European peoples, the days of Hitler were only yesterday. And memories of a leading German role in both world wars this century only further complicate the issue. The question remains, though, of just what sort of a threat a reunified Germany will present. According to many authorities, among them former CIA chief Richard Helms, Poland is understandably worried that a reunified Germany might assert a claim to such historic German lands as Silesia and East Prussia, and Czechoslovakia may be similarly worried about the Sudetenland.²⁶⁵ Some other nations are reportedly not too comfortable with the idea, either; as noted by Dean Rusk at an autumn 1989 conference of former U.S. secretaries of state, "Many people in Western and Eastern Europe would be rather terrified to see the Germans united and rolling like a loose cannon around the deck."²⁶⁶

But does Moscow have reason for undue concern over German reunification? The ghosts of some twenty-seven million dead Russians from the Great Patriotic War still moan loudly; the USSR has not forgotten and will be reluctant to risk a repeat performance of 1941-45.²⁶⁷ But unless the Soviets drastically reduce their military and the Germans greatly expand theirs, the German-Soviet military balance is not even close. With no

²⁶⁵Richard Helms, "What's The Big Rush?" Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 5-11 March 1990, 23.

²⁶⁶Lucia Moat, "Former Secretaries of State Gather," Christian Science Monitor, 31 October 1989, 8.

²⁶⁷Author's note: For years, a figure of approximately 20 million was the commonly accepted total of Soviet citizens thought to have been killed in World War Two. More recent Soviet estimates have increased the total to approximately 27 million, and this figure is now being accepted as genuine by most authorities. Roy Medvedev, has, for example, estimated a figure between 25-30 million. See Roy Medvedev, Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 770.

reductions made in either country's troop levels following reunification, the united Germanys would have available 767,400 troops, versus an estimated 4.2 million for the USSR.²⁶⁸ The comparison is made much more lopsided by the awesome nuclear might of the Soviet arsenal. Soviet fears undoubtedly relate not only to military considerations, but also to renowned German technology. Germany, if it wanted to, could certainly acquire nuclear weapons. Although a nuclear-free Germany does not offer a significant military threat to Moscow, a Germany armed with nuclear weapons would be quite a different story. Although I believe Germany's intentions for the foreseeable future will remain peaceful, any acquisition by Germany of nuclear weapons would be viewed with great alarm in Moscow.

The Soviets have vacillated considerably on their position on the future status of Germany. In the closing weeks of 1989, Moscow announced that any move toward reunification must take place over a period of years, not months. (It should be remembered that most western analysts believed this as well.) However, as the drive for reunification took on a life of its own in both East and West Germany, the Kremlin has been forced to modify its position. On February 21, President Gorbachev outlined the revised Kremlin stance: first, that it is the right of the two Germanys to pursue unification; and second, that the security issues that unification raises must be settled in the context of all European states.²⁶⁹ This reflects Soviet support of the so-called "two plus four" talks in which negotiations on the future German role will be jointly decided by the U.S.,

²⁶⁸These calculations are based on data from The Military Balance 1989-90 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989).

²⁶⁹Linda Feldman, "Beyond Military Blocs in Europe," Christian Science Monitor, 23 February 1990, 3.

USSR, Britain, France, and the two Germanys. These states agreed in February to proceed with the negotiations.²⁷⁰ Although Gorbachev now seems resigned to accepting a reunified Germany, he continued until March to vow that a united Germany must be neutral.²⁷¹ In early April, however, reports surfaced within diplomatic circles which indicated that the Soviets may be laying the groundwork for a more conciliatory attitude.²⁷² Indeed, in an article published on April 11, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze backed away from the Kremlin's earlier demand for German neutrality and then proposed the most bizarre idea yet, that being a simultaneous membership of a united Germany in both the Warsaw Pact and NATO.²⁷³ This latest proposal by Moscow is seen by many western analysts as a face-saving measure by the Kremlin to allow for an eventual abandonment of demands for neutrality.²⁷⁴ Other observers perceive, as I do, that Moscow is rapidly shifting its support toward the abandonment of both NATO and the WTO, in favor of constructing a new pan-European security structure, probably under the auspices of the CSCE.²⁷⁵ The latter model would appear to give the Kremlin the best chance to preserve a voice in European policymaking, the loss of which is deeply feared by Moscow.

²⁷⁰Ibid.

²⁷¹Serge Schmemmann, "Bonn Cabinet Acts to Reassure Poles on Border Policy," New York Times, 7 March 1990, A1.

²⁷²Thomas L. Friedman, "White House Bars A United Germany in Both Alliances," New York Times, 12 April 1990, A1.

²⁷³Ibid.

²⁷⁴David Mutch, "Soviets Seek Firm Ground on Germany's Status," Christian Science Monitor, 13 April 1990, 1.

²⁷⁵Steven Kull, "The End of NATO," Christian Science Monitor, 12 April 1990, 19.

The U.S. has remained strongly committed to the determination of Germany's future within the "two plus four" talks. Washington has also backed West German president Helmut Kohl's position that a unified Germany should be a member of NATO and remain closely tied to the West.²⁷⁶ For the U.S., inclusion of a unified Germany in NATO is necessary for the continued viability of the alliance.

E. THE FATES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT

As has already been implied, hand in hand with the issue of German reunification goes the question of the continued existence of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As both alliances evaluate their future roles, member state support for the respective leaders of each alliance becomes crucial. In that context, there have been and remain substantial differences between the opposing alliances. As President Bush observed in his 31 January State of the Union address, "Soviet forces in Europe are there by occupation; the American troops are there by invitation."²⁷⁷ Most of America's NATO allies support a continued U.S. troop presence on the continent. However, many Europeans do favor a larger political role for NATO. Unlike its WTO counterpart, NATO does not have to evolve into a political body; it already is one. In a December 1989 interview, Manfred Wornat, Secretary-General of NATO, strongly characterized the alliance as a political body; he

²⁷⁶R.W. Apple, Jr., "Bush's Fragile Battalions in Europe," New York Times, 12 February 1990, A1.

²⁷⁷President George Bush, "State of the Union Address," 31 January 1990. Quoted in Thomas L. Friedman, "Moscow Accepts U.S. Advantage of 30,000 Soldiers Across Europe," New York Times, 14 February 1990, A1.

stated, "We've spent 80 percent of our time in the last months on East-West relations, and not only on military matters."²⁷⁸

The nature of the WTO, on the other hand, is almost entirely military. Arnold Horelick of the RAND Corporation notes several crucial weaknesses in the current WTO structure: its political infrastructure is poorly developed and its political organs meet only rarely and are largely ceremonial. Furthermore, its most important political decisions in the past were made in party, not state, channels—a practice that has been overtaken by the collapse of ruling communist parties in Eastern Europe.²⁷⁹ As a result, Moscow is increasingly forced to deal with her former satellites on a traditional state-to-state basis, in sharp contrast to the previous relationship wherein orders were virtually dictated from the Kremlin.

The tumultuous events in Eastern Europe have had some detrimental effects on NATO. There is some limited talk about abolishing the alliance, and several nations have spoken of reducing their commitment to NATO. Once more, the case of the WTO is much worse. Its continued existence is in considerably more doubt than that of NATO. Official Kremlin statements until only a few months ago called for the eventual dissolution of both the WTO and NATO, but these amounted only to political propaganda. In the wake of the dismemberment of one after another of its fellow communist governments, the USSR has struggled to promote a new role for the future of the WTO. Much as is the case with the U.S. promotion of NATO, Moscow is calling for an expanded political role for the eastern

²⁷⁸Howard LaFranchi, "NATO Chief Prepares for 'Political Role' for Alliance," Christian Science Monitor, 21 December 1989, 3.

²⁷⁹Arnold L. Horelick, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: Threshold of a New Era," Foreign Affairs 69, No. 1, 1990: 63.

alliance. Such a role for the WTO was the topic for a New Times article in October 1989.²⁸⁰ In that article, the authors, Kortunov and Bezrukov, advocated that the WTO be transformed into a primarily political body. They detailed four reasons for the continued usefulness of an Eastern European alliance: common economic problems; the need to ensure stability in the region; existing ties in trade, scientific, cultural and other relations; and the need for joint action to keep from being left out of an economic environment increasingly dominated by the countries of Western Europe.²⁸¹ According to the authors, the "...politicization of the WTO would greatly enhance the stability of the organization, put its work into a new key, and, most importantly, would make it more receptive to the qualitatively new demands of the times."²⁸²

But, as I described in detail in the last chapter, in all but the most technical sense, the WTO has already collapsed. Although Poland has temporarily ceased its calls for the evacuation of Soviet troops until the Polish-German border question is settled, she will likely press vigorously for a full withdrawal afterward. Treaties have been concluded which provide for a total evacuation of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Besides calling for the withdrawal of all Soviet troops, a growing number of Hungarians are also demanding that their country withdraw from the WTO. On 13 March, Janos Kis, leader of the front-running opposition party Alliance of Free Democrats, declared that his

²⁸⁰Mikhail Bezrukov and Andrei Kortunov, "What Kind of an Alliance Do We Need?" New Times, No. 41, 1989: 7-8.

²⁸¹Ibid.

²⁸²Ibid.

party would ask the Parliament to annul the country's Warsaw Pact membership following free elections.²⁸³

Although Soviet troops are still in place in these countries, the USSR is for all practical purposes a lone actor in the WTO. To preserve the pact's structure and give it a further chance to salvage Soviet interests in Europe, the Kremlin will continue to try to make a case for a Soviet/WTO role in such functions as monitoring the reunification of Germany and involvement in continuing arms control efforts such as START and CFE. Arnold Horelick writes, "For the Soviet Union, the CFE process provides a vehicle for securing at least some reciprocal returns from the West for reductions in swollen Soviet forces."²⁸⁴ He also expresses concern that, while the arms control process gives NATO further reason for continuation, the same holds true for the WTO. In other words, by strengthening its own position, NATO will provide a basis for continued Soviet participation in the affairs of Eastern Europe.

Mr. Horelick's concerns must be considered, but there are other matters at stake as well. The sudden, virtual collapse of the WTO has spurred new fears of reemerging traditional international and ethnic strife in Europe, whose submersion under the mantles of the two alliances have been one irrefutable benefit of the otherwise repressive Cold War. As the Warsaw Pact evaporates and NATO begins to suffer some disarray, a very real danger emerges of the resurgence of such rivalries. The best known of these is probably the age-old bitterness between Hungary and Romania. The dispute over Polish-German

²⁸³"Hungarian Politician Urges End to Role in Warsaw Pact," New York Times, 14 March 1990, A6.

²⁸⁴Arnold L. Horelick, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: Threshold of a New Era," Foreign Affairs 69, No. 1, 1990: 61.

borders is also fraught with peril. Elsewhere in the region, Slovaks suspect Czech domination, Slovenes fear domination by Serbia, Serbs fear an expansionist Albania, Bulgarians struggle with a growing Turkish population, to name just a few. In this very troubled environment, many argue that a continued presence of NATO, and perhaps even the WTO, will serve to help police such ill will among peoples.

As previously observed, the two superpowers would also like to maintain prominent roles in the monitoring of the status of Germany. U.S. support for a Soviet voice in the "two plus four" negotiations assures the Kremlin a continued role in those affairs. Indeed, according to some western analysts, in light of the virtual collapse of the WTO, "...a supervisory role for the Soviet Union in company with the western Big Three may be the most Mr. Gorbachev could ever expect in the way of a brake on any German expansionary tendencies." ²⁸⁵

F. TURBULENT TIMES AHEAD FOR WASHINGTON

Jeane Kirkpatrick warns that, with the ending of the Cold War, the U.S., too, will inevitably face a reduced role in Europe. The lessening of the Soviet threat which made NATO and U.S. military power vitally important to Western Europe, forces a reorientation of U.S. military policy there. ²⁸⁶ A reduction of U.S. forces is inevitable. During the recent "Open Skies" negotiations in Ottawa, the USSR agreed to the Bush Administration's proposal for reduced superpower troop levels in Europe. Under those provisions, the U.S. and the USSR would each be allowed to maintain a total of 195,000 soldiers in the zone of

²⁸⁵R.W. Apple, Jr., "Moscow Pays the Price," New York Times, 15 February 1990, A9.

²⁸⁶Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "Beyond the Cold War," Foreign Affairs 69, No. 1, 1990: 14.

Central Europe, and the U.S. would be allowed an additional 30,000 troops in Europe, but outside the central zone.²⁸⁷

Acceptance by Moscow of this agreement was widely interpreted to reflect Moscow's recognition of the decided geographic disadvantage which the U.S. would face in quickly reinforcing its allies in Europe, versus the Soviet Union's relative proximity. As Andrew Goldberg notes, the removal of U.S. forces from Europe entails their relocation 3,000 miles from the locus of conflict in Europe and even their probable demobilization. In contrast, any Soviet forces withdrawn would remain within 300 miles of Central Europe.²⁸⁸ Although the chances of Soviet military intervention in Eastern Europe will likely remain slight so long as the USSR is ruled by Mikhail Gorbachev, we must not forget that past Soviet leaders have repeatedly intervened militarily in what they considered to be dangerous situations; Gorbachev's successors might do the same. Until the USSR completely withdraws its military forces from Eastern Europe, the U.S. must preserve a military presence on the continent strong enough to offset as much as possible the Kremlin's tremendous geographic advantage.

However, only a week after they had agreed to a joint U.S.-Soviet troop ceiling in Ottawa, the Soviets made another proposal which seemed to supersede the earlier agreement. The Kremlin caught NATO somewhat off guard by proposing that NATO and the WTO cut their troops in the same zone of Central Europe to meet ceilings of between

²⁸⁷Thomas L. Friedman, "Moscow Accepts U.S. Advantage of 30,000 Soldiers Across Europe," New York Times, 14 February 1990, A1.

²⁸⁸Andrew C. Goldberg, "Soviet Imperial Decline and the Emerging Balance of Power," Washington Quarterly (Winter 1990): 165.

700,000 and 750,000.²⁸⁹ According to Soviet negotiator Oleg Grinevskiy, this broader limit would cover troops from West Germany, Britain, Canada, France, Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as American troops.²⁹⁰ Western officials suspect that one motive for this surprise Soviet move might be Soviet concerns over the military implications of German reunification. The Soviet Union has previously sought measures that would indirectly limit the size of the West German military.²⁹¹ I would agree that this move is an attempt by the Kremlin to make some gains in connection with the U.S. insistence that a unified Germany be a member of NATO. It is also another avenue of further restricting the level of U.S. forces which will remain on the continent.

Much to Washington's dismay, the Kremlin is not alone in calling for a reduced U.S. presence in Europe. For months now, there have been reports that more and more Germans favor the withdrawal not only of Soviets, but of U.S. troops as well. Then, on 4 April, Premier Walter Wallman of the German state of Hesse formally requested that U.S. forces be withdrawn from his state as part of any European arms cuts.²⁹² Although West German President Helmut Kohl and other leading officials still publicly support a continued U.S. presence in Germany following reunification, such public appeals as Wallman's spell trouble for American policy in the very near future. If most or all American forces were required to be withdrawn from a reunified Germany, future U.S. flexibility will be seriously restricted due to the troop ceilings agreed to by the U.S. and

²⁸⁹Michael B. Gordon, "Soviets Now Seeking Broader Troop Limits in Central Europe," New York Times, 23 February 1990, A4.

²⁹⁰Ibid.

²⁹¹Ibid.

²⁹²"German State Chief Wants U.S. Troops Cut," New York Times, 5 April 1990, A6.

Soviets in February. Under that agreement, the U.S. would be allowed only 30,000 military personnel outside of Germany. This potential situation has many senior U.S. officials concerned. A recent article by Jeffrey Smith of the Washington Post quotes one senior American diplomat as stating that, "Once our troops are forced out of central Europe, the overall political situation will likely...[prevent] any other nation from accepting a significant number of these troops." ²⁹³

The final level of U.S. forces to remain in Europe is still uncertain, but what is certain is that American forces will be reduced. What strategy should the U.S. employ in withdrawing forces from Europe? In a recent issue of the Washington Quarterly, former National Security Agency director William Odom outlined his recommendations for U.S. military actions amidst the changing European security environment. Odom recommends that, should a withdrawal of significant U.S. forces from Europe become necessary, we should do things that least restrict our ability to regenerate combat strength. Stating that the most difficult things to reintroduce into Europe are corps, division, and battalion headquarters detachments, he urges that cadre battalions capable of being quickly upgraded to combat efficiency be maintained for each division in question. Even if the troops are withdrawn, Odom advocates that weapons and vehicles be left forward-deployed in Europe, and stateside forces should be regularly re-deployed in exercises. To further reduce costs while not inordinately harming our capability to reinforce European allies, the author recommends that tactical air force units be withdrawn to the U.S. and placed in the reserves, and that the Navy decrease deployments to the Mediterranean and the Baltic regions. Finally, Odom warns that the U.S. should avoid arms control

²⁹³R. Jeffrey Smith, "Wearing Out Our Welcome," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 19-25 March 1990, 17.

agreements that provide for U.S. force levels which are either too small or wrongly structured to retain U.S. operational wartime significance, in comparison with Soviet forces.²⁹⁴

Besides justifying its continued presence in Europe to the Europeans, the U.S. is also going to find it increasingly difficult to garner domestic support for the presence of U.S. forces on the continent. The common perception is that the Cold War is over, that Mikhail Gorbachev has given an entirely new complexion to the face of European affairs, and that the Soviet threat is gone. As Bush Administration officials attempt to preserve American military forces from the budget chopping block, many prominent authorities are calling for reductions of U.S. forces far below the levels agreed upon in Ottawa. In February, former American defense secretary James Schlesinger, a renowned hard-line conservative, declared that the Warsaw Pact's "role as a military alliance and a military threat have been largely broken" and called for elimination of all but a "residual" American force of perhaps 50,000 troops in Europe.²⁹⁵ Even within the Bush Administration there are signs of a dispute regarding the viability of the Soviet threat. Secretary of Defense Cheney, in promoting the current defense budget, has repeatedly argued that Moscow will pose a potentially serious military threat for some time, regardless of who is in power. In sharp contrast to Secretary Cheney's comments, the nation's chief intelligence officer, Director of Central Intelligence William Webster, testified before the House Armed Services Committee that it is unlikely

²⁹⁴William E. Odom, "Gorbachev's Strategy and Western Security: Illusions Versus Reality," Washington Quarterly (Winter 1990): 145-155.

²⁹⁵R. W. Apple, Jr., "Bush's Fragile Battalions in Europe," New York Times, 2 February 1990, A1.

that the Soviets would pose a major conventional military threat in the foreseeable future.²⁹⁶

G. THE CRUCIAL QUESTION: IS "THE THREAT" TRULY GONE?

The U.S. and her allies are beginning rapidly to reduce troop levels and military spending on the assumption that Moscow no longer represents a threat. But has the threat really gone away? It is true that Gorbachev has entirely revamped the international situation, in Europe and in the rest of the world. It may also be true that the end of the Cold War is within sight, but the fact remains that a significant percentage of the Soviet threat still has not been removed from Eastern Europe. Since the idea of the evaporation of the Soviet threat is the driving force in most calls for evacuation of U.S. forces from Europe and cutting of the U.S. defense budget, let us examine just what threat the Soviets still present in Eastern Europe. Presently, there are about 380,000 Soviet troops still in the GDR. As already noted, treaties have been signed to withdraw all Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia. However, most of the 73,500 Soviet troops stationed there are still in Czechoslovakia. And a total of some 90,000 Soviet troops remain in Hungary and Poland. In sum, the vast majority of the Soviet portion of the WTO—a force totalling over 500,000 troops—still remains in the middle of Europe. Contrary to popular opinion, the threat is greatly diminished, but not yet gone. As Jeane Kirkpatrick notes, the Cold War will not be entirely over until the Soviet Union completely withdraws all its forces from any and all European countries that request it to do so.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁶Michael Wines, "Webster and Cheney at Odds Over Soviet Military Threat," New York Times, 7 March 1990, A7.

²⁹⁷Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Beyond the Cold War," Foreign Affairs 69, No. 1, 1990: 12.

Many in the West have already declared that the Cold War is over and that the West won. Although it is true that the forces of democracy have made huge gains in the political revolution that swept Eastern Europe, the final curtain has not yet dropped on the Cold War. For four decades, the only way the Kremlin preserved its hegemony in the region was to amass overwhelming military force and conduct a military occupation. Although the peoples of Eastern Europe are to be applauded for their bravery in standing up to Moscow's authority, and democracy has been vindicated as a system truly desired by people everywhere, we in the West must be careful not to lose our objectivity amidst the popular euphoria. We should not confuse the disintegration of the non-Soviet portion of the WTO (whose reliability has been in question for years) with the continuation of the Soviet portion of the WTO, which remains a viable and potentially dangerous force. The sole insurance policy of Kremlin domination of Eastern Europe was and is the WTO. Today, while the Eastern European portion of that force is an empty shell, the stronger Soviet contingent is still largely intact. A withdrawal of Soviet forces is a prerequisite for insuring the true and full self-determination and self-government in the countries of Eastern Europe. As long as those forces are in place, Moscow will by default still play a role in the region and true freedom will not exist.

H. CHIEF U.S. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Against this background, what is the proper role for the U.S. in the future of Europe? Our main objectives are and should be to preserve the maximum level of stability while working toward true self-determination in Eastern Europe. Of greatest concern is the determination of the future of Germany and its inclusion in NATO. At the same time, the U.S. should try to safeguard the rights of other countries in the region. While seeking to

expand the political role of NATO, we should anticipate that the military portion of NATO will have to be continually reduced as events prove that the region is indeed more secure. Although America's formerly preeminent leadership role in Europe will now be challenged, the U.S. should still work to maintain its stake in Europe's future through an expanded role in such forums as the CSCE and EC.

I believe that, in the short term, the U.S. should continue to focus upon three main threats to the security of Europe: the possible breakout of traditional rivalries between nations and ethnic groups of the region; a limited, but potential threat of conventional Soviet military intervention into European affairs, and the remaining threat of nuclear war. Regarding the threat of traditional nationalist rivalries, I assert that the most logical way to counter such rivalries is to maintain a larger umbrella structure such as NATO or the EC to arbitrate differences between parties. So far, the U.S. has continued to strongly back NATO as the most viable vehicle to preserve the security of Western Europe.

The final two issues of conventional and nuclear threats to Europe primarily center around the USSR. In my estimation, the best way to approach all these situations, but especially the issue of future U.S.-Soviet relations, is to formulate a dynamic and vigorous policy to achieve the goals desired and then to work toward these goals in the forums available. Such a policy was described by Graham T. Allison, Dean of Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, in a 1988 Foreign Affairs article.²⁹⁸ As it regards the USSR, this "proactive" policy, as depicted by Dr. Allison, would seek to rob the Soviets of the political initiative by carefully establishing a long-term political agenda and then bargaining firmly with the Kremlin in a virtual "tit for tat" manner. By proposing such

²⁹⁸Graham T. Allison, Jr., "Testing Gorbachev," Foreign Affairs 67 (Fall 1988): 18-32.

a stance, I do not imply that the Bush Administration should change its overall objectives, but that it should press hard for every advantage in ways that will achieve American objectives while still allowing Gorbachev to reform the Soviet system in ways not detrimental to his own political standing. It is my belief that we should move aggressively ahead in pursuing foreign policy objectives now, since there is no possible guarantee that Gorbachev will still be in power tomorrow. While the Soviets do appear willing to reduce their conventional force levels, they have shown little interest in doing the same with their nuclear arsenal. The Bush Administration has established a good starting point to continue conventional and nuclear force reductions through the CFE and START processes, respectively. While preserving the security of the West, the U.S. should move aggressively to drastically reduce these forces while a willing counterpart presides in the Kremlin. The continuation of Mikhail Gorbachev in power is far from certain, and we should proceed with the attitude that any forces taken out of Eastern Europe or dismantled in accordance with treaties today, cannot be magically replaced tomorrow. In this regard, I would recommend that we approach the Soviet Union with a list of concrete proposals which, if met, would be reciprocated by us with expanded trade, economic benefits and other opportunities. While respecting legitimate Soviet national security needs, we should take a highly aggressive, not reactive stance in such negotiations. The Soviets would respect us for it. They definitely do not respect those who negotiate from positions of uncertainty and weakness.

Under Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviets have demonstrated a willingness to play the game of international relations according to rules more acceptable to other nations, at least for the time being. As long as they continue to play by those rules, we should respond accordingly. The USSR seems willing to release its military vise-grip on Eastern Europe.

We should encourage the fastest removal of those forces remaining as is possible. While the non-Soviet WTO forces are no longer viable, the Soviet contingent is still a potent threat. However, if those forces are not directly challenged, it is difficult to envision a Kremlin under Gorbachev ordering those troops into action outside the USSR. The costs of doing so would be astronomical, and their success would be far from certain. So long as the Kremlin does not interfere with domestic Eastern European affairs, the West should not object to a temporary continued presence of those Soviet forces during a limited period of transition. We should, however, still do everything possible to encourage their rapid withdrawal.

I. A REDUCED ROLE IN EUROPE: THE REALITY AMERICA MAY BE FORCED TO ACCEPT

Although it will almost certainly fall far short of our pre-World War Two isolationism, the U.S. in all likelihood will soon reduce its worldwide commitments and concentrate more on U.S. domestic concerns. Assuming that the Soviet threat to Europe continues to decline, the Bush Administration will come under increasing pressures from the American public, from Congress, and from some of our European allies, to significantly reduce U.S. troop levels in Europe. Barring a radical realignment of American foreign policy, however, this country will continue to maintain close ties with its European allies, and America's security will continue to be closely linked with the security of those allies. As we approach the decision of how far to cut back our presence in Europe, or indeed whether to withdraw entirely, we should not overlook the fact that we have had to hurriedly insert forces into the European continent to provide the winning balance in two world wars already this century. Granted, this country stands to achieve short-term

economic benefits by drastically cutting our defense spending and withdrawing American forces to the U.S. But the gains achieved in any reductions of U.S. military forces in Europe must be weighed against the possible costs. In my opinion, a sharp drawdown of the number of troops in Europe is inevitable, but a full withdrawal would be highly inadvisable. The Bush Administration is justified in its attempt to preserve America's position in European affairs, but it will face great obstacles in doing so.

According to some respected authorities, the United States may not be given too much say in the matter. As previously noted, Jeane Kirkpatrick has asserted that a reduced voice in European affairs is simply a reality which America is going to have to live with. In her recent article in Foreign Affairs, she observed that, although most European leaders and their publics are grateful to the U.S. for its help in a vulnerable period, they do not now and never will regard America as a European power. They have not invited the U.S. to join the European Community and are not likely to do so. Ambassador Kirkpatrick claims that our European allies are not moving blindly ahead, but are willing to accept the risks of a reduced American presence in Europe, namely, that the USSR will be left as the strongest power on the continent. On the other hand, she feels that Western European nations probably will not try to quickly expel the U.S. from Europe and are unlikely to seek mutual withdrawals of U.S. and Soviet troops as an acceptable security arrangement.²⁹⁹

As President George Bush reaffirmed in his State of the Union message on 31 January of this year, there have been and remain marked differences between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Chief among those differences is the fact that NATO is a voluntary alliance among

²⁹⁹Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Beyond the Cold War," Foreign Affairs 69, No. 1, 1990: 16.

partners of equal sovereignty. The U.S., in accordance with the spirit of this partnership and its democratic principles, must accept the wishes of its allies. As a voluntary contract, NATO can rightfully be abolished at any time. Although not advisable in the immediate future, that may happen someday. As a guest in Europe, we will have to act accordingly. While maintaining political and economic ties for our own good, we should continue to assist in the defense of the European members of NATO to the extent they will allow us. After 1945, we decided to stand beside our European allies and secure their way of life. The events of the last ten months have vindicated our policies over the last four decades and reflect the rightness of our decision. Now, much as a senior partner must eventually surrender some of his own power and responsibilities to an aspiring junior partner, the U.S. must surrender its dominant position as the "Chairman of the Board" and take its place as more of a "first among equals." Our policies in Europe have proven successful; we must now learn to live with that success, along with its possible consequences.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

This work has presented a general overview of a variety of issues surrounding Gorbachev's policy of "new thinking," with a particular emphasis on how these matters have altered Soviet military doctrine and will continue to affect the future U.S.-Soviet security relationship. This chapter will attempt to briefly synopsise the major findings of this study under the three headings of "Economic Factors," "Western Reaction," and "Military Factors."

A. ECONOMIC FACTORS

Mikhail Gorbachev's "perestroika" faces a series of hurdles which individually could severely hamper success and, when taken together, seem almost insurmountable. Gorbachev's attempts to divert high-technology equipment, manpower and other resources from the military-industrial sector into the lagging civilian economy, appear to have achieved only marginal gains. As he continues to chip away at the military's stockpiles, he is certain to encounter mounting opposition from the defense establishment. Military support for Gorbachev's reforms is certainly important, but this alone will not make or break Gorbachev's reform program. As previously observed in Chapter Three, in my estimation, the single greatest danger to "perestroika" and to its godfather, Gorbachev, lies in the political tumult which has erupted inside the USSR. Ironically, this same wave of political unrest came about largely as a result of political reforms enacted by Gorbachev to reinforce his own program.

What then, is the likely outcome of Gorbachev's economic modernization program? Gorbachev's "perestroika," as it stands now, will achieve some limited successes but will not accomplish most of Gorbachev's goals. I do not foresee how the Soviet economy can be transformed without totally abandoning the centrally-planned Stalinist system and erecting in its place a true market-oriented economy. There is mounting evidence to indicate that Gorbachev may, in early 1990, be planning yet another push toward radical economic reforms which could transform the present system. Such a move, even given his greatly strengthened political position, will be fraught with many perils. Granted, Mikhail Gorbachev is a highly pragmatic statesman—one of the greatest statesmen of this century—and he continues to amaze the world with his political acumen and daring. If the Soviet economy can ever be successfully transformed, if given enough time, he is probably the one man who can do it. However, so long as the Stalinist economic system is preserved, the Soviet Union will continue to be a one-dimensional superpower and an economic cripple.

With this in mind, any and all considerations by the West to grant economic aid to the Soviet Union should be subjected to intense scrutiny. If Dr. Stephen Rosefielde of the University of North Carolina is correct, no amount of western aid can help to salvage the hopelessly swamped Soviet economy. If this is true, any economic aid whatsoever to the USSR will only be wasted.

B. WESTERN REACTION

What general conclusions can be drawn from this study regarding future western actions toward the USSR? In my judgement, a realistic approach demands that we not be naive and take Soviet proclamations as gospel. On the other hand, we must not ignore the

fundamental changes that we are witnessing regarding the Kremlin's approach to international relations. We have seen tangible evidence in the form of Soviet troop withdrawals from Afghanistan and from Eastern Europe. We have observed fundamental political alterations inside the Soviet Union. Democratic and nationalist movements, although not unprecedented, have arisen on a scale never before seen in Soviet times. Moscow's tolerance to this point of the astounding political revolutions in Eastern Europe, along with Gorbachev's apparent intent to avoid military intervention in that region, also present very heartening evidence that the USSR has dramatically altered its foreign policy away from a heavy dependence on the Soviet military. On the other hand, the Kremlin's recent use of military force in Lithuania, however limited in scale, serves as a stark reminder that Moscow is still willing to use its military fist to settle important issues. On the whole, though, the positive gains for international security under Gorbachev's leadership have far outweighed any negative results.

In return for visible and authentic reforms in the East, the West must also do some rethinking of its own doctrine and policies. For over forty years, many in the West have viewed U.S.-Soviet relations largely as a zero-sum game, believing that any gain by Moscow was to the detriment of Washington. If we continue to see positive, tangible overtures from Moscow, common sense dictates that we must now acknowledge that cooperation can produce mutually beneficial results. We must, however, be realistic in our own expectations. We should not expect the USSR to transform into a western-style liberal democracy; that simply is not going to happen. Many of the reforms evolving inside the USSR and in Eastern Europe have resulted directly because of Gorbachev or are strongly connected with him. We must remain aware that certain events such as strong or violent nationalist uprisings—such as those occurring now in the Baltic states and in Soviet Central

Asia--may yet induce the Kremlin to resort to large-scale military force. Inside the USSR, the fate of Gorbachev's economic reforms is still very uncertain. A dramatic failure in either of these sectors could easily lead to Gorbachev's ouster or convince him to withdraw to a more centrist position, resulting in a sense of "muddling through" much as happened during the years of Brezhnev. Gorbachev has already remained in power longer than most experts had predicted; some very highly respected authorities two years ago gave Gorbachev at most a year in office. At this writing, his grasp on power still seems far from secure.

After almost five years of closely following the actions of Mikhail Gorbachev, I am still unsure of his ultimate objectives and motives. Quite simply, we cannot be certain of what those objectives are. Too many positive changes have occurred to dismiss all of what Gorbachev has done as being part of some sinister plot. Despite the remaining uncertainties, the West should cooperate and negotiate with a responsive Kremlin while the opportunity presents itself. While I believe it premature now to declare that the Cold War is completely over, today we definitely have that objective within our grasp. Over forty-two years ago, George Kennan noted in his legendary "X-article" that the U.S. had at its disposal the ability to force a "gradual mellowing of Soviet power." Gorbachev seems to have gone a long way toward accomplishing that goal himself, and much quicker than anyone would have ever thought possible. It is in our interest to aggressively continue this process, to further reduce the already lessened Soviet threat to American and western interests. In doing so, however, the U.S. and her allies must preserve defenses sufficient to combat any Soviet backtracking which may occur in the future.

C. MILITARY OBJECTIVES—A FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE ANALYSIS

There is already mounting evidence to indicate that the USSR has indeed modified its military doctrine and is reducing its annual military spending. Chapters Six and Seven described the great changes under way in Soviet forces stationed in Europe and examined possible future force deployments which, if adopted, will further decrease the threat to the West. As previously observed, the non-Soviet portion of the Warsaw Pact has collapsed, and the democratic political reforms now being enacted in the former Soviet satellites will only serve to strengthen western security and further complicate any Soviet incursions in the region. However, we cannot ignore the potential threat which will exist so long as the approximately 500,000 Soviet soldiers remaining in Eastern Europe, stay in place. The removal of these forces, I believe, should be the single greatest objective of future U.S.-Soviet negotiations. Only when those troops are removed will Eastern Europe be truly free of Soviet domination. And only then can the U.S. safely contemplate significantly reducing its military forces in Europe.

Although it is impossible to know Gorbachev's ultimate military objectives under "new thinking," I am convinced that the USSR has indeed begun to adopt a less offensive military doctrine. In assessing future Soviet intentions, we must look past the rhetoric and consider what is really important to western security—the degree of threat offered by Moscow to western interests. I therefore offer the following as factors which the West should look for in determining future Soviet sincerity in adhering to its declared defensive stance. Some of those measures outlined by Mr. Andrew Marshall and detailed in Chapter Five included: the withdrawal of all Soviet forces to home soil, a withdrawal from forward deployments of more offensively-oriented units, and preparation by the USSR of defensive positions along Soviet national borders. As described in Chapter Six, the first two of these

conditions are already being met as Soviet forces continue to be withdrawn from Eastern Europe. Construction by the USSR of the so-called "fortified regions" would satisfy the third requirement outlined by Mr. Marshall. Additionally, we must closely monitor the continuing Soviet troop withdrawals to preclude any possible deceptions such as those warned about by Mr. Graham Turbiville. The specific forces and types of armaments withdrawn will help to reveal the true nature of Soviet intentions. If the equipment and troops withdrawn come from combat units, this would lend credence to the idea that a true restructuring of forces is under way. If, on the other hand, these resources are withdrawn from storage facilities and the troops are taken from rear echelon units or from security forces, the significance of the reductions will be greatly diminished. In contrast, continued withdrawal of offensively-oriented units from Eastern Europe will decrease the threat to NATO of a short-warning Warsaw Pact attack. Furthermore, deep cuts made in the Soviet military under Mikhail Gorbachev will not be instantly reversible if Gorbachev decides to abandon his current policies or if he is ousted from power. In the meantime, while respecting justifiable Soviet concerns for their own national security, we should require that the Kremlin furnish some proof that forces withdrawn to the USSR have indeed been disbanded. We also should not hesitate to require Soviet cooperation in dissipating the mysteries of the USSR's defense budget. Within limits, a Kremlin genuinely interested in peaceful reforms will respond to reasonable requests for clarification.

D. SUMMATION

In the closing months of 1989 and the first half of 1990, we have witnessed miraculous political breakthroughs in Eastern Europe. We have been promised that military reforms are under way and that more reductions are imminent. Soviet officials

have repeatedly assured us that the Kremlin no longer poses a threat to the security of Europe--Western or Eastern--or to the United States. But the key term here is "promise." While we cannot expect Mikhail Gorbachev to continue to make substantive, unilateral cuts with no quid pro quo from the West, NATO states could be risking disaster by reducing defense capabilities solely on the basis of Gorbachev's promised reductions. The USSR is indeed reducing some of its forces in Eastern Europe and at home. These actions, if continued, should be matched with equivalent actions on the part of the West, while maintaining a reasonable balance of force capabilities in Europe. However, until ample evidence is available that the Soviets are indeed withdrawing and/or disbanding the forces they have promised to, the West would be foolish to proceed with substantial cuts of its own. The security of the West, particularly of the U.S., is not something that can ever be trusted to the mere words of Mikhail Gorbachev or anyone else.

After carefully researching the available sources of information, a still murky picture emerges of Kremlin intentions under "new thinking." In trying to make some sense of contemporary events, I often look to the writings of great leaders of the past. In the dark days of October 1939, Sir Winston Churchill spoke to a grim British people concerning the German invasion of Poland and the treachery of the Soviet Union in signing a pact with Hitler. In that address, the British prime minister coined a phrase often used since then by Sovietologists; he said, "I cannot forecast to you the actions of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside of an enigma..." Most writers quoting Churchill often overlook the last--but highly significant--portion of his statement, which continues, "...but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest."³⁰⁰

³⁰⁰Sir Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1948), 449.

While interpreting the newest watershed events in Soviet policy, we must not forget the lessons of fifty years ago. We must look past both pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet rhetoric to discern the important facts at hand. Today, as in 1939, the Kremlin has acted and will continue to act, in a manner which it views as furthering Soviet interests; if in doing so, it happens to also help the West, then so much the better for Soviet propaganda purposes. But anyone who believes that Gorbachev is acting solely to further the cause of world peace is kidding no one but himself. Whether present Soviet actions are part of some long-term scheme or are desperate moves foisted upon a weakening Kremlin, will not be quickly discernable. My own feeling is that Gorbachev embarked upon his daring course of reforms in 1985 because he was convinced he had no choice but to take desperate actions or lose his empire. Still, what matters most in the immediate future is for the West to look for concrete indications that the USSR no longer represents an overwhelming threat to western security. Now is not the time to be crying wolf without ample proof, but it is imprudent and dangerous to rush blindly ahead and deprive ourselves of our defenses without sufficient evidence of Soviet fair play. What is called for is a carefully thought out, businesslike approach of dealing with Moscow in ways that produce mutually beneficial results while not unduly risking the security of America or her allies. In light of Gorbachev's "new thinking," I agree that we must do some new thinking of our own. It must, though, be well-reasoned and clear thinking, not thinking clouded by premature euphoria.

IX. EPILOGUE

Anyone who followed the rapidly unfolding events inside the Soviet Union in 1989-90 can appreciate the difficulty encountered by one attempting to analyze or forecast events during that period. In the few short weeks which have elapsed since the majority of the research on this work was completed, several important events have already had a tremendous impact on some of the key observations made in this thesis.

Without doubt, the most dramatic of these events was the agreement reached on 16 July between Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. In that meeting, Gorbachev told Kohl that the USSR would drop its objection to a united Germany's membership in NATO. The two leaders also announced that negotiations would soon begin on the complete withdrawal of the approximately 380,000 Soviet troops which still remain in what is now East Germany. Those troops should be withdrawn in three to four years, perhaps sooner. In return, Kohl agreed that the army of a united Germany, during the same period, will be reduced to 370,000 men, and that no NATO forces will be stationed on the territory of eastern Germany so long as Soviet troops remain there.³⁰¹ Chancellor Kohl also did much to alleviate Kremlin worries about a possible resurgence of German militarism by agreeing that a united Germany would renounce the right to manufacture and possess nuclear weapons and would sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. West Germany presented Gorbachev with another sought-

³⁰¹Mark J. Porubcansky, "Soviets Agree to NATO Role for Germany," Monterey Herald, 17 July 1990, 1,4.

after concession by formally backing a \$3 billion loan to the USSR.³⁰² On 17 July, West German leaders also agreed to give up any claim to territory absorbed by Poland at the end of World War Two. The latter decision paved the way for a breakthrough agreement among the seven nations now participating in the "two-plus-four" talks, removing the last big obstacle in the path to German reunification.³⁰³

The Gorbachev-Kohl agreement and the resolution of the Polish border question together will greatly accelerate the Soviet military pullout from Eastern Europe. The WTO is now clearly defunct, and events have moved so far that Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov announced in July that a joint commission of the WTO would formally submit a proposal this fall to consider dissolving that organization.³⁰⁴ Although these events bode well for Eastern Europe, they will only fuel the opposition to Gorbachev at home. Divisions are clearly emerging within the Soviet officer corps and military officials are more openly criticizing the Kremlin leader, accusing him of moving too quickly with his reform program and consenting to a humiliating Soviet military retreat from Eastern Europe.³⁰⁵ The military's reaction is likely to be even more negative to Gorbachev's stunning announcement on 17 August that he is appointing a commission to go ahead with a formal transition of the Soviet military into an all-volunteer force. These reforms could include abolition of the mandatory draft and creation of "national-territorial units," but

³⁰²Daniel Sneider, "Gorbachev and Kohl Agree On Terms for German Unity," Christian Science Monitor, 18 July 1990, 1-2.

³⁰³Barry Schwied, "Talks Resolve Dispute Over Polish Border," Monterey Herald, 18 July 1990, 1, 4.

³⁰⁴Marshal Dmitri Yazov, in an interview in Rabochnaya tribuna. Quoted in Report on the USSR, 6 July 1990, 30.

³⁰⁵See, for example, Stephen Foye, "Gorbachev and His Generals," Report on the USSR, 18 May 1990, 15, 16.

would leave strategic weapons under central Kremlin control.³⁰⁶ The reforms, if implemented, will clearly signal a bold departure from recent Soviet military doctrine and strategy. These events point out the increasing importance of research into the various military structures under consideration by the USSR and the Kremlin's interest in such new developments as construction of "fortified regions" which were highlighted in Chapter Six of this thesis. Finally, these reforms, if they come to fruition, will provide proof that the USSR is indeed adopting a truly defensive military posture.

Gorbachev's readiness to take bold steps on the international scene reflects his strengthened confidence in his own political position following the conclusion of the tumultuous 28th Communist Party Congress. Although he was strongly challenged on a number of key issues, Gorbachev managed to achieve all of his major goals in that congress. This followed his consolidation this spring of tremendous political powers in the new Presidential Council, which left the historically all-powerful Politburo virtually impotent. The shifting of all important leadership positions into the Presidential Council allows Gorbachev to not only consolidate the most crucial governmental powers under those men loyal to him, but it also strips the CPSU of much say-so in the country. Furthermore, Gorbachev's position of President is independent of the CPSU, and offers him an alternative base of power should he choose to leave the Communist Party, which is now in total disarray following the resignations of RSFSR President Boris Yeltsin and the mayors of Moscow and Leningrad and the continuing exodus of thousands of party members.

³⁰⁶Bill Keller, "Gorbachev Vows to Reorganize Military," New York Times, 18 August 1990, 3.

In sharp contrast to his strengthened position within the Soviet political structure, Gorbachev seems absolutely unable to control other events inside the USSR. He is everywhere beset by a bewildering array of problems. Republics clamoring for greater independence threaten Moscow's central authority. Hundreds have died in ethnic clashes in Kirghizia and the bloody fighting continues between Armenians and Azeris. The country's crime rate is skyrocketing. Worker strikes are widespread. Five years after Gorbachev set out to resuscitate the USSR's sluggish economy, he is still unable to halt the economic collapse. This spring, it seemed that the country's downward economic spiral had hit rock-bottom; somehow, it has plummeted even lower. Recently, shoppers in the Siberian city of Krasnoyarsk, seething over the lack of basic foodstuffs, angrily ransacked the market square and sent shopkeepers running for their lives.³⁰⁷ And while many store shelves lay empty, this year's bumper crop harvest may rot in the fields due to fuel and worker shortages and the collapsed supply system.³⁰⁸ Official Soviet statistics for the first quarter of 1990 verify that economic output is down by 1.6 percent relative to the same period last year. Furthermore, many Soviet and western specialists estimate that the country's inflation rate is now running between 10-15 percent.³⁰⁹ Despite these grim statistics, the Kremlin has repeatedly drawn back from enacting true price reforms, the cornerstone of any successful transition to a market economy. In April, Gorbachev's top economic adviser, Nikolay Petrakov, conceded that the Soviet government lacks the

³⁰⁷Celestine Bohlen, "Some Soviet Items Aren't Scarce: Crime, Strikes, Fighting, Pollution," New York Times, 18 August 1990, 1,3.

³⁰⁸Daniel Sneider, "Bumper Soviet Crop Rots in Fields," Christian Science Monitor, 6 August 1990, 3.

³⁰⁹John E. Tedstrom, "First Quarter Economic Results: Can It Get Any Worse?" Report on the USSR, 1 June 1990, 5.

political legitimacy needed to implement harsh economic measures, in contrast to Poland's Mazowiecki government which has apparently successfully implemented far-reaching reforms in that country.³¹⁰ The Kremlin's latest plan to implement price reforms was shelved in June after it sparked a wave of panic buying from Moscow to Vladivostok.³¹¹ The economic situation has now become so desperate that a coalition effort is said to be in the works between advisers of Mikhail Gorbachev and those of Boris Yeltsin, men whose political outlooks often differ sharply.³¹² Recent reports indicate that Gorbachev is once again seeking to implement more radical economic reforms and may be using Yeltsin to push forward reforms that have been repeatedly blocked by conservative opponents in his government.³¹³ Kremlin leaders have repeatedly hesitated to go forward with such radical reforms for fear of unleashing nationwide political chaos; whether they will be able to successfully implement such measures now is highly doubtful.

There has been much speculation over ultimate Soviet objectives within "new thinking" and over whether Mikhail Gorbachev is operating based upon some "master plan." These questions will remain a mystery, and no longer matter much. These days, Gorbachev has no time for long-term planning; he is merely reacting to an unending series of problems in a herculean struggle to salvage not just the Soviet economy, but to save the Soviet Union itself. Against this background, the ultimate success of "perestroika" is far

³¹⁰ New York Times, 26 April 1990. Quoted in Aurel Braun and Richard B. Day, "Gorbachevian Contradictions," Problems of Communism (May-June 1990): 45.

³¹¹ Michael Dobbs, "The Amazing, Death-Defying Mikhail Gorbachev," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 23-29 July 1990, 18.

³¹² LeMonde, 6 June 1990. Quoted in Elizabeth Teague, "Gorbachev Advisers Meet Secretly with Opposition Leaders," Report on the USSR, 22 June 1990, 1-2.

³¹³ Daniel Sneider, "Gorbachev-Yeltsin Pact Shifts Political Balance," Christian Science Monitor, 14 August 1990, 4.

from certain and frankly seems more doubtful with each passing day. Regardless of the ultimate outcome of "perestroika," Mikhail Gorbachev has irreversibly altered the modern Soviet state; he has also had a tremendous impact on reorienting the world political order. It is entirely possible that the political revolutions which erupted in Eastern Europe in 1989 would have eventually occurred without the influence of Gorbachev, but without him they would likely have been delayed for many years to come. For four decades, the United States and the Soviet Union icily stared at each other over the immense fortifications erected during the Cold War. Now, in August 1990, Gorbachev himself has declared that the Cold War is over, and that his country and all others must move to reorient their international policies.³¹⁴ The two superpowers seem increasingly less worried about the other's intentions, and more and more preoccupied with domestic political matters. One of the starkest indications of the impact of Gorbachev's reforms is the newfound cooperation which has emerged in most matters between the United States and the Soviet Union in a manner unprecedented in the post-World War Two era. No matter what one thinks about Gorbachev as a man or as a leader, the impact he has had on international affairs is indisputable. Even if he were to be ousted from the Kremlin tomorrow, Mikhail Gorbachev's first five years in office will forever stand out as a watershed period in world history.

³¹⁴Michael Dobbs, "The Amazing, Death-Defying Mikhail Gorbachev," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 23-29 July 1990, 18.

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